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Abstract
It is widely accepted that most natural language expressions do not have
precise universally agreed definitions that fix their meanings. Except in
the case of certain technical terminology, humans use terms in a variety
of ways that are adapted to different contexts and perspectives. Hence,
even when conversation participants share the same vocabulary and agree
on fundamental taxonomic relationships (such as subsumption and mutual
exclusivity), their view on the specific meaning of terms may differ signi-
ficantly. Moreover, even individuals themselves may not hold permanent
points of view, but rather adopt different semantics depending on the par-
ticular features of the situation and what they wish to communicate.
In this thesis, we analyse logical and representational aspects of the
semantic variability of natural language terms. In particular, we aim to
provide a formal language adequate for reasoning in settings where different
agents may adopt particular standpoints or perspectives, thereby narrowing
the semantic variability of the vague language predicates in different ways.
For that purpose, we present standpoint logic, a framework for inter-
preting languages in the presence of semantic variability. We build on
supervaluationist accounts of vagueness, which explain linguistic indeterm-
inacy in terms of a collection of possible interpretations of the terms of the
language (precisifications). This is extended by adding the notion of stand-
point, which intuitively corresponds to a particular point of view on how to
interpret vague terminology, and may be taken by a person or institution in
a relevant context. A standpoint is modelled by sets of precisifications com-
patible with that point of view and does not need to be fully precise. In this
way, standpoint logic allows one to articulate finely grained and structured
stipulations of the varieties of interpretation that can be given to a vague
concept or a set of related concepts and also provides means to express
relationships between different systems of interpretation.
After the specification of precisifications and standpoints and the con-
sideration of the relevant notions of truth and validity, a multi-modal logic
language for describing standpoints is presented. The language includes
a modal operator s for each standpoint s, such that s φ means that a
proposition φ is unequivocally true according to the standpoint s — i.e. φ
iv
is true at all precisifications compatible with s. We provide the logic with
a Kripke semantics and examine the characteristics of its intended models,
of the class MS0 . Furthermore, we prove the soundness, completeness and
decidability of standpoint logic with an underlying propositional language,
and show that the satisfiability problem is NP-complete. We subsequently
illustrate how this language can be used to represent logical properties and
connections between alternative partial models of a domain and different
accounts of the semantics of terms.
As proof of concept, we explore the application of our formal framework
to the domain of forestry, and in particular, we focus on the semantic vari-
ability of ‘forest’. In this scenario, the problematic arising of the assignation
of different meanings has been repeatedly reported in the literature, and it
is especially relevant in the context of the unprecedented scale of publicly
available geographic data, where information and databases, even when os-
tensibly linked to ontologies, may present substantial semantic variation,
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The fact that natural language terms do not have precise universally agreed definitions
that fix their meanings is widely accepted. Instead, their applicability is unclear and it
may vary depending on the context and pragmatics of use; there are borderline cases
where it is a matter of judgement whether a term should be applied or not.
Semantic variation occurs in different ways, such as shifts in the thresholds of ap-
plicability of terms like ‘tall’, and fluctuations in the sense with which words like ‘game’
are used. In practice, the particular semantics that a term acquires in a natural or arti-
ficial scenario can be bounded both by explicit compliance to definitions or conceptual
models and by implicit commitments derived from the previous usage of the term. For
example, by asserting that ‘Tim is tall’, an agent implicitly commits to his threshold
for tallness to be lower than Tim’s height.
As a consequence of the variability, language users that share the same vocabulary
may differ in the specific semantics that they give to terms in a particular situation,
even if they agree on essential relationships (such as subsumption or mutual exclusivity)
and on the truth or falsity of a wide range of predications. For instance, two agents may
agree that ‘Tim is tall’ and yet they may have different standpoints on the threshold
for tallness; hence they could disagree on other predications. Moreover, individuals
do not tend to hold permanent and precise interpretations of the meaning of terms
themselves [EdGR13], wherewith the problem is not only the interoperability between
agents but also the semantic variability with which the same agent may use natural
language terms in different scenarios.
Humans seem to cope with the Semantic Variability of Natural Language Terms
(SVoNLT) by making use of context and other pragmatic information to narrow the
range of possible interpretations, generally achieving successful (or at least acceptable)
information exchange and reasoning. How we do this has been a long-lasting question,
and there is as yet little consensus, even regarding the basic principles and mechan-
isms that are involved. Investigations into this issue are fuelled by several motivations,
some linked to philosophical inquiry (for example, that raised by the sorites paradox1),
and others to current challenges in domains like information processing. Despite the
1The sorites paradox or the heap paradox is discussed in chapter 2, section 2.2.1. In a nutshell, it
starts with a heap and, by iterating the assumption that ‘if we remove one grain from a heap we still
have a heap’, it reaches the paradoxical conclusion that a single grain is a heap.
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advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI), current limitations in automated language un-
derstanding hinder the integration and synthesis of a large amount of the information
and knowledge that humans make use of through natural language.
The topic of the Semantic Variability of Natural Language Terms (SVoNLT) has
consequently been approached within a highly interdisciplinary area of research, going
from philosophy to linguistics, cognitive science and AI. Philosophical interest dates well
back to Ancient Greek philosophy [Ari55, Ath93] and contemporary authors often refer
to it as the vagueness of natural language. One traditional view is that the imprecision
of terms presents an obstruction to good philosophy [Fre48], and should be circumvented
by establishing precise definitions. In contrast, views of human language becoming
prominent in the 20th century (e.g. [Gri75, Wit09]) have accepted the SVoNLT as
a fundamental feature of human communication1, and numerous logical theories of
vagueness have been proposed to model different aspects of it. To date, some of the
most popular logico-philosophical approaches are based on many-valued logics [Tar80],
mainly fuzzy logic [Zad75, Zad65], epistemic frameworks [Wil99] and supervaluation
semantics [Fin75]. Meanwhile, in the field of cognitive science, conceptual models have
been proposed (e.g. conceptual spaces [Ga¨r04]), as well as accounts of the processes
of concept formation, manipulation and understanding [GL05]. Finally, research on
computational linguistics and AI has embraced the challenge of semantic heterogeneity
as key to language understanding and have delivered substantial advances in strategies
for representation and resolution of the meanings of terms in context [Nav09].
Given the variety of approaches and techniques, it is not surprising that there is,
to date, no one way of representing natural language terms or concepts that performs
well in all situations when the phenomenon arises. While some techniques do well at
disambiguation within big corpora, others allow for formal reasoning and inference.
Some are cognitively valid (supported by cognitive evidence) and applicable in research
with humans while others are good for handling significant amounts of data.
1Some research suggests that not only it is not a deficit of natural language, but it may enable
more efficient communication [Zip49, PTG12], being, therefore, an advantageous feature.
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1.2 Overview of the problem
1.2.1 Statement of the problem
This project is concerned with elucidating the logical mechanisms that underlie com-
munication involving the use of semantically heterogeneous terms. In particular, we
aim to develop a logic formalism suitable for knowledge representation and reasoning
with vocabularies whose terms display semantic variability.
We explore how different agents can establish their standpoints on the meaning
of terms, that typically involve narrowing the admissible variability in their semantics
while not necessarily fixing a sharp interpretation, and possibly setting general con-
straints that must hold on the domain. Natural reasoning tasks involving standpoints
include gathering unequivocal or undisputed knowledge, knowledge that is relative to
a standpoint or a set of them, and contrasting the knowledge that can be inferred from
different standpoints.
Furthermore, our attention with regards to the semantic heterogeneity lays not
only on variations in degree but also in qualitative aspects such as the cases where the
set of attributes that determine the applicability of a predicate is contentious. Also,
rather than seeking a strategy for the ‘resolution’ of the semantic variability, we are
interested in a framework with which we can perform general-purpose representation
and reasoning tasks with semantically variable terms.
1.2.2 Semantic variability notions
In line with the stated problem, we intend to establish explicit criteria of consistency
for sets of statements involving the use of semantically variable terms. Such statements
can be relative to the admissible variability in the whole language or with respect to
specific standpoints. The following are the kind of statements that we are seeking to
represent:
N1. ”It is unequivocal that φ.”
N2. ”In some sense φ.”
N3. ”It is definite whether φ (or not φ).”
N4. ”It is borderline that φ.”
4
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N5. ”According to s, [it is unequivocal that] φ.”
N6. ”According to s, in some sense φ.”
N7. ”According to s, it is definite whether φ (or not φ).”
N8. ”According to s, it is borderline that φ.”
N9. ”Whatever is unequivocal according to s is also unequivocal according to s’. In
other words, standpoint s’ is sharper or more precise than standpoint s.”
In the former sentences, φ is an independent clause and s and s’ are standpoints.
The notions ‘unequivocal’ and ‘in some sense’ should be self-explanatory, by ‘definite’
we mean that φ is either unequivocally the case or unequivocally not the case, and
‘borderline’ that φ is in some sense the case and in some sense not the case. Finally,
a standpoint reads as a particular interpretation or narrowing of the semantics of the
language, which may be taken by an agent in a particular context. E.g. ‘According
to the standpoint that Anna took when she was in the classroom, Silvia is tall’. Note
that a standpoint does not represent an agent or a context as such; it only represents
a particular sharpening of the variability of the language, which can be specified and
used by different agents in different scenarios.
1.2.3 Motivation
The SVoNLT, in different shapes like the sorites paradox and polysemy, causes problems
for sound communication and reasoning, which has been observed by philosophers since
ancient times. Far from being only problematic to solve deep philosophical questions,
it creates difficulties in various research fields, among them Knowledge Representation.
While the applied research on the topic is broad, a large extent focuses on comput-
ing contextualised or prototypical meanings, on selecting the intended senses of terms
in use and on establishing metrics to grade phenomena that are typically presumed
to be binary. Examples of the latter include assigning degrees of truth or probabil-
ity distributions to vague predications and graded membership to instances of vague
categories.
In contrast, in this research we focus on applications where retaining classical reas-
oning is desired, and where the object of interest involves handling fine-grained symbolic
5
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perspectives on the semantics of terms, knowing what can be inferred from the consen-
sual semantics of sets of agents or which standpoints are compliant with a partial truth
among others. In this way, we hope that this framework has interesting applications in
scenarios where binary or qualitative reasoning is preferred over approximations.
Consequently, we approach the problem of the SVoNLT from a different angle from
most of the research on the topic, thereby providing a framework that can be thought of
as complementary to other strategies for representation. We base our framework on a
well established philosophical theory of vagueness, supervaluationism, for which, despite
its reasonable success in the philosophical literature, there have been only mild attempts
to turn it into an operational framework for automated knowledge representation and
reasoning.
Finally, we put forward the idea that the logical mechanisms that we study in this
thesis have interesting practical applications. For instance, in scientific domains were
rigorous definitions and consistent data are necessary, scientists are often required to
(partially) ‘precisify’ vague terms for the pursuit of their investigation. This process
is non-trivial and depends on the domain and purpose of use, thereby leading to a
multiplicity of characterisations of the terms. Unsurprisingly, problems arise when the
interoperation of different standpoints is needed, as reported in a variety of domains
such as engineering [CGV11] and forestry [CBL16, Gra08]. We will use the latter for
our application scenario.
1.3 Application scenario in forestry
We illustrate the scenes that we want to model and reason about with an application
scenario in the domain of forestry, in which a broad range of forest concepts and defin-
itions have been specified for different purposes, leading to discrepancies of estimates
([Gra08, CBL16]) and to the consequent confusion over both the global forest extent
and its spatial distribution [Ful06, GZR05].
This has been recognised to be one of the key challenges [BHHR18] preventing the
integrated use of the more and more datasets (e.g. [HPM+13]), portals (e.g. Global
Forest Watch) and ontologies (e.g. EnvO ontology) that have recently emerged for
enabling the tracking, comparing and understanding of the available information on
land use-cover and global forest extent.
Our application scenario involves the analysis and representation of the semantic
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variation of the term forest, including both matters of degree and conceptual diver-
gencies that stem from the different domains and purposes for which the concept is
defined. In particular, we focus on the representation of established definitions in the
domain. Moreover, we discuss four use cases for a framework to be used in conjunction
with existing datasets, portals and ontologies:
UC1. Reasoning and querying data with varying standpoints. This involves the capacity
to interpret a dataset according to different standpoints on the relevant objects
to which the data refers. In particular, we analyse how an agent can establish
standpoints on the semantics of forest that comply with reference definitions in
order to analyse the results in forest cover from a dataset, namely [HPM+13],
according to different interpretations. Moreover, we explore how an agent can
establish intermediate standpoints and relations to investigate the implications of
different semantic commitments between those definitions.
UC2. Reasoning with multiple underlying standpoints. This involves the capacity to de-
termine when a proposition is unequivocally true, regardless of which standpoint
is taken on the semantics of the terms involved. In this use case, we analyse how
an agent can establish definite or potential deforestation alerts depending on the
(semantic) unequivocability of the deforestation process with respect to a set of
reference definitions and data sources.
UC3. Publishing knowledge relative to an interpretation. This involves the capacity of
an agent or a system to distribute knowledge that is dependent on a particular
semantic interpretation, in the assumption that more than one interpretation
may exist or be necessary to characterise the domain. We explore scenarios in
the domain of forestry where such interpretation is typically provided in natural
language, but partial aspects can be formalised with our framework enriching the
representations. Or where we infer complex knowledge from observational data
using a particular standpoint, which may be useful for other research.
One must remark that the issues that arise in this application scenario are some-
what different from those in informal conversational settings. In this case, standpoints
concerning the meaning of forest belong to institutions or scientific communities that
produce and distribute data. While in common-sense applications rough meaning is of-
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ten sufficient, here a more precise analysis of the implications of choosing one or another
interpretation is required, and potential data conflicts need to be resolved [BHHR18].
1.4 Achievements and contributions
The main achievements and contributions of this research can be summarised as follows:
1. The development of a novel modal logic framework, standpoint logic,
based on the well known logico-philosophical framework supervaluation
semantics. Standpoint logic is intended as a reasoning system for Knowledge
Representation (KR), particularly in scenarios where agents or systems need to
represent and reason about the different semantics that they give to natural lan-
guage terms. We analyse the characteristics of the framework, its fundamental
elements, namely precisifications and standpoints, and the relevant notions of
truth and validity. While we take a modal approach to supervaluationism, in line
with previous work on the subject, we separate ourselves from previous research
on axiomatisations of supervaluational modalities in order to accommodate the
notion of standpoint, which is central in our study. As such, not only standpoint
logic is a multi-modal framework, but also its modalities respond to different
schemas than those proposed in previous work. We provide detailed examples of
the capacities of the framework to reason about different forms of semantic vari-
ability, such as graded predicates like ‘tall’ and qualitative variations as in ‘game’,
and with different standpoint arrangements and the relations between them.
2. The stipulation of its syntax and semantics, together with proofs of
soundness, completeness, decidability and complexity, going further than
previous work on modal supervaluationist frameworks. We specify a formal lan-
guage, syntax and semantics for Standpoint Logic with a propositional base lan-
guage; we discuss the proof theory, where the most characteristic features are
the interaction axioms AS4 and AS5. These are stronger than the well known
A4 and A5 and correspond to what we call trans-transitive and trans-euclidean
relations in the Kripke models. Moreover, the multiple modalities are partially
ordered under the subset relation, which corresponds to axiom AP and encodes
the sharper relation that can hold between standpoints (notion N9). We prove
the soundness, completeness and decidability of propositional standpoint logic,
8
1.5 The structure of this thesis
and establish the complexity of the satisfiability problem as NP-complete. This
is a ‘good’ result that is a consequence of the stronger interaction axioms AS4
and AS5 and contrasts with the higher complexity of other multi-modal logics
such as epistemic logic, that is PSPACE-complete. Finally, we also provide the
syntax and semantics for standpoint logic with more expressive underlying logics,
namely description logic and first-order logic.
3. The study of an application scenario in the domain of Forestry. In order
to illustrate the applicability of standpoint logic, we have explored an application
scenario (as introduced in 1.3) that tackles the difficulties that the semantic vari-
ability of the term forest poses in the context of the scientific multidisciplinarity
of the forestry domain. In addressing it, we proceed to analyse the literature on
ontological issues of geographical objects and determine three main aspects that
the different standpoints may represent, namely the classification, individuation
and demarcation of forests. We then provide formal representations for stand-
points corresponding to selected definitions and characterisations of forest from
leading organisations that map into publicly available data. Finally, we illustrate
how the framework can handle the four use cases through different reasoning tasks
on the created standpoint knowledge base.
1.5 The structure of this thesis
The organisation of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 provides the background and
literature review of this research. This begins with a broad historical introduction to
the study of vagueness and the semantic variability of language (in section 2.2), followed
by the specification of what is meant by the Semantic Variability of Natural Language
Terms (SVoNLT) and which phenomena fall under its umbrella (in section 2.3). We
continue with the literature review, which considers the main contemporary theories
and approaches to the problem (in section 2.4), mostly focusing on logical theories of
vagueness, and finally we look at relevant formal logic frameworks (in section 2.5). This
includes a recollection of preliminary work for this thesis, a review of modal frameworks
for supervaluationism and vagueness and finally a discussion of other related logic
frameworks to this research.
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Chapter 3 is devoted to the presentation of the standpoint framework, which ini-
tiates with the motivation (in section 3.2) and a general overview (in section 3.3).
Subsequently we proceed to the specification and analysis of its key elements, namely
precisifications (in section 3.4) and standpoints (in section 3.5). Then, we establish the
relevant notions of truth and validity (in section 3.6) and finally we briefly consider the
phenomenon of higher-order vagueness (in section 3.7), which we do not model in our
framework.
Chapter 4 provides the formal framework for the multi-modal standpoint logic.
After a brief introduction (in section 4.1), propositional standpoint logic (S0) is presen-
ted (in section 4.2) and its syntax, proof theory and semantics are given. In addition,
the class MS0 of simplified Kripke models is declared and its correspondence with the
axiomatisation is shown. Subsequently, we proceed to prove soundness and complete-
ness of S0 with respect to the class MS0 of models (in section 4.3) and we present
decidability and complexity results (in section 4.4). We then conclude the chapter by
considering more expressive underlying logics (in section 4.5), namely first-order logic
and description logics.
Chapter 5 explores how can standpoint logic be used in order to represent different
forms of semantic variability, and illustrates it with examples and formalisations. We
begin by considering an adaptation of a propositional syllogism (in section 5.2) and
then proceed to illustrate representations of ‘sorites’ or graded predicates (in section
5.3) and of conceptual or non-numerical vagueness in (in section 5.4). Following, we
consider penumbral connections between the representations (in section 5.5) and then
we inspect other aspects that do not fall under the umbrella of the SVoNLT, namely
context, generality and ambiguity (in section 5.6). We finish the chapter by introducing
the relations that may hold between standpoints and some combinations that can be
performed with them (in section 5.7) and lastly the formulation of an appropriate
normal form for standpoint formulae (in section 5.8).
Chapter 6 explores an application scenario in the domain of forestry, addressing the
reported challenges that the variability of terms like ‘forest’ pose for scientific and public
knowledge acquisition. We first provide a background for the problem, as reported in
the forestry research (in section 6.1) and then consider the representational challenges
(in section 6.2), drawing on the literature of geographic objects and concluding with
some formal representations. We then establish a set of use cases (in section 6.4) and
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we illustrate the reasoning tasks that can be done with the former representations. We
conclude the chapter with a consideration of challenges, opportunities and limitations
(in section 6.5).
Finally, chapter 7 concludes this thesis with a brief recapitulation of its structure
and main contributions (in section 7.1), a summary of further work (in section 7.2) and
the conclusion (in section 7.3).
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The Semantic Variability of Natural Language Terms (SVoNLT) has been studied from
a range of perspectives, with different motivations and at various levels of detail. The
problem is open and well known in the domains of AI and computer science, with
active research in areas such as Word Sense Disambiguation (WSD) and knowledge
integration. Preceding the contemporary interest, the literature on the topic has a long
tradition dating back to Ancient Greek philosophy. While much of the philosophical
research has focused on the study of natural language, often in relation to logic, the
state of the art is mostly driven by the technical challenges posed by the phenomenon,
particularly for the automated handling of natural language terms and discourse. As
such, the literature on the topic is rich, historic and widely multidisciplinary.
In this chapter we provide the context for this research. We begin, in section 2.2,
with an introduction of the study area and its progression, intended to provide the
general background to the topic by revisiting the historical interest that the SVoNLT
has awaken. We continue in section 2.3 with a clarification of the terminology and a
broader explanation of the phenomena that we want to model. Subsequently, in section
2.4 we analyse the main theoretical frameworks for modelling the SVoNLT. Given the
breadth of the domain, we will primarily focus on the developments in philosophical
frameworks dealing with vagueness, but we will also briefly consider other formalisms
and tools that have been developed to tackle different aspects of the SVoNLT. Finally,
we discuss relevant formal frameworks and previous work in section 2.5.
2.2 A brief historical introduction
In the study of the SVoNLT, the philosophical analysis of vagueness has been central.
This section draws from the historical accounts provided in [Wil94] and [KS96a] (to
which the reader should refer for a more detailed discussion) on the philosophical study
of vagueness. Moreover, as we will see in section 2.3, we consider the SVoNLT to be a
broader phenomenon than some philosophical accounts of vagueness. Hence we discuss
here other relevant issues, most notably a last period where emerging applications in AI
prompt the loss of centrality of philosophical issues in the debate (such as the analysis
of higher-order vagueness1) in favour of a broader and more multidisciplinary focus in
1Higher-order vagueness is discussed in chapter 3, section 3.7
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the research on the SVoNLT.
2.2.1 Early history and introduction to the sorites paradox
Theoretical interest in language dates well back to ancient Greek philosophy. While
philosophical reflections arose in the context of other kinds of inquiry, the analysis
of language became abstract, focused and systematic with Aristotle and the Stoics,
who also did extensive work in the area of logic [Ade13]. Indeed, since its origins, the
history of the philosophy of language has often been closely related to that of logic, to
the extent that the boundaries between them have often been elusive.
With regards to the SVoNLT, Aristotle focused on the notion of ambiguity [Hin59].
He distinguished two different kinds of phenomena that were denoted by the term
and needed different theoretical treatment: on the one hand, what Hintikka calls ‘the
multiplicity of applications’ [Hin59], here referred as polysemy, by which a word has
multiple and correlated senses; On the other hand, ‘mere ambiguity’ or homonymy,
by which words may have two or more distinct meanings like in the paradigmatic
example of bank. Alternative distinctions and confusion between both phenomena have
prevailed in subsequent philosophical and linguistic literature about the variability of
natural language, and will be discussed in the following section (subsections 2.3.4 and
2.3.5.3) in order to avoid terminological confusion.
Even more influential to subsequent developments on the study of the SVoNLT
was the formulation of the Sorites paradox (also known as the slippery slope paradox),
attributed to a contemporary of Aristotle, Eubulides [KS96a], and which has played
a major role in the contemporary analysis of vagueness. The sorites paradox uses the
example of a heap (soros in Greek) and goes:
‘If we have a heap of sand and we remove one grain, we still have a heap of
sand. So take a heap and remove grains one by one, until there is a single
grain left. You will absurdly infer that such grain is still a heap of sand.’
[KS96a]
The paradox relies on the intuition that a single grain does not make a difference
to whether something is a heap. Yet, even though a person would not even perceive
the removal of one grain, after performing over and over the same operation we are left
14
2.2 A brief historical introduction
with a single grain1. Arguments with a sorites structure can be formalised in classical
logic, so that premises that appear clearly true yield to a clearly false conclusion: that
one grain of sand is a heap.
This formulation became paradigmatic in the analysis of vagueness, which has been
described as the phenomenon characterised by the presence of borderline cases in the ap-
plicability of predicates. The paradox motivated not only philosophical inquiry among
the stoics, but also in subsequent and contemporary research on vagueness, and will be
discussed further in section 2.3.2.
2.2.2 Approaches within the analytic tradition
After a long period without major interest in the topic, the so-called ‘Linguistic Turn’ in
Anglo-American philosophy took place in the mid nineteenth century and drew back a
great attention to language, which came to be seen as a ‘a focal point in understanding
belief and representation of the world’ and a ‘medium of conceptualisation’ [Wol10].
The early years of the analytic tradition were highly marked by the positivist agenda
and a high regard to science and the ideal of precision. It was under such circumstances
that the interest in the SVoNLT (or rather on the lack of precision of natural language)
arouse back, and that the notion of vagueness became established as being the phe-
nomenon exemplified in the sorites paradox. Russel, in ‘Vagueness’ [Rus23], made the
technical sense of vagueness canonical, providing the first systematical analysis of the
problem in something close to its current form [Wil94].
Around the mid twentieth century, the analytic tradition shows a notorious shift
towards ordinary language philosophy, pushing the focus of philosophical inquiry to
natural language in use, rather than towards its relation to formal logic. The SVoNLT
began to be seen as a feature providing flexibility to language rather than a deficiency,
and logic got questioned as an adequate tool for investigating it. Examples of spe-
cific accounts of the SVoNLT along these lines are the family resemblance concepts of
Wittgenstein [Wit09] and Waismann’s open-texture concepts [Wai45].
At the same time, the first formal accounts of vagueness started to be developed;
Max Black provided the first formal framework for the treatment of vagueness in natural
language [Bla37], according to which the correctness of the use of a vague predicate is
1In the antiquity it was formulated in the constructive order and with a series of questions: ‘Does
a grain of wheat make a heap? Do two grains? Do n grains?’ [Wil94]
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equated to the ‘statistical conformity with the behaviour of a certain group of users’. In
this way, his work aimed to integrate the idea of meaning as use while still providing a
systematic framework for its treatment, yet it raised objections over conflating statistics
about the contingent use of terms with the abstract notion of logical validity 1. Later,
in [Meh58], Mehlberg continues the investigation of the relation between vagueness
and truth, and in particular of the logical status of indeterminate statements. For that
purpose, he provides an account of vagueness that can be considered supervaluationistic
in essence, according to which a vague term ‘can be characterised tentatively as one
the correct use of which is compatible with several distinct interpretations’.
The former discussions generated a subsequent explosion of philosophical interest
in the 1970s that gave rise to the development of contemporary formal theories of
vagueness2, most of which are non-classical in nature. Those are commonly grouped in
epistemic views of vagueness, many-valued logics and supervaluationist theories, and
will be discussed in detail in section 2.4, as they constitute the main theoretical back-
ground of this research (in particular the supervaluationist approach section 2.4.1).
Likewise, nihilist positions concluding that the sorites paradox is unsolvable were not-
ably explored by Dummett [Dum75] and Wright (eg [Wri87]) among others. Finally, in
recent years, the focus of philosophical investigations of vagueness moved towards the
‘unsolved’ problem of higher-order vagueness (section 3.7), into whether vagueness is
exclusively linguistic or there may be vague objects (‘de dicto’ and ‘de re’ vagueness),
and to the role of context in vagueness, which is overviewed in chapter 5, section 5.6.1.
Overall, this subsection illustrates the history of the development of the main formal
approaches to vagueness in the philosophical tradition. Those (supervaluationism,
many-valued theories of truth and the epistemic view) will be discussed further in sec-
tion 2.4, where we will justify using supervaluationism as the basis for our framework.
Moreover, one may notice that the theories introduced here arise from the philosophical
investigation of truth with regards to propositions involving vague predicates, rather
than as computational frameworks. As such, subsequent developments on formal meth-
1Black modified his position in [Bla63], dropping his revision of logic, yet his work was significant
and probabilistic approaches to vagueness are today established.
2Vagueness is often understood as being both single-dimensional and multi-dimensional. Therefore
the notion can be considered to be analogous to that of SVoNLT. In practice, however, the philosophical
literature on vagueness has a very strong focus on single-dimensional vagueness and the sorites paradox,
and often the phenomenon of multi-dimensionality is only briefly mentioned and not compared to other
phenomena such as polysemy or ambiguity in a rigorous way.
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ods and implementations will be discussed separately, in section 2.5.
2.2.3 Multidisciplinarity and shift of the focus towards applied work
Meanwhile, roughly simultaneously with the development of the first (proto) formalism
for vagueness, major developments were happening in other domains of science. The
first digital computers were created in the 1930s and soon later, in the 50s, the domain
of Artificial Intelligence (AI) became established, giving rise to new motivations for the
study of the SVoNLT. In terms of techniques, the advances in AI meant, on the one
hand, that for the first time logical frameworks could be used for automated logical
deduction. On the other, it provided the technical means for other kinds of non-binary
representation, notably machine learning algorithms.
As AI, and notably the field of Knowledge Representation (KR)1, became a play-
ground for the application of existing logical theories and frameworks, it became evid-
ent that some problems that had not been previously considered (such as the semantic
representation of whole domains of knowledge or the interoperation between different
vocabularies and logic theories), raised challenging issues in applied scenarios. In the
particular case of vagueness, most of the philosophical literature was focussed on the
formal analysis of the sorites paradox, yet most instances of semantic variability can
not be cleanly formalised in this way. Since then, the KR community has worked on
modelling vagueness in a broader sense that is better aligned with the representational
challenges that emerge in the computing domain, although the research in the domains
of mathematics, philosophy and KR regarding logical frameworks is closely intertwined.
Moreover, the need for creating rich representations of knowledge and the simultan-
eous move in linguistics from behaviourism towards constructivism (with Chomsky’s
generative grammars) resulted in the emergence of the new interdisciplinary field of
cognitive science emerge. In subsequent years, the multidisciplinary work led to an
explosion of sub-fields, and, as such, the domains now involved in the area of modelling
the semantics of natural language terms range from Philosophy and Linguistics to a
broader academic arena also including Cognitive Science, Psychology, AI and all the
intersections: computational linguistics, cognitive linguistics, psycho-linguistics, etc.
1KR is the subfield of AI that is concerned with representing information such that a computer
system can perform automated reasoning with it in order to solve complex problems. It incorporates
findings from logic as well as inspiration from psychology and cognitive science about how humans
solve these problems.
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For the analysis of the SVoNLT, this led to the wide-ranging scene of the research
in the topic today, which we will overview in section 2.4. Moreover, it motivated
a noticeable shift from studying vagueness and the SVoNLT in order to have a good
understanding of language towards the urge to solve specific (and often mundane) tasks
which, however, test established theories and their applicability. Since then, studies on
the SVoNLT have broadened in scope: they have included psychological tests and
computational simulations of behaviour, general theories of representation that deal
with the SVoNLT (implicitly and explicitly) have been proposed and more methods
for resolution have rested on empirical and behavioural evidence. Perhaps the most
salient domain looking into the SVoNLT today is Natural Language Processing (Natural
Language Processing (NLP)), in particular the sub-field of Word Sense Disambiguation
(WSD).
2.3 The Semantic Variability of Natural Language Terms
(SVoNLT)
Following the overview of the study of the SVoNLT, we proceed to provide an explicit
account of what the ‘Semantic Variability of Natural Language Terms’ stands for, given
that the specific phenomena under study varies across the literature. Hence, in this
section we aim to clarify what the SVoNLT refers to in the context of this research,
and we overview the different elements that we consider that fall under its umbrella.
2.3.1 Terminology
The terminology used for the notions related to the semantic variability is, perhaps
unsurprisingly, as diverse as the different approaches from which this feature of natural
language has been studied. Different terms are linked to different domains of study and
emphasise different aspects of this phenomena.
In this work, we have decided to adopt the notion of ‘Semantic Variability of Natural
Language Terms (SVoNLT)’. This is an unconventional jargon, particularly taking into
account that we mostly draw on philosophical and logical literature on vagueness. We
make this move to highlight the shift from the philosophical study of the sorites paradox
towards a more practical aim of supporting knowledge representation mechanisms for
scenarios involving semantically heterogeneous languages.
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In what follows, we will call the Semantic Variability of Natural Language Terms
(SVoNLT) to the phenomenon by which the meanings of natural language terms do
not have precise definitions that fix their meanings; that is, neither their intension or
extension1 are well defined. Consequently, there are scenarios in which it is inherently
unsettled whether a proposition is true or false, which are often referred as borderline
cases of application, and where underdeterminacy is not a consequence of the lack of
information or knowledge about the world, but rather of the lack of semantic precision
of the proposition. This area of borderline applicability of vague predicates makes room
for speakers to use terms and make judgements from a variety of perspectives, making
further semantic commitments that are relevant to the context of use and other factors.
With regards to the phenomena that we consider that fall under the umbrella of the
SVoNLT, we include: all the variants of vagueness as discussed in philosophy, that is,
single-dimensional, multi-dimensional and conceptual or non-numerical vagueness; and
polysemy, which we understand as a similar phenomenon to that of conceptual vague-
ness. On the contrary, we do not consider ambiguity, when understood as homonymy,
and generality. The rest of this section is devoted to the description of these notions.
2.3.2 Vagueness and the sorites paradox
‘A proposition is vague when there are possible states of things concerning
which it is intrinsically uncertain whether, had they been contemplated by
the speaker, he would have regarded them as excluded or allowed by the pro-
position. By intrinsically uncertain we mean not uncertain in consequence
of any ignorance of the interpreter, but because the speaker’s habits of
language were indeterminate.’ (Peirce, [Bal02]).
The former is Charles Sander Peirce’s entry for vague in the 1902 Dictionary of
Philosophy and Psychology [Bal02]. While there are varying definitions across the
literature [KS96b], the vagueness of a predicate is generally characterised as the pos-
session of some or all of the following features: the potential for borderline cases of
application, the lack of well defined extensions or boundary and the susceptibility to
1Intension and extension, in logic, are correlative words that indicate the reference of a term or
concept: intension indicates the internal content of a term or concept that constitutes its formal
definition; and extension indicates its range of applicability by naming the particular objects that it
denotes.
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Figure 2.1: Illustration of the slippery slope effect.
the sorites paradox1 (see Fig. 2.1). These features are strongly intertwined but not all
apply in some scenarios. A longer discussion on the differences can be found in [KS96b].
In this thesis, we mostly focus on the possibility of borderline cases of application, given
that not all vagueness is easily represented in the form of a sorites paradox and that
smooth fuzzy boundaries are not necessarily easy to establish, as we will see for cases
of multi-dimensional and conceptual or non-numerical vagueness.
Although definitions rarely specify it, most analysis of vagueness focus on the single-
dimensional case, where the applicability of a predicate depends on a specific parameter
and the thresholds that determine its truth or falsity are undetermined, thus potentially
creating borderline cases. Archetypal examples of single-dimensional vagueness are
the predicates ‘tall’, whose applicability depends on the property ‘height’, and ‘heap’,
whose applicability depends on the number of grains (assuming an appropriate spatial
arrangement).
Let us consider the case of ‘tallness’. The predicate ‘tall’ lacks well-defined exten-
sions, as there is no sharp boundary between tall people and people who are not tall.
Instead, there may be instances such as ‘Tina is tall’ that are borderline cases of applic-
ation. Moreover, with regards to the sorites paradox, let us imagine that it is clearly
true that ‘Nena is tall’. Then, it would be natural to assert that somebody who is 1mm
shorter than Nena is also tall. It is easy to see how, by repeatedly iterating such claim,
we would be forced to admit that any person is tall.
1Referred to a puzzle known as The Heap: Would you describe a single grain of wheat as a heap?
No. Two grains? No. ... You must admit the presence of a heap sooner or later, so where do you draw
the line? (Stanford Dictionary of Philosophy). The paradox is also formulated in the inverse way, so
that we repeatedly assert: If this is a heap and I remove one grain, then this is still a heap.
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2.3.3 Beyond single-dimensional vagueness
While single-dimensional examples of vagueness dominate the philosophical literature,
the semantic variability of most natural language terms can not be expressed in this
way, yet still fit the definition of vagueness that we provided the previous section.
Hence we consider multi-dimensional vagueness, which has been described as vague-
ness that manifests itself in multiple dimensions of the meaning of a predicate, in op-
position to the single dimension of examples such as ‘tall’. In [KS96a], Keefe gives the
example of ‘big’, which depends on both height and volume (when used to describe
people). Some recent literature studying multidimensional vagueness is [Ron11, Raf13]
and some applied work can be found in [Gri12, Qiz06]. In previous work we have
used the more general term sorites vagueness to describe the phenomena that occurs
when the applicability of a predicate depends on specific measurable parameters but
their thresholds are undetermined, hence combining both the notions of single and
multi-dimensional vagueness [GA´B17].
In contrast, let us consider the example of ‘Nice’, which doesn’t have a clear-cut
set of associated dimensions. Examples of this kind are abundant and arise when
there is a lack of clarity on which attributes or conditions are essential to the meaning
of a given term, so that it is controversial how it should be defined. Thus, there
is indeterminacy regarding to which property or logical combination of properties is
relevant to determining whether a concept is applicable.
We call this conceptual vagueness [Ben05, GA´B17] (also refered as non-numerical
vagueness [BC12]). In this case, the fact that there is not a total or even partial order
with which we can represent the cases where a vague predicate applies, through border-
line cases, to the cases where it does not apply, means that there is not a straightforward
way to formalise this vagueness in the form of a sorites paradox (unless some sort of
artificial similarity measure is computed).
For instance, this is the kind of vagueness that underlies the controversy about
whether what determines a ‘forest’ is its land cover or its land use (or different com-
binations of both). As it is often the case, both are highly intertwined, since the use
to which land can be put depends to a large extent on the material and ecological
properties of its land cover, and conversely the land cover depends substantially on the
use to which the land has been put.
Moreover, despite the fact that many (if not most) vague predicates display concep-
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tual vagueness to some extent, this variety has been mostly neglected in the dominant
literature on vagueness, perhaps because it is less attractive for logico-philosophical
analysis than the single dimensional case illustrated by the sorites paradox. Nonethe-
less, the phenomenon has received more attention from other philosophers of language
who have approached it in a more descriptive fashion. Indeed, family resemblance
concepts [Wit09] and open-texture theories [Wai45] illustrate this kind of phenomena,
although the authors did not consider logic to be an adequate tool for its investigation.
2.3.4 Polysemy
The phenomenon studied in linguistics and cognitive science under the name of polisemy
denotes the capacity for a sign (such as a word, phrase, or symbol) to have multiple
meanings or senses related by contiguity of meaning. Thus, if they where to be repres-
ented in a semantic field, polysemous terms would be closely clustered senses without
well defined boundaries as opposed to homonymous ones, which would be disjoint and
clearly separable [Tug93, VP06].
The accounts of the notion of polysemy in cognitive science and linguistic literat-
ure (e.g. [WPB05, VP06, RGMW02, KM02]) and that of conceptual or non-numerical
vagueness can be considered somewhat parallel. In the case of polysemy there is often
an underlying assumption that there is a set of senses, each of which can be listed and
(at least roughly) separated, as opposed to a single concept who’s semantics are highly
variable. However, it is acknowledged in linguistic research that determining the num-
ber of senses of a word, defining them, and saying where one ends and another begins
is non trivial and hence the idea of a well defined number of precise senses in polysemy
should be relaxed. Some of the most recent work in Word Sense Disambiguation (WSD)
goes further in this direction by completely avoiding the lists of senses and adopting ‘a
more Wittgensteinen approach’ that fits better with cognitive research, pointing at the
human ability to think flexibly [Dea88]. In this thesis we take a similar approach and
hence include polysemy in the general notion of SVoNLT.
2.3.5 Related (yet distinct) phenomena
We finish this section by reviewing some phenomena that are often discussed (and
sometimes confused) with vagueness in the literature, and that we do not consider to
fall under the umbrella of the SVoNLT. Those are generality, uncertainty due to a lack
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of knowledge and ambiguity when defined as equivalent to homonimy.
2.3.5.1 Generality
While in some of the literature in cognitive linguistics no clear distinction is made
between vagueness (and more generally the SVoNLT) and generality or underspecificity
(e.g. [Lak70, Tug93, Zha98]), here we do differentiate them sharply, on the basis that
generality does not necessarily display uncertainty in meaning.
For example, if we compare the statements ‘I am in my twenties’ and ‘I am 29’
we find that, although the first proposition is more general, it is not at all vague: It
is true for me being any age exactly within the twenties and false otherwise [Ben98].
Moreover, ‘I am in my twenties’ is more general than ‘I am 29’ just in the same way
that ‘I am 29’ is more general than ‘I am 29 years and 3 months old’, showing that there
is no obvious criteria to decide what is general and what is specific. Instead, generality
may be better understood as a relation that holds between propositions rather than a
characteristic of a proposition itself. ‘I am approaching 30’, however, is vague because
it doesn’t have a clear range of applicability.
While generality and vagueness have often been conflated in the linguistic literature
(e.g. [Tug93]), the distinction is generally recognised in the philosophical literature on
vagueness, since it was proposed by Russell [Rus23]. According to him, a proposition
is general when there is a well defined set of possible facts or states of the matter that
would verify it, as opposed to unclarity about which states of the matter satisfy the
proposition1 (different accounts have been provided, such as those of Pierce [Pie05] and
Burns [Bur95]). Consequently, we do not consider generality to be part of the SVoNLT,
yet we will briefly consider the representational issues in our framework (section 5.6.2)
when we tackle the expressive capabilities of the standpoint framework in chapter 5.
2.3.5.2 Uncertainty
We also differentiate vagueness and the SVoNLT from uncertainty due to lack of know-
ledge about the state of the matter: while the former refers to the variability with which
language applies to a known state of affairs, the latter considers the lack of knowledge
about the state of affairs itself.
1Curiously enough, it is reported in [Wil99] that Russell then contradicts himself confusing vague-
ness and generality when defining precision.
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“... when Tek is borderline tall, it does seem that the unclarity about
whether he is tall is not merely epistemic (i.e. such that there is a fact
of the matter, we just do not know it). For a start, no amount of further
information about his exact height (and the heights of others) could help us
decide whether he is tall. More controversially, it seems that there is no fact
of the matter here about which we are ignorant: rather, it is indeterminate
whether Tek is tall.” [KS96a]
Given that one of the main philosophical theories of vagueness is the epistemic
view[Wil94], the reader could think that this distinction is contentious in the literature.
Yet, the epistemic ignorance of [Wil94] refers again to the lack of knowledge about the
precise semantics of vague terms (which are presumed to exist), and hence of the criteria
of applicability of a predicate to a given state of the matter. As such, despite knowing
the exact height of Tek, we may be ignorant of the true threshold of applicability of the
predicate tall. The epistemic view of vagueness is discussed in more detail in section
2.4.2.1.
2.3.5.3 Ambiguity
Another phenomenon related to the SVoNLT but not considered part of it in this thesis
is ambiguity, which is generally defined as the existence of several meanings associated
to a single term. As introduced in 2.2.1, two different kinds of multiplicity are usually
distinguished: polysemy, as discussed previously, and homonymy.
Both polysemy and homonymy are studied in linguistics. While in the former
those senses are related by contiguity, in the later they convey unrelated meanings,
being often the result of mere linguistic coincidence. It can be interpreted that rather
than there being a term with different senses, there are two different terms which are
indistinguishable in their spelling [Tug93, VP06].
In the literature, ambiguity is usually described as either the conjunction of both
polysemy and homonymy (e.g. [Tug93, WPB05]) or as homonymy alone (e.g. [IW07,
Zha98]. Traditional strategies for ambiguity detection (e.g. conjunction reduction)
similarly adopt the latter approach (implicitly).
Despite previous attempts to clarify what we understand as ambiguity and to ana-
lyse its nature, research on the field reveals a lack of uniformity on its theoretical treat-
ment, accentuated by a tendency not to specify which are the commitments embodied
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in the proposed representation and resolution techniques. In this work we narrow the
meaning of ambiguity to the linguistic notion of homonymy and, moreover, we do not
consider it to be part of the SVoNLT. This is because, while ambiguity (i.e. homonymy)
is akin to conceptual vagueness and polysemy in that the semantic variation is qualitat-
ive (rather than graded), in this case the meanings are entirely distinct. Consequently,
rather than agents adopting different standpoints that narrow the semantics of terms in
different ways, they face a binary choice, or rather they use the same word for two con-
cepts. The underlying logic mechanisms are therefore different; further discussion on
the limitations of our framework for modelling ambiguity will be provided in chapter
5, section 5.6, and, in contrast, an example of a logic intended for representing this
phenomenon can be found in [WL16].
2.4 Theories of (and approaches to) the SVoNLT
After the clarification of the meaning of the SVoNLT and the discussion of the phenom-
ena that the notion covers in the previous section (2.3), we move back to the point where
our historical background ends. In this section, we overview the main contemporary
formal theories of vagueness, introduced in section 2.2.2. We focus on supervaluation-
ism, which is the underlying theory of standpoint logic, and we subsequently discuss
the epistemic view on vagueness and many-valued approaches. Finally, we consider a
set of alternative approaches that originate from a more multidisciplinary area of re-
search (introduced in 2.2.3), highlighting the differences between them and our subject
of interest.
2.4.1 Supervaluationism
According to the supervaluationist theory of vagueness, the failure of vague predicates
to divide the domain into two sets (its positive and negative extensions), neatly and
without a remainder, is explained by the fact that language can be precisely interpreted
in many different yet acceptable ways [KS96a]. The contested area that may origin-
ate between interpretations is considered a truth-value gap [Fin75], and the possible
interpretations are commonly referred to as precisifications.
Each precisification is an admissible yet arbitrary sharpening of the vague predicates
(e.g. one precisification could determine that 4 grains of sand make a heap) and it is
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as good as any other sharpening. This results in predications having an undetermined
truth value whenever they have borderline cases of application that can be sharpened
in different ways. Overall, supervaluation semantics is involved with the representation
and reasoning with such a set of possible sharpenings or classical interpretations of
vague terms.
An early proposal that vagueness could be analysed in terms of multiple precise
senses was made by Mehlberg in [Meh58] (as discussed in section 2.2.2). Lewis de-
fended the position in [Lew70] and, in [Dum75], Dummett provided a description of
the supervaluationistic approach and its attractions (which he rejected). Subsequently,
drawing from the formal semantics used by Frassen [vF68], Fine applied a similar model
to the analysis of vagueness in the influential [Fin75], and Kamp offered an analogous
approach from a linguistic perspective in [Kam75]. After that, supervaluationism has
become a popular theory of vagueness, which has been adopted by philosophers, logi-
cians and linguists. Yet, there have been little attempts of applying it in computational
scenarios.
A remarkable feature of the theory is that precisifications sharpen the semantics of
vague terms but do not interfere with non-borderline scenarios or facts [Fin75]. Con-
sequently, the precisification of a predicate must always validate what is unproblem-
atically true and falsify what is unproblematically false, including both non-borderline
cases of the predicate and penumbral connections. Penumbral connections are general
statements that constrain the way vague predicates can be sharpened, helping to avoid
implausible valuations of compound propositions . Examples of this are ‘someone that
is short is not tall’ and ‘anyone that is taller than a tall person is also tall’. In this
way, penumbral connections ensure that any sharpening of a vague predicate respects
certain laws or intuitions established in language use.
In order to support the former, supervaluationistic frameworks are not truth-functional.
The truth-valuation of a proposition is, instead, determined by the collection of all com-
plete precisifications of the language. In particular, a sentence is super-true iff true on
all precisifications, and super-false iff false on all of them. Let us consider the valuation
of some examples; Assuming that Tim is a borderline case of tallness, the proposition
‘Tim is tall or Tim is not tall’ is super-true because, wherever we set the threshold for
tallness, ‘Tim’ will be either tall or not tall. Conversely, ‘Tim is tall and Tim is not tall’
is super-false because there is no way to make the language precise without it leading
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to a contradiction. Furthermore, ‘Tim is tall and Tim is short’ is similarly super-false
if the appropriate penumbral connection is established.
One of the advantages of adopting supervaluationism is that it preserves classical
theorems (they are super-true because they hold in all the complete — hence, classical
— precisifications of the language) while the theory still provides the means for reason-
ing with vague predicates and borderline cases, as shown in the previous examples. The
main criticisms to the theory are mostly directed at its handling of the philosophical
problem of higher-order vagueness (see section 3.7) and at some proposed notions of
validity, which we will discuss in section 3.6. However, these objections are not relevant
for the aims of this thesis, given that the phenomenon of higher order vagueness does
not occur naturally in language and that in our framework a standard notion of modal
validity is used.
To conclude, we highlight some ways in which supervaluationism is an attractive
theory with regards to the problem of interest of this research. In the first place,
modelling vagueness through collections of admissible precise interpretations is not
only useful to represent the variability of language as a whole, but it can also be
applied to the notion of standpoint, which can be thought as a smaller collection of
interpretations that results from the sharpening of the general semantics of terms,
rending the framework suitable for multi-agent systems. Moreover, the preservation
of classical theorems and penumbral connections is useful for a variety of applications
like our forestry information use case, where different standpoints include a range of
constraints that must be strictly satisfied for facts to hold according to that view-point.
Finally, the acknowledgement that all admissible precisifications are true in some sense
and are on an equal footing (because language is genuinely vague) is well suited for
describing multi-agent scenarios where a different use of language does not imply that
one of the agents is misusing it, in contrast to the epistemic view (following in section
2.4.2.1).
2.4.2 Other formal theories of vagueness
In addition to supervaluationism, there are two other prominent philosophical ap-
proaches to vagueness, namely the epistemic view and many-valued theories.
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2.4.2.1 The epistemic view
According to the epistemic view of vagueness, attributed to the stoics [KS96a] and most
influentially defended by Williamson [Wil94], vague predicates do, in fact, have sharp
boundaries, and hence borderline cases are in reality either true or false. The lack of
clarity portrayed in the sorites paradox is then interpreted as an unavoidable kind of
ignorance: ‘thresholds for vague predicates are not just unknown; they are unknowable’
[Sor01] (yet they exist). The main consequence of such a stance is that, at least from
a philosophical perspective, classical logic and semantics can be preserved.
Despite the apparent implausibility of such position, the epistemic view of vagueness
has been significantly endorsed by authors such as Cargile [Car69], Sorensen [Sor88] and
Williamson [Wil92, Wil94]. The defendants of this position often present it as a reason-
able alternative after the exposition of the problems that non-classical alternatives face
(mostly higher-order vagueness) and the drawbacks from abandoning classical logic and
semantics. These authors have also explored different aspects of natural language in
order to give accounts of how can vague terms have sharp boundaries [Wil92, Sor01],
and provided a treatment of higher-order vagueness.
Relaxed interpretations of this approach include the pragmatic view that even if
there is actually no such precise language in reality, individuals, when faced with de-
cision problems about assertions, find it useful to behave as if the epistemic theory is
correct. This has been refered to as the epistemic stance, whereby ‘each individual
agent in the population assumes the existence of a correct set of language conventions,
governing what can appropriately (or truthfully) be asserted given a particular state of
the world’ [Kyb00, LT12].
It follows from the epistemic assumption of sharp boundaries that vagueness is a
purely epistemic phenomenon: it is lack of knowledge, akin to beliefs and knowledge
about the world but with regards to the language instead. In [Law06], Lawry names
these two sources of uncertainty possible worlds uncertainty and semantic uncertainty
respectively. Moreover, some frameworks for vagueness have considered both issues
to play an important role on a characterisation of vagueness. This is the case of the
bipolar belief framework [Law06], that models the phenomenon of vagueness as both
the genuine lack of precision of the meaning of terms and also the agent’s necessary lack
of knowledge about the exact conventions that rule the use of language. In addition,
the framework includes possible worlds uncertainty in the model. While we view this
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approach as realistic, we do not integrate epistemic issues in our theory. Instead, we
focus our attention to a simple framework for representing the variability of language,
and, rather than modelling the decision process that an agent faces to decide if a
statement is assertible [LT12], we concentrate on the reasoning that can be done from
her assertions once they have been made.
With regards to logic frameworks, the epistemic view is often formalised via epi-
stemic modalities. For instance, Williamson, in [Wil94], proposes the ‘logic of clarity’,
with the modality C (which reads as ‘It is clearly the case that’) built around the
notion of a margin of error. Intuitively, if W is a set of possible worlds, d a measure
of their similarity, α a margin for error and [A] is the set of worlds at which A is true,
then we say that CA is true (‘It is clearly the case that A’) at a world w if A is true
at every world within the margin for error α of w [Wil94]. Subsequent research have
often used, however, standard epistemic logic (eg. [FHMV95]).
Beyond the philosophical considerations on the merits and plausibility of this ap-
proach, we consider that the epistemic view on vagueness is not a natural framework for
the representation of the problems of interest for this project, because the underlying
assumption that vague terms are actually precise collides with our intended standpoint
usage, where different agents can have equally acceptable standpoints on the meaning
of terms, which can be conflicting between them.
However, in many instances frameworks implementing the epistemic view of vague-
ness and modal approaches to supervaluationism are formally very close. Hence, there
is often room for the reinterpretation of the semantics given to a framework, such that
they adapt to different theoretical interpretations.
2.4.2.2 Many-valued logics and fuzzy logic
Many-valued logics are non-classical systems that accept the principle of truth-functionality
but have more than two truth values; in most cases, they are either three-valued or
infinite-valued, with truth degrees ranging from ‘0’ to ‘1’. They emerged as a subject in
the early twentieth century with  Lukasiewicz logics [ Luk20] and were conceived to use
a third additional truth value for ‘possible’ in order to model modalities. Since, many
systems have been proposed with different aims, such as Go¨del [Go¨d32] or Jas´kowski
logics [Jas´36].
Several many-valued theories of truth have used these logics for modelling vagueness
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on the basis that, if borderline case predications are not clearly true nor false, then ad-
ditional non-classical truth values may be needed (e.g. see Tye [Tye94] for three-valued
and Zadeh [Zad75] for infinite-valued). While in three-valued systems borderline cases
are indeterminate, infinite-valued systems aim at reflecting the continuity of phenom-
ena (such as the possible heights of people) by assigning a continuous range of truth
values to vague predicates like tall. These non-classical systems have different semantics
and notions of validity, often determined by either a certain threshold for truth (which
could be true or ‘1’, or a lower threshold such as ‘0.5’) or by the preservation of degree
of truth (e.g. the conclusion is at least as true as the premiss) – choices on the former
impact on the appropriateness of the logic for modelling different phenomena.
Three-valued theories are the most simple representations of this sort, and consider
a third value borderline that represents ‘not true nor false’ with Kleene logic connect-
ives (e.g. [Tye94] and [LGR11] for more recent work). For instance, in [LGR11] vague
predicates are handled by means of valuation pairs that capture the three values true,
borderline and false, and that can express the basic three-valued connectives of conjunc-
tion, disjunction and negation. Moreover, these logics can also be used for representing
uncertainty, when interpreting the third value as unknown instead of borderline.
However, the best known of the many-valued approaches to vagueness is fuzzy logic,
an infinite-valued logic proposed by Zadeh in [Zad75] which develops fuzzy analogues
of standard set-theoretical notions and has been remarkably successful in the domain
of computing. In this system, functions (which correspond to vague predicates) map
objects to numbers in the interval [0,1]. For example, the function for tall maps people
to values between ‘0’ and ‘1’, where a person that is not tall will be assigned the value
‘0’, a clearly tall person will be assigned the value ‘1’ and borderline cases will have
intermediate truth degrees such as ‘0.7’. Correspondingly, instances belong to the ‘tall
fuzzy set’ to the degree determined by the former function.
Since the 1970s, the expression ‘fuzzy logic’ started to be used in two different ways;
not only as a particular logical theory developed for modelling partial truth but also, on
a broader sense, to refer to logic systems, formalisms and techniques handling degrees,
particularly when these are modelled with fuzzy sets: an extension of set theory in
which the membership of elements to classes is a matter of degree. For example, in
engineering contexts ‘fuzzy logic’ (also fuzzy control systems, fuzzy classification, . . . )
is aimed at efficient methods tolerant to suboptimality and imprecision [Ros04].
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Contemporary research on mathematical fuzzy logic is mature, including detailed
investigations of algebraic structures, graded notions of entailment, complexity issues,
proof theory and automated theorem proving [CHN11]. Moreover, applied research in
the area of computer science is widely recognised, most of it occurring in its broader
sense, being remarkable its success in the engineering domain (see [Ros04]). In contrast,
its applications for modelling vagueness in natural language are less prominent1, and its
suitability for its analysis has been sometimes questioned in the domains of philosophy
and linguistic semantics [Sau11, Wol13].
Different semantics have been proposed for fuzzy logics modelling vagueness (see
[DP97, Law06] for a review of some of them). For instance, some adopt a prototype
theory approach, so that the degree of membership is interpreted in terms of similarity
to the prototypical instances of a class, or probabilistic approaches, several of which
have been put forward aiming to model the underlying uncertainty or variance of the
vague terms, or the degree of preference or assertability among others. Examples range
from the pioneer work of Black [Bla37] to contemporary frameworks such as [Law08],
[Las11] and [LJ17], which suggest that semantic uncertainty is a likely consequence
of the empirical way in which language is acquired and, in the latter, that stochastic
assertion decisions can play a positive role in some communication scenarios.
Some general criticisms to fuzzy logic as a formalism for modelling vagueness were
formulated in [Kam75] and [Fin75] (followed by [Wil94, KP95, Haa79] among others)
and they generally question the appropriateness of truth-functional systems2 for natural
language vague terms. Despite the fact that truth functionality provides simplicity and
intuitively generalises classical logic, critics point at the awkwardness of the valuation
of certain composite expressions when applied to language. A fuzzy logic parallel of an
example provided for supervaluationism is presented in [KS96a]:
Suppose Tim is borderline tall (say, tall to degree 0.4) and Tek is taller (tall
to degree 0.5); and assume negation flips values so that “Tek is not tall” is
1 For example, if we analyse the results of searching for fuzzy logic in the last five years in Web of
Science, we find that most of the results are in the branch of engineering electrical electronic. Overall,
9,287 out of 14,715 results were classified in an engineering/industrial category. This contrasts with the
701 results in computer science information systems, 67 in logic, 21 in philosophy and 4 in linguistics
2Note that some many-valued frameworks diverge from classical formalisations of fuzzy logic in
that they are not truth-functional, particularly those based sets of classical valuations of the language
(e.g. [LT12],[FK06])
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as true as “Tek is tall”. Then consider (a) “Tim is tall and Tek is not tall”
and (b) “Tim is tall and Tek is tall.” Truth-functionality would imply that
(a) and (b) must have the same value. But it seems that (a) must be false:
if Tim is shorter than Tek, then it cannot be that Tim is tall and Tek is
not. And (b) is surely not false for a degree-theorist, but is true to some
positive degree.
Despite these criticisms, fuzzy logic has been successfully applied in different know-
ledge representation scenarios involving vagueness, such as ontologies and description
logics [Str01, CC18]. The main appeal is the graded membership to the fuzzy set,
which is used to capture not only vagueness but also uncertainty in a more general
sense. Moreover, probabilistic approaches such as [Law06] avoid the odds of the afore-
mentioned truth-functionality, and bridge towards the epistemic view and supervalu-
ationism while preserving the infinite-valued system, have been proposed, for instance,
in [FR09] and [LT12].
However, with regards to the problem under consideration in this thesis, infinite-
valued systems are not directly suitable to represent the notion of truth relative to
a context or view-point, hence we do not consider fuzzy logic a natural theory for
the standpoint framework. One could conceive, however, an extension of the logic of
standpoints supporting degrees of truth relative to a standpoint, perhaps by introducing
some kind of degree of membership of each precisification in a standpoint. Yet, such a
line of work is not explored in this thesis.
2.4.3 Other multidisciplinary approaches
The previously discussed approaches to vagueness are philosophical theories that arouse
from the aim to solve the sorites paradox and were intended to dissect the underly-
ing logical structure of vague terms; It was only subsequently that they were studied
with regards to their capacity to solve problems arising in computational scenarios. In
contrast, we now briefly overview a set of approaches and techniques that have been
developed with a practical aim or cognitive foundation and that are relevant for address-
ing other aspects of the SVoNLT. In particular we will focus on three areas of research,
namely sense approximation and resolution techniques and cognitive frameworks.
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2.4.3.1 Sense approximation and resolution
In the first place, we consider the body of work on sense approximation and resolution of
semantically variable terms (WSD). In a nutshell, the task involves the computation of
the intended sense of a term in context. This can be done by selecting the relevant sense
from a discrete set of options, or by computing a sense within a continuous semantic
space. The field agglutinates a variety of techniques, mostly based on learning methods
and many of which use vector representations [LT93, YCF01].
Most, but not all strategies for WSD use heuristic methods to acquire knowledge
from big corpora and knowledge bases such as WordNet [Mil95], and they use it to
predict the senses of words in context. There are supervised and unsupervised methods
[GSD04], corpora may be annotated or not [AE07], and the resolution may consist of
the selection of one sense from a set of possible ones or on the automatic generation of
senses through clustering algorithms [ASPPBL06]. This area of research is mature; a
comprehensive literature review on the topic with an overview of the current techniques
and applications can be found in [Nav09]. In particular, the vector space model is a
representation framework that supports approximate inference and performs well in
this domain [LT93, YCF01].
To understand the relation of these frameworks to standpoint logic, we highlight the
way in which they differ: The former focus on estimating the intended sense of a word
in use (normally in a corpus), and generally consider senses that are either given or
generated from the corpora; In the latter, we are interested in the way that semantic
commitments enable agents to set the standpoints with respect to which they make
assertions, and the logical reasoning that can be done with sets of them.
2.4.3.2 Cognitive frameworks
Secondly, work in cognitive science has stimulated the development of alternative mod-
els for understanding the semantics of concepts (some examples are conceptual spaces
[GW01], image schemas [Joh87, Lak87] and connectionist models [BA91]). All the
former are explanatory theories of language that account in some ways for the se-
mantic variability of its terms and, while some of them have not been conceived with
an intended application, they have all motivated or inspired subsequent applied re-
search.
For instance, conceptual spaces [Ga¨r04], based on prototype theory [KP95, Ros88],
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deal with concept formation and representation, where semantics are expressed within
a geometrical space. For example, a colour concept such as ‘orange’ can be associated
with a region in the space of all possible colours. This approach has been applied
to concept comparison and conceptual adaptation to context (e.g. in the case of geo-
graphic information [AJ11]) and has been employed in accounts of prototypicality and
borderline cases [DDDE´13]. However, it is unclear whether conceptual spaces can deal
with other forms of SVoNLT (particularly conceptual or non-numerical vagueness, see
2.3.3), as every concept is defined within a fixed set of quality dimensions; thus, a choice
of the relevant ones in complex and ambiguous categories implies ruling out different
and potentially close understandings of the meaning of such concepts that depend on
different dimensions.
Cognitive frameworks are successful at modelling concepts in alternative ways other
than a definition and they have a cognitive foundation. However, in the context of this
research, they provide less flexibility than general purpose logic languages to encode
semantic constraints and domain axioms. This imposes limitations on how can we
characterise standpoints on the semantics of terms, particularly in scientific domains
such as our applied scenario (in chapter 6). In contrast, these approaches are more
focused on capturing the general ‘common-sense’ semantics of terms rather than the
specific semantics with which words can be used in a certain context.
2.5 Formal logic frameworks
In this section we specifically overview relevant formal frameworks (rather than theor-
ies) for this research. We begin by reviewing previous work in establishing a logic of
standpoints in subsection 2.5.1 and then we focus on the work on modal approaches
2.5.2, where we introduce modal logics, we review the literature formalising supervalu-
ationism via a modal logics and we overview the work on multi-modal logics. Finally,
we conclude by considering the non-modal frameworks (subsection 2.5.3) that have
been used for modelling supervaluationism.
2.5.1 Preliminary work on a standpoint framework
In [Ben06], Bennett provides the first account of a logic of standpoints. There, a
standpoint is associated with ‘a set of precisifications considered acceptable by some
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agent’, and truth is primarily contemplated ‘as a property of propositions that is relative
to a particular precisification, rather than determined by the whole set’1.
In Bennett’s framework, two modes of vagueness, namely sorites and conceptual
vagueness (see section 2.3.3), are modelled separately. Vague terms have various ad-
missible definitions or predicate groundings that are specified in terms of primitive
functions representing observable measurements, which models conceptual vagueness.
Moreover, those are associated with thresholds of applicability, which encode the sorites
vagueness of such groundings. Bennett then provides a two-dimensional semantics
in which the interpretations of propositions are indexed by precisifications and pos-
sible worlds. Implementations of the framework in computer systems can be found in
[BMT08] and [SBS05].
In this thesis, we revise the work in [Ben06] in different ways. We introduce a
modal framework and we do not explicitly differentiate between predicate grounding
and threshold assignment. Instead, we provide a uniform treatment of vagueness within
which any formula expressible in the language can constrain the semantics of vague
predicates. While we believe that the distinction made in the earlier version of the
formalism is a useful way to organise semantic constraints, we do not consider that it
is advantageous to separate them in the logic language.
Second, while Bennett’s work was focused on the development of a grounding the-
ory upon which the vague language was based, we take a somewhat different approach.
We depart from the assumption that, in most scenarios, such grounding theories are
not fully defined or that such information may not be available. For instance, a stand-
point on the semantics of a vague predicate like nice is more naturally expressed or
constrained in terms of other vague predicates such as pleasant, than in terms of a phys-
ically grounded theory relying on objective and measurable parameters. Hence, while
the latter is expressible in our framework, softer commitments using vague terminology
are also allowed.
Finally, the formalism that we now present goes significantly beyond [Ben11] in
explicitly representing standpoints within the logic of the object language, which in
our framework is done by employing modal operators (previously standpoints were
handled by an auxiliary semantic apparatus). In what follows, we will provide our
1While [Ben06] is not a modal framework, it does adopt the notion of truth at a point/precisification
characteristic of modal interpretations of supervaluationism.
35
2.5 Formal logic frameworks
language with standard Kripke semantics, and prove soundness and completeness of
the logic with respect to a class of Kripke frames.
2.5.2 Modal frameworks
2.5.2.1 Introduction to modal logic
Modal logics are formalisms that extend classical logic by means of additional modal
operators that qualify truth. For instance, a proposition P , standing for ‘Phil is here’,
can be qualified with the traditional (alethic) modal operators of possibility and neces-
sity, such that ♦P reads as ‘It is possible that Phil is here’ and P as ‘It is necessary
that Phil is here’. Different systems of modal logics can be used broadly to formalise
a variety of modal notions, such as those used for temporal, deontic, epistemic and
doxastic modal logics.
The semantics of modal logics are usually given in the form of Kripke models, which
will be formally defined in section 4.2.2.1. These are characterised by having a set of
possible worlds or points of evaluation and an accessibility relation (or a set of them)
on the set of worlds as well as the evaluation function. The intuitive idea is that ‘It
is necessary that Phil is here’ if ‘Phil is here’ holds at all accessible worlds, and ‘It is
possible that Phil is here’ if ‘Phil is here’ holds at some accessible worlds. Validity is
then defined as truth in every possible world in every possible model.
A system of modal logic is characterised by a particular set of axioms and their
corresponding restrictions on the relations of the Kripke models. Some well known
systems of modal logic are determined by some or all of the following schemas:
K : (φ → ψ) → (φ → s ψ)
D : φ → ♦φ (serial)
T : φ → φ (reflexive)
4 : φ → φ (transitive)
5 : ♦φ → ♦φ (euclidean)
While K holds in standard Kripke models, the rest of the schemas impose the
corresponding relation on the models. In this thesis, we will make special reference to
the well known systems KD45 and S5, which have the schemas K, D, 4, 5 and K, D,
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T, 4, 5 respectively. These axiomatisations restrict the relations on the corresponding
models to be serial, transitive and euclidean in the case of KD45, and equivalence
relations (as a result of adding reflexivity to the former) in the case of S5.
2.5.2.2 Modal approaches to supervaluationism
As in this thesis, there have been several proposals to treat vagueness as a modal phe-
nomenon, and in particular to implement the supervaluationistic approach to vagueness
with modal logic. Examples of that are [Var07, ADP09, Wil08, Cob08, Ben98] among
others.
In a modal approach to vagueness, simple notions of truth are replaced by the notion
of modes of truth with regards to vagueness [ADP09] in a similar way as it is done in
other modal systems, such as epistemic or doxastic logic. In a supervaluationistic
modal logic, a statement such as ‘Phil is tall’ can be qualified by saying that Phil is
unequivocally tall (if Phil is a clear case for tallness) or that he is in some sense tall
and in some sense not tall (if he is a borderline case for tallness). In the context of
supervaluationism, in the former case we would be asserting that it is supertrue that
Phil is tall; in the later, we are asserting that Phil is tall according to some but not all
the precisifications of tallness.
When we provide the supervaluationistic modal logic with Kripke semantics, the
structure of points (or worlds) of evaluation is used to model the precisifications of the
language. In such a structure, the notion of truth-at-a-point replaces global notions of
truth and reads as truth relative to one precisification [ADP09]. Modal truths are then
derived from different configurations of points (or precisifications) and their valuation.
A modality that is often provided in such logics is one that implements the notion
of super-truth (truth at all points), but more operators have been proposed. Work
exploring accounts along these lines include [Var07, ADP09, Wil08, Cob08, Cob11,
Cob16], and a review on the different operators is provided in chapter 3, section 3.5.3.
It has been argued that some of the main philosophical objections to the super-
valuationistic account of vagueness are not applicable if we interpret it as a modal
phenomenon [ADP09]. Modal interpretations simplify Fine’s presentation of the the-
ory, which is somewhat obscure in its intensional and extensional accounts and has been
attacked for its treatment of higher-order vagueness via the D (determinacy) operator.
Most of the referenced work on modal accounts of supervaluationism focus on
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analysing different forms of validity and logical consequence [Var07, Wil08, ADP09,
Cob08, Cob11] and on responding to some of the main objections to supervaluationism
[Far10, Wil18]. These, as well as the notion of validity in our system, will be discussed
in chapter 3, section 3.6. Other research includes the combination of modal supervalu-
ationistic approaches with other frameworks like fuzzy logic [FK06], some investigations
on handling vague objects [Aki00, Swa14] and the formulation of responses to other ob-
jections to supervaluationism, such as the handling of indirect speech [GC10, Kee10].
However, established work providing fully-formalised supervaluationistic modal lo-
gics intended for operational frameworks for knowledge representation and reasoning
is scarce. A preliminary example of this is [Ben98], where an early formalisation of a
modal logic for vague concepts is given. Bennett’s two-dimensional modal logic con-
siders both possible worlds and possible interpretations, and provides a modal operator
U for unequivocality (for modelling vagueness) as well as the standard alethic operators
(necessity and possibility). In Bennett’s work, precisifications are three-valued, hence
they are not forced to be precise, in contrasts to the framework proposed in this thesis.
While the potential applications of the framework in different computational scenarios
are explored to a greater extent than in other related work, a formal semantics and
proof theory of the logic are not provided. In [Ben01], a prototype of the framework
is applied to the spatial reasoning domain and, along these lines, a modal logic for
description logics is presented in [LC06]. Another implementation framework based on
supervaluationism, in this case only for modelling the spatial terms near and far, can
be found in [MM13].
Finally, more recently, [LYV16] presents a philosophical analysis of various previ-
ously suggested modal operators, together with an axiomatisation suitable for both
supervaluationistic and epistemic logics of vagueness, which is contrasted with our
analysis in chapter 3, section 3.5.3 and highlights the formal closeness of frameworks
implementing the epistemic view of vagueness and supervaluationism, the latter par-
ticularly when based on local (modal) notions of truth. The framework, which is a
three-dimensional modal logics with operators for actuality, ‘supernecessity’ and defin-
iteness, explores and models philosophical aspects of epistemic, supervaluationistic and
metaphysical [BW11] approaches to vagueness.
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2.5.2.3 Relation to modal approaches to uncertainty
Modal frameworks are however much more commonly used to model uncertainty (as in
lack of knowledge) rather than vagueness. This is particularly the case since the use
of modal logic frameworks for modelling knowledge and belief [Hin62] became wide-
spread. Epistemic logics [FHMV95] are modal frameworks for reasoning about incom-
plete knowledge and beliefs. They are well established in the domain of knowledge rep-
resentation and they have been widely used to reason about epistemic uncertainty (e.g.
[HP98, Auc10]). Formally, they are normal modal logics satisfying S51 for reasoning
about knowledge and KD45 for reasoning about beliefs [FHMV95]. The semantics is
generally given in terms of Kripke structures, based on an accessibility relation between
possible worlds or points. A modal proposition α is true at a world w if and only if
it is true at all accessible worlds w′ under the relation R.
These logics are intended for modelling the knowledge and belief of an agent about
the state of affairs, rather than the semantics of language. However, different variants
have been used for reasoning about vagueness, particularly following an epistemic in-
terpretation of vagueness, and on occasions due to the conflation of uncertainty (on the
state of affairs) and vagueness (e.g. in [BD14] it is unclear for us whether they discuss
possible worlds or possible interpretations).
Formally, Standpoint logic can be considered an extension of the formal frameworks
that are commonly used in Epistemic logics, with a reinterpretation of its semantics
(e.g. we model precisifications of the language rather than worlds) and additional
schemata that capture the logics of standpoints.
One can also relate our work to MEL[BD14], a ‘simple epistemic logic’ to model
uncertainty (on the state of affairs) that takes an unconventional approach in modal
logics. In the first place, MEL uses only a fragment of the KD language, avoiding
nesting of modalities and with no objective (modality-free) formulas. Moreover, instead
of Kripke structures, its semantics is given in terms of epistemic states, understood as
subsets of mutually exclusive propositional interpretations [BD14]. These epistemic
states represent the ‘incomplete knowledge (or belief2) about the real world possessed
by an agent’ as a disjunction of interpretations, ‘one and only one of which is, according
1For more information on well known systems of modal logic such as S5 and KD45 the reader can
refer to [Che80].
2It cannot distinguish belief from knowledge (true belief) since axiom T (  α → α) cannot be
expressed in the MEL language.
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to this agent’s beliefs, the actual state of the world’ [BD14]1.
Indeed, the restricted language used in MEL could be, in a multi-modal flavour,
interesting for standpoint logic. Like most modal logics, we use the general syntax
extending propositional logic together with interaction axioms (in our case AS4 and
AS5, see chapter 4) to simplify the syntax. However, a restricted language may be
interesting in some applied scenarios where the flexibility of the language is worth
compromising, as we will consider in chapter 5, section 5.2.1.4.
Moreover, its semantics in terms of epistemic states relies on the results of [Pie09],
that show that K45 logics can be given simplified Kripke frames where the relations
can be reduced to sets. While the semantics of Standpoint logic uses the same principle,
extending it to the multi-modal case, we preserve the (simplified) Kripke style semantics
(as in [Pie09] itself). In contrast, MEL’s approach offers a logical grounding to other
uncertainty theories like possibility theory and belief functions [BD14], and given that
Standpoint logic could be given similar semantics despite its multi-agent nature, it
highlights the links of our framework with other non-modal formal approaches, such as
those introduced in section 2.5.3.
2.5.2.4 Multi-modal logics
Modal logics with a multiplicity of modal operators are common and have substan-
tial applications in computer science. A prominent example is epistemic modal logic
(logic of knowledge and belief) [Hin62, HM92], which uses the modal operators as a
tool to represent the cognitive states of sets of agents (in particular their knowledge
and/or beliefs) and provides the means for reasoning about them [Hin62]. This, in
turn, provides a natural theoretical framework for reasoning with multi-agent systems
[WJ94, dFL+97, FHMV95].
This multi-agent nature is achieved by introducing an accessibility relation for each
agent in the system. Consequently, a multi-modal logic for n agents is obtained by
joining n modal logics, usually described by the same logical system for simplicity
[HS15]. In the case of epistemic logic, this provides expressivity to make statements
such as ‘agent α knows φ’ or ‘agent α knows that agent β knows φ’. From those further
1Note that in contrast to this, in supervaluationism the set of interpretations of language is con-
junctive. It is in fact the whole set of admissible precisifications what characterises the meaning of a
vague term.
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notions can be defined, for instance common knowledge, that supports certain aspects
of reasoning within groups of knowers.
In this research we are interested in taking a similar approach for the representation
and reasoning with different perspectives that agents can take on the semantics of vague
terms. Hence we aim to establish an adequate proof theory for language standpoints
rather than mental states. This is a novel approach given that the literature reviewed
so far on modal approaches to supervaluationism only discuss how modal operators can
express the notions of super-truth and definiteness with respect to the whole language.
We consider that modelling different perspectives of language has two fundamental be-
nefits: on the one hand it provides a reasonable symbolic representational framework
that characterises the semantics of vague terms in function of the uses that different
agents make of them, which is particularly interesting for the modelling of concep-
tual vagueness; On the other hand, we hope to provide an interesting framework for
reasoning with multi-agent systems in the presence of semantic heterogeneity.
2.5.3 Other logic frameworks for supervaluationism
Logic frameworks appropriate for supervaluationism must account for penumbral con-
nections, which rends the logic non-truth functional. Beyond the modal approach, other
alternatives have been proposed to model supervaluationist semantics, for instance
through the use of valuation pairs (in this case particularly supervaluation pairs) as in
[LD12]. Given a supervaluation pair, the lower truth valuation represents the criteria
for absolute truth and the upper valuation represents the criteria for not absolute false-
hood, which are evaluated over a set of classical valuations that encode the admissible
precisifications.
This approach is, in form, strongly connected to possibilistic logic, a formalism
related to fuzzy sets through possibility measures but which focuses on classical lo-
gic formulas pervaded with qualitative uncertainty [DP14], as discussed in [CDL14].
Moreover, through this connection, it also possible to relate this work to a variety of
other formal frameworks for vagueness and uncertainty [CDL14].
In [LT12], supervaluation pairs are used in a framework that provides an integrated
treatment of two modes of uncertainty, ‘possible worlds uncertainty’ and ‘semantic un-
certainty’ (see section 2.3.5.2) with the assumption that interpretations of the language
may admit truth-gaps, expressed with valuation pairs. Their model of epistemic uncer-
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tainty can be defined in terms of a probability measure on subsets of the cross product
space of the precisifications (linguistic conventions) with the possible worlds, generating
a probability distribution on valuation pairs.
In relation to the formal framework that is proposed in this thesis, there are close
similarities. In particular, as will become obvious, standpoints are parallel, in Lawry
and Tang’s framework [LT12], exactly as sets of valuations (rather than individual valu-
ations). This will be the case because standpoints capture partial accounts and com-
mitments on the semantic variability of terms, rather than a well specified sharpening of
the whole language. Hence, the framework proposed here allows for the unified repres-








In this chapter we present standpoint logic, our logical framework within the family
of logics based on supervaluational semantics. The two key contributions to previous
work on modal approaches to supervaluationism and vagueness are the introduction of
the notion of standpoint (first proposed in [Ben11] in a non-modal framework) and the
multiple modalities, intended to enable reasoning with vague languages in multi-agent
settings.
Standpoint logic is a multi-modal logic with a particular characterisation of the
notions of precisification, truth and validity, determined by a particular class of Kripke
frames, and which intends to be an adequate system for multi-agent reasoning in the
presence of a vague or semantically heterogeneous vocabulary.
This chapter is committed to the introduction and discussion of the main elements
of the framework and to the justification of its particular interpretations within the
supervaluationist approach to vagueness. In section 3.2 we introduce the motivations for
the development of the framework with some very simple examples and in the following
section, 3.3, we provide a general overview. Section 3.4 discusses precisifications in our
logic, followed by standpoints in section 3.5. Finally, section 3.6 examines the notions
of truth and validity in standpoint semtantics and section 3.7 briefly considers the issue
of higher-order vagueness.
3.2 Motivation
We first introduce the kind of sentences and scenarios that we want to model. To begin
with, let us consider an agent α stating the following assertions, (1) and (2).
1. (according to α) ‘Nena is (unequivocally) tall.’
2. ‘Pepa is taller than Nena.’
A competent English speaker should be able to draw the conclusion ‘Pepa is tall’
from the sentences (1) and (2). Yet, words like tall may mean different things to
different agents, or even to the same agent in different contexts or occasions. However,
while two agents may disagree on whether Nena is tall or not, they are quite unlikely to
disagree on (2) and particularly on whether (3) is a sound conclusion from (1) and (2).
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I.e. if we accept (2) and we are willing to accept (1) then the norms of language use
require that we must also accept (3). This represents one of the paradigmatic examples
of commonsense reasoning with vague terms. Consequently, our competent English
speaker can safely draw the conclusion that, according to agent α, (3) is the case:
4 ‘Pepa is unequivocally tall according to α.’
Let now the sentence (4) be uttered by an agent β in the same context:
5 (according to β) ‘Pepa is not tall.’
In that case, our competent English speaker can infer that:
6 ‘Nena is unequivocally not tall according to β’.
7 ‘Nena and Pepa are borderline tall’. Neither Pepa nor Nena are undisputed cases
of tallness (they are not unequivocally tall or ¬tall).
Let us suppose that all agents know the height of both Nena and Pepa in the context
of such conversation. Then it is highlighted that the two first inferences that our agent
γ makes are not about α and β’s beliefs about the state of affairs. Instead, they are
inferences about their use of the term ‘tall’ facing the same state of affairs. Moreover,
the last inference is valuable for our competent speaker as it highlights the fact that
Pepa and Nena, as well as other instances of tallness within their height, are borderline
cases of tallness and thus they can not be considered to be unequivocally true or false.
Additionally, it is known that any person taller than Nena will be considered to be tall
for α (if the context is constant) while any person shorter than Pepa will be considered
to not be tall for β, and that any person considered tall by β will certainly be considered
tall by α, who has a lower threshold for tallness, and that such person’s height will be
more than Pepa’s height.
Hence we get information not only about the state of affairs but also we acquire
information on the semantic commitments of the agents, which can be used in further
communication.
3.3 Overview of the framework
The previous section highlights the multi-agent (or better multi-perspective) nature of
the framework. In this section we overview its main elements and features, which will
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be subsequently discussed individually in the following sections.
In accordance with the general supervaluationist theory of vagueness, vague pre-
dicates such as tall fail to divide the domain into a positive and a negative extension,
giving rise to borderline cases. Such cases can be interpreted as the discrepancy in the
set of all possible precise interpretations of the language, its precisifications, and each of
these precisifications is an admissible yet arbitrary sharpening of the vague predicates.
When an agent makes use of the vague language, she is unlikely to use a particular
precisification, e.g. she is unlikely to commit to a fully precise language before referring
to someone as tall. Instead, the agent is likely to narrow the variability of the relevant
terms in order to communicate effectively, either explicitly or implicitly, for instance
via semantic commitments. E.g. by stating that somebody is not tall she narrows the
meaning of the term.
Our framework interprets the semantics of the vague language as a collection of
admissible precisifications of the language. Agents using the language may refer to
the whole set of precisifications or they may only use a subset of them, by adopting
a standpoint that narrows or precisifies the meaning of the terms of the language.
Standpoints therefore capture the intuition that an agent commits to the subset of
precise interpretations of the language that are consistent with her own statements1.
It must be highlighted that we do not consider epistemic limitations in our model,
such as situations where different agents perceive different things. E.g.: ‘The vision of
α may be better than that of β and thus ‘Pepa is taller than Nena’ may hold for β
but not for α. In fact, standpoint logic is not concerned with the perceptions or mental
states of agents. Instead, it is concerned with possible interpretations of a language
that agents can then use to describe the world in a non-precise manner. Particularly,
with a language such that a proposition φ may hold or not for the same state of affairs,
depending on the interpretation of the language (standpoint) to which the assertion φ
is associated.
1This is presumed on the basis of general communication principles, for example supported by
[Gri75]. The contrary would be regarded as a dishonest behaviour from the agent, which we do not




As discussed in section 2.4.1, the supervaluationistic approach to vagueness is built on
the idea of precisifications. A precisification is identified with a precise interpretation
of the language, such that every word has a unique, precise definition. The definitional
theory may involve additional axioms and it must be consistent, such that for any state
of the world there is a unique extension for every predicate.
A vague language is characterised by admitting several precisifications, and typically
a statement using vague terms or predicates is said to be super-true/super-false iff it
is true/false according to all of the admissible precisifications (see section 3.6 for the
interpretation of truth in our framework).
There is however a substantial variation in the literature with respect to what
precisifications are taken to be. In [Var07], Varzi outlines some of the key features
present in the literature. The two first options relate to the conceptual interpretation
of the framework and are:
(a) The distinction between precisifications being
(a.1) classical languages in their own right, such that the vague language is a
cluster of homophonic precise languages; or
(a.2) precise interpretations or sharpenings of the vague language.
(b) The second distinction relates to whether
(b.1) the vague term is literally defined by its precisifications; or
(b.2) the vague term is analytically prior to the precisifications. Precisifications
are then either the classical terms that have substituted the vague ones
(a.1+b.2) or the interpretations obtained by sharpening them (a.2+b.2).
It is argued that decisions on these aspects play an important role in both the cri-
ticisms to supervaluationist approaches to vagueness and their answers [Var07]. Both
points are relevant to questions about the nature of natural language and the plausib-
ility of the supervaluationist theory. Given that the present work is instead interested
in supervaluation as a tool for modelling certain scenarios rather than as the definitive
theory of vagueness we do not commit to any of those, and leave it open to the reader.
Formally, our model is close to the interpretation (a.1-b.1), yet it can be considered an
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abstraction of any of the other. In fact, our reasoning with standpoints and commit-
ments on the meaning of terms replicates the scenario in (a.2), and (b.2) is certainly
more compelling than (b.1).
Varzi makes a last and more relevant distinction, this time focused on the scope.
(c) Precisifications can be
(c.1) relative to the whole language or
(c.2) we can speak of partial or limited precisifications, which only relate to the
subset of the language that is relevant for the vague statement.
Precisifications in Standpoint Semantics are always relative to the whole language (c.1).
This feature facilitates the modal interpretation of precisifications as worlds or points
in standard Kripke semantics.
Finally we do consider a last issue, on whether
(d) Precisifications
(d.1) ought to be complete (or classical) as in [Var07, Ben11], or
(d.2) can be incomplete, as suggested by Fine [Fin75] and others
(e.g [ADP09, Ben98]), leaving certain propositions indeterminate.
In Standpoint semantics, like in most modal interpretations of supervaluationism
(e.g. [Cob11, LYV16]), precisifications are classical/complete. Each precisification
corresponds to a classical language with no borderline case scenarios or vagueness. Yet,
partial orders of incomplete precisifications capture important intuitions on the process
of sharpening terms and the relation between more and less precise interpretations of
the semantics of sets of terms. Consequently, while we do not consider the possibility of
incomplete precisifications, we do provide partially ordered structures for that purpose
that we name standpoints and are discussed in the following section.
3.4.1 A note on admissible precisifications
The literature in supervaluation semantics discusses a further notion, that of admissible
precisifications. In Varzi’s words, ‘precisifications should be admissible in the sense that
some connections must be respected, such as analytic relations between expressions.
These restrictions on the admissibility of a precisification enable the supervaluationist
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theory to endorse Fine’s so-called penumbral connections, that is, connections that
might hold among sentences even if these have a borderline status’ [Var07].
How to account for such admissibility has been considered in the literature. In
some modal frameworks it is suggested that admissibility could be formalised as the
accessibility relation between precisifications/worlds [Cob11] and other work such as
Fine’s [Fin75] uses it as a primitive notion.
In the standpoint framework, the set of precisifications is the set of admissible pre-
cisifications. In the intended models, any precisification is complete and it ought to
be consistent with the statements made in the language, including universal state-
ments such as those corresponding to the notions N1-4. Given that analytic relations
between expressions and other penumbral connections must be encoded as propositions
of the kind ‘It is unequivocal that φ’, then any precisification in our semantics must be
consistent with them and hence it is an admissible precisification.
Moreover our intuition is that, while an admissibility relation between precisifica-
tions has an intuitive role in a framework admitting incomplete precisifications (such
that a precisification pi′ is admissible from another precisification pi iff the former is
more precise than the latter), there is not such a clear interpretation if we only con-
sider complete precisifications.
3.5 Standpoints
Given that in Fine’s terminology a precisification need not be completely precise, pre-
cisifications form a partial order where pi2 is more precise than pi1 if all propositions
with a definite truth value in pi1 have the same truth value in pi2 but some propositions
that are indeterminate in pi1 have a determinate truth value in pi2.
The partial order is useful for a variety of reasons, such as the fact that precisific-
ations become comparable (one precisification can be more precise than another) and
it models the intuition behind the sharpenings of the meaning of vague terms. For
instance, we can sharpen the meaning of the vague predicate ‘tall’ by stating that a
borderline individual is ‘tall’ (or ‘not tall’), and then using this judgement as a preced-
ent for subsequent uses of the word ‘tall’, thus narrowing the range of cases considered
borderline.
In our framework, precisifications are akin to possible worlds and thus each cor-
responds to a complete, precise classical assignment. To capture the idea that the
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meaning of vague terminology is only partially defined, we propose and formalise the
notion of standpoint, understood as a partial account of the semantics of the terms of
a vocabulary, and we focus on how different standpoints interact.
Standpoints are modelled as collections of precisifications. They are typically organ-
ised by constraints (axioms and threshold limitations) that pick out a corresponding
set of admissible precisifications that satisfy these constraints. In the example be-
low, a standpoint might be constrained by a definition D1. Moreover, the value of
the threshold t tall linked to such definition might not be fixed but constrained to lie
between certain values, as in D2:
(D1). ∀x[Tall(x) ↔ height(x) > t tall]
(D2). t tall > 175cm ∧ t tall < 185cm
Such values may not be explicitly given, since they could be inferred from assertions
associated with the standpoint. For instance, if a person of height 175cm is asserted
not to be tall, the threshold for tallness must be greater than 175cm.
Consequently, standpoint semantics uses a conceptually simple model that fits well
with Kripke semantics, in which a partially determinate interpretation is called a stand-
point and is modelled by a set of the (fully determinate) precisifications (or points) that
are consistent with the (partially determinate) standpoint (relation).
Since they are modelled as sets, standpoints form a lattice under the subset relation;
and, when one standpoint is a subset of another, we may also regard it as more precise,
since it rules out certain interpretations of the vocabulary.
3.5.1 Standpoints as a tool for representation
Standpoints are straightforward tools for the representation of interpretations of the
semantics of terms, which can be adopted by an agent or community, and be reused
in the system. Moreover, we argue that the collection of standpoints is an interesting
representation tool on its own right.
Beyond the expressivity of the underlying languages, with which individual stand-
points can express different constraints such as D1 and D2, the complete collection of
standpoints of a system is a natural way to symbolically characterise the semantics of
its vague terms as a whole.
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Standard supervaluationistic frameworks model the abstract variation in meaning
via the set of precisifications of the language, but such a set is unstructured. Whenever
the whole semantic variation can be encoded via symbolic penumbral connections which
apply to the global language (rather than individual standpoints), as in D1 and D2,
this is enough to represent the vague semantics of a term. However, conceptual or
non-numerical vagueness resists this type of strategy, as we have seen in section 2.3.3,
and hence previous supervaluationistic frameworks offer limited tools for the symbolic
representation of concepts like ‘clever’.
Alternatively, with standpoint logic we can provide a characterisation of the se-
mantics of conceptually (or non-numerically) vague predicates by means of a (poten-
tially big) collection of standpoints, which capture different constraints that hold in
different scenarios and that encode different characteristic aspects of the meaning of
such terms. This approach takes inspiration on the notions of family resemblance and
open-texture concepts, yet it differs from prototype theory approaches in that, rather
than learning the semantics from the instances of the concept, in standpoint logic they
are characterised by the collection of different interpretations that have been specified
and used in the system. The main upshot is that the characterisation is intensional
rather than extensional, and that rich symbolic interpretations can be given, therefore
providing a complementary framework to those based on similarity measures between
instances.
3.5.2 Stanpoints in relation to Fine’s theory
In Fine’s presentation of supervaluation theory [Fin75], a specification space S is an
arbitrary collection of partial models. Such a collection is, as shown, somewhat parallel
to the set of standpoints and precisifications in our framework.
According to Fine, a rooted specification space is a specification space with a base
point, one partial model identified as privileged. In our model, the analogy is the
universal standpoint, which is referred to as ∗. The universal standpoint subsumes any
other standpoint and it is characterised by the set of all admissible precisifications in
the model; Anything that is unequivocally true in ∗ (that is, ∗ φ) is also unequivocally
true in any other standpoint s (that is, s φ).
Moreover, it is desirable (in Fine’s proposal) for a supervaluationistic framework




FC Completability states that any point can be extended to a complete point within
the same space. This can be formalised as follows, for t, w points in the specific-
ation space S and ≤ the extension relation :
∀t ∈ S, ∃w ∈ S(t ≤ w ∧ w complete)
FF Fidelity states that truth-values at a complete point are classical.
FS Stability states that truth-values are preserved under extension points (in Fine’s
work it is modelled through monotonicity for precisifications).
FR The Resolution Condition for atomic sentences states that an indefinite atomic
sentence can be resolved in either way (true or false) upon improvement in pre-
cision.
One obvious difficulty in order to draw parallels between the current framework and
Fine’s proposal is that, while Fine considers a single sort of entity (i.e. precisifications),
we do consider both precisifications and standpoints. There are consequently different
ways to interpret Fine’s properties in our framework.
On the one hand, we may consider (I1) that any subset of precisifications could
be a standpoint1. However, we may not want this to be the case, and indeed across
this thesis it is presumed that, instead, (I2) only labelled subsets of precisifications
are standpoints. While with interpretation (I1) we can draw the parallel exclusively
between Fine’s specification space and our standpoints, with interpretation (I2) we will
consider both precisifications and standpoints.
For the case of FS, the condition holds unproblematically for standpoints given that
they are monotonic (see chapter 4, section 4.2.2.5). Monotonicity in the sharpening
relation between standpoints implies that one standpoint, s, is sharper than another,
s′, only if the former improves precision on the latter. That is, any proposition that
is unequivocally true or false in s′ has the same truth value in s. Additionally, s may
precisify other propositions.
FF also trivially holds if we take interpretation (I1) and define complete points
as standpoints containing a single precisification (we rename them as complete stand-
points). Given that precisifications in our model are classical and complete, then the
1This is analogous to Fine’s own specification if we consider partial points instead of standpoints.
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truth-values of any proposition at the complete standpoint are also classical. In par-
ticular, for a complete standpoint, scs, and any proposition φ it is the case that either
cs φ or cs ¬φ. If we take interpretation (I2), the condition holds trivially if we take
complete points to be precisifications.
FC holds, for (I1), in virtue of the partial order of standpoints under the subset
relation. In particular, if the standpoints are modelled by all the possible subsets of
precisifications of the language, then for any standpoint s there is another standpoint
s′ such that s′ is complete (is modelled by a set consisting of one precisification) and
s′  s. Conversely, for (I2), the condition should be rewritten so that completability
states that any standpoint can be sharpened to a precisification of the language. In this
way the intuition is preserved and the condition holds trivially, as any standpoint is
non-empty.
Finally, the Resolution Condition FR holds in our system for (I1) given that for
any standpoint s and proposition φ indefinite with respect to s, there are two sharper
standpoints sp, sn  s such that they are identical to s except from the assertion of
φ in sp and its negation in sn, thereby being a sharpenings of s and guaranteeing
that φ is definite in both sp and sn. For the interpretation (I2), again assuming that
there is an atomic proposition φ that is indefinite with respect to a standpoint s, then
by definition, both ♦s φ, i.e. there is necessarily at least a precisification pi ∈ s that
validates it, and ♦s ¬φ, i.e. there is necessarily at least a precisification pi′ ∈ s that
validates its negation.
3.5.3 Modelling standpoints with modal operators
While precisifications are modelled as the points of our standpoint logic, standpoints
are represented via the modal relations. Standpoint modal operators are denoted with
the standard box and diamond. Each standpoint s is associated with the corresponding
modal operators s and ♦s, and there is a universal standpoint ∗, corresponding to ∗
and ♦∗, which is the standpoint mapping to the set of all admissible precisifications.
Differently from other standpoints, something that is necessarily true according to ∗
is also super-true (as in true in all precisifications. See section 3.6). For this reason,
stronger axioms apply to ∗ (chapter 4, section 4.2.3).
s φ reads as ‘φ is true in standpoint s’, i.e. φ is true in all admissible precisifications
for standpoint s. ∗ φ means that φ is true in all precisifications. Consequently, the
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semantic heterogeneity notions N1-9 in section 1.2.2 are formalised as follows:
NF1. ∗ φ ————— “It is unequivocal that φ.”
NF2. ♦∗ φ ————— “In some sense φ.”
NF3. ∗ φ ∨ ∗ ¬φ —“It is definite whether φ (or not φ).”
NF4. ♦∗ φ ∧ ♦∗ ¬φ —“It is borderline that φ.”
NF5. s φ ————— “According to s, [it is unequivocal that] φ.”
NF6. ♦s φ ————— “According to s, in some sense φ.”
NF7. s φ ∨ s ¬φ — “According to s, it is definite whether φ (or not φ).”
NF8. ♦s φ ∧ ♦s ¬φ — “According to s, it is borderline that φ.”
NF9. s′  s ————– “s is sharper than s′.”
In the semantics, the standpoints are interpreted as sets of admissible precisifications
and are partially ordered under the subset relation. We say that a standpoint s is
sharper than a standpoint s′, s  s′, if the set of precisifications compatible with s is a
subset of the set of precisifications compatible with s′. Any standpoint si is sharper or
equal than standpoint ∗, i.e. for all s ∈ S and for ∗ ∈ S it is the case that s  ∗. This
ordering of interpretations was first proposed in [Sha06] and has been also referred as
semantic precision in other work like [LD12].
Moreover, the embedding of standpoint operators is trivial. Although one could see
standpoints to belong to agents (e.g. someone’s standpoint), they are fundamentally
relative to language. One standpoint can be shared among a community of agents and
one same agent can adopt different standpoints in different circumstances. However, a
standpoint s about another standpoint s′ is no different than the latter itself (s′). This
is discussed in more detail in chapter 4, section 4.2.3.4.
3.5.4 Other modal operators in the supervaluationist literature
We identify two main operators being discussed in the literature about modal ap-
proaches to supervaluation semantics, namely the definitely operator D and the super-
truth operator T or S, which we briefly review in relation to the standpoint operators.
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3.5.4.1 D Definitely operator
The definitely operator D was first introduced by Fine in [Fin75], fundamentally to
address the issue of higher-order vagueness, and became the source of a variety of
arguments against supervaluationism. In particular, it has been argued that one of the
principal benefits of supervaluationism, retaining classical consequence, was lost in the
presence of the operator (see [Wil94, Far10] and [Var07, Cob11] for responses, as well
as section 3.6 for the notion of consequence in standpoint semantics).
However, given the need for a mechanism to represent the definiteness or clarity of a
predication in a vague language, most modal approaches to supervaluationism discuss
some variation of the D operator (e.g. [Fin75, Var07, Cob11, LYV16, ADP09]). In
[Var07], Varzi argues that there are two main readings of such an operator:
1. ‘Dφ is true on a precisification pi if and only if φ is true on all precisifications
accessible from pi ’.
2. ‘Dφ is true on a precisification pi if and only if φ is true on precisification pi.’
On the first and most common reading, D is said to be a necessity operator with
a logic at least KT (see section 2.5.2.1 for the introduction of the main axioms and
systems of modal logic). If, on the other hand, it is read according to the second option
(2), then it could also be considered to be analogous to the actuality operator, hence at
least S5. In our framework, according to the description (1), D would be analogous to a
standpoint operator s except in that s does not satisfy axiom T (with the exemption
of ∗), in contrast to part of the literature, where it is presumed that reflexivity is an
obvious characteristic of D [Var07, Cob11].
The presumption of reflexivity is justified by the parallel to the necessity operator
and the intuition that if “it is definitely the case that φ” then “it is the case that φ”
(Dφ → φ). This certainly holds in our system whenever “it is definitely the case (with
respect to all standpoints)”, i.e. when D is parallel only to the universal standpoint
operator ∗ (which indeed satisfies S5). On the contrary, if D is set to be parallel to
any standpoint’s operator s, then it is not reflexive, as the fact that “it is definitely
the case according to s that φ” does not guarantee that φ is the case in the ‘actual’
point (see chapter 4 section 4.2.2.5 for further analysis of the properties of s).
Last but not least, we do include in section 4.2.1 the defined operators Ds and
its converse Is , which are simply shortcuts such that Ds φ ≡def (s φ ∨ s ¬φ) and
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Is φ ≡def (♦s φ ∧ ♦s ¬φ) and thus they are not to be confused with other accounts
of Ds in the supervaluationistic literature such as those previously described in this
section.
3.5.4.2 T True or S Super-true and ∆ Locally-true operators
A truth operator T is discussed in [Var07, ADP09] (named S in the latter), with the
reading “Tφ is true on a precisification pi if and only if φ is true on all precisifications”
and satisfying S5. This operator is introduced to provide an account of global validity
built upon the standard modal local validity, which will be discussed in the coming
subsection. Given that in our framework all precisifications in the model are admissible
and are accessible under ∗, this additional T operator would conflate with ∗.
Finally, the locally-true (∆) operator is proposed in [Var07] with the reading “∆φ
is true on a precisification pi if and only if φ is true on precisification pi ” for the analysis
and discussion of Williamson’s objection to supervaluationism on the grounds of the
failure of disquotationality1 (see Williamson [Wil94] for the objection and Varzi [Var07]
for the response). Although such an operator is definable in our logic we do not specify
it because it is not deemed useful in applied scenarios.
3.6 Truth and Validity
Validity is generally defined in different ways that are equivalent in the case of a classical
bivalent logic. An argument is said to be valid iff it is truth-preserving: ‘whenever all
the premises are true, one of the conclusions must be true’. Alternatively one may
say that an argument is valid if and only if it is not possible for all the conclusions
to be false when the premises are all true [Var07]. Moreover, it is usual to accept, in
supervaluation semantics, that ‘truth is super-truth’.
Discussions on appropriate notions of validity for supervaluationistic frameworks
are abundant in the literature, examples of which are [Var07, Cob11, Cob08, Kee00] In
the absence of a definitely (or any modal) operator and multiple conclusions, all the pro-
posed notions of supervaluationist consequence coincide with the classical counterpart
[Cob11]. This is not the case, however, in the aforementioned cases.
Typically, supervaluationistic frameworks rely heavily on the notion of super-truth,
1ψ ↔ Tψ, which reads ‘ψ is the case iff it is true that ψ is the case’
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whereby a proposition φ is true iff it is true in all possible ways of precisifying φ. As
commonly expressed, ‘truth is super-truth’, and any proposition that fails to be either
super-true or super-false has no semantic value as such [Var07]. Along these lines, the
so-called global validity, which has been put forward as the most natural notion in a
supervaluationistic framework, evaluates the truth value of the premises and conclusions
of an argument globally, and hence these can be super-true, indeternimate or super-
false. However, global validity gives rise to counterexamples [Var07, Cob11, Cob08]
that have been put forward as objections to the supervaluationistic framework overall
[Wil94], as well as motivated reasonable interest on the right notion of validity in
supervaluation semantics. Moreover, global validity fails to accommodate penumbral
connections, which are arguably an important advantage of supervaluationism over
other theories of vagueness [Var07].
This issue is discussed in depth in [Var07], where a variety of options are presented
(see box 3.1). One of the main alternatives to the notion of global validity is that of
local validity, which is the standard in modal logics [BdRV01] and hence particularly
appropriate for modal approaches to supervaluation semantics. In a local validity
approach, an argument is valid iff the argument is valid in all the precisifications of the
language. Given that each precisification is classical in nature, there are no scenarios
where the value indeternimate occurs, and hence classical consequence rules apply and
behave well.
In standpoint semantics, along the lines of [ADP09], we consider truth to be a modal
notion representing a way of being true rather than a fundamental notion of truth.
Consequently, the fundamental role is played by the notion of truth at a precisification
and we incorporate modal operators such that we can express not only truth relative to
the whole language (which is akin to super-truth) but also truth relative to particular
standpoints. This gives us a variety of applications that have not yet been explored,
particularly for the process of concept negotiation and multi-agent systems, regarding
the reasoning that can be done between standpoints.
In accordance to that, it is natural to adopt a local notion of validity, which is
well studied in the domain of modal logics [BdRV01] and avoids the failure of well
known rules of inference (contraposition, indirect proof, proof by cases and conditional
proof), the failure of entailments with multiple arguments and the failure of entailments
involving special operators such as D or s in our logic.
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Options of validity notions, extracted from [Var07]
• Σ |=GA Γ =df If every φ ∈ Σ is: T on all pi ∈ Π, then some ψ ∈ Γ is: T on all pi ∈ Π
• Σ |=GB Γ =df If every ψ ∈ Γ is: F on all pi ∈ Π, then some φ ∈ Σ is: F on all pi ∈ Π
• Σ |=GC Γ =df If every φ ∈ Σ is: T on all pi ∈ Π, then some ψ ∈ Γ is not: F on all
pi ∈ Π
• Σ |=GD Γ =df If every ψ ∈ Γ is not : T on all pi ∈ Π, then some φ ∈ Σ is: F on all
pi ∈ Π
• Σ |=local Γ =df On all pi ∈ Π: if every φ ∈ Σ is: T, then some ψ ∈ Γ is: T.
• Σ |=X Γ =df If on all pi ∈ Π every φ ∈ Σ is: T, then on all pi ∈ Π some ψ ∈ Γ is: T.
• Σ |=Y Γ =df If on all pi ∈ Π every ψ ∈ Γ is: F, then on all pi ∈ Π some φ ∈ Σ is: F.
Table 3.1: Candidate notions of validity for a supervaluationistic framework, extracted
from [Var07]. Local validity is the standard modal interpretation of ‘truth at a point’.
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The main argument provided against local validity in a supervaluationistic frame-
work is that, since ‘for the supervaluationist that a sentence is true means that it is
true in every precisification (that is, ‘truth is supertruth’)[...], local consequence does
not preserve the supervaluationist-relevant notion of truth’ [Cob11]. However, as put
in [Var07], ‘just as questions of truth may only be answered upon considering the
precisifications of the language, so questions of validity may be answered only upon
considering those precisifications. Just as a statement is rated true, supervaluationally,
if and only if it is true on all admissible precisifications, so an argument may be rated
valid if and only if, necessarily, its premises and conclusions stand in the appropriate
relation on all admissible precisifications’. Given our modal approach and the nature
of our intended applications, focused on supporting reasoning within multiple inter-
pretations of the semantics of terms, it seems to us that the more reasonable option is
to adopt local validity. Moreover, as discussed in [Cob08, Var07], reasoning with other
notions of validity can be performed using a local notion as a base, and hence, wherever
the intended use is gobal (or another) that is still supported in our logic by using the
modal operators ∗ (see the refered papers for more detail).
3.6.1 Super-truth or relative truth
Despite the fact that we focus on the modal notion of ‘truth at a point’ rather than
on that of ‘truth as super-truth’, we do normally include the ∗ operator, which is a
special standpoint containing all the admissible precisifications of the language. This
operator satisfies S5, hence being stronger than the rest of the standpoint operators
s.
There are, however, certain scenarios in which we may want to remove or dismiss
∗, which we can do without prejudice to the rest of our logic. Such scenarios involve
situations in which our system is used to model a variety of standpoints, say those
relevant to a group of stakeholders for the domain of forestry, but were we want to
acknowledge that there may be other admissible standpoints which are not currently
formalised and could disagree with the axioms encoded by ∗. In such cases, proposi-
tions that are true according to all the standpoints in the system are presumed to be
super-true in the presence of ∗, which can allow for further inferences and may not
be intended by the users of the system. Hence, in these scenarios we can completely
suppress the super-truth operator ∗ and reason within relative truth (truth can only
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be relative to a standpoint).
3.7 Higher-order vagueness
The phenomenon of higher-order vagueness rests on the intuition that, as much as
it is difficult to draw a sharp line between, say, a ‘heap’ and a ‘non heap’ (thereby
there being borderline cases of heap), it is also difficult to draw a sharp line between
a ‘heap’ and a ‘borderline-heap’. In other words, in a sorites sequence of heaps, each
with one grain less than the previous one and ending in a single grain, it is not trivial
to determine which is the last clear case of heap, followed by the first borderline case.
This creates second-order vagueness and, by iteration, infinite orders of vagueness and,
hence, unsharpeneability.
The issue of higher-order vagueness is prominent in the philosophical literature,
where it is often considered that a logic of vagueness that does not provide an account
of the phenomenon is deficient [Wil94, KS96a]. Consequently, important objections to
the different theories of vagueness are made on these grounds [Wil94, Far10] In the
case of supervaluation semantics, a notorious part of the literature ([Var07, Cob16,
Fin75, Cob08, Var04] among many others) considers or deals with the phenomenon,
presents counter-arguments to the objections and provides formalisations. In contrast,
several philosophers reduce the phenomenon to an illusion [Wri10] which is deemed to
be incoherent [Cri17] and which does not manifest in language use (‘speakers do not go
around talking about borderline borderline cases and borderline borderline borderline
cases and so forth’ [Raf05])
Given that our framework, standpoint semantics, is mostly intended as a formalism
for knowledge representation and, on the grounds of the absence (or at least scarcity)
of manifestations of higher-order vagueness in language use, we do not account for the
phenomenon. In this way, a statement such as ∗∗ φ is semantically equivalent to
∗ φ. In fact, we have particularly strong axioms governing the iteration of standpoint
operators, as can be seen in chapter 4, section 4.2.3.4. The intuition is that ∗ φ holds
iff φ holds in all the precisifications. Because precisifications are classical, then φ or
¬φ must hold in all pi ∈ Π. Therefore, ∗ φ can not be a vague expression itself and
hence ∗∗ φ is redundant. In our framework, whenever an agent considers that the
valuation of φ is not entirely definite (to any order), then their standpoint must be
formalised such that Is φ, hence the model accounts for at least a precisification in
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which φ does not hold.
On the other hand, standpoint logic does not force one to committ, for φ and a
particular standpoint (or the whole language), to either s φ, Is φ or s ¬φ, nor to
their universal counterparts. In fact, we may know that that ♦s φ but we may not be
able to infer neither s φ or Is φ because the standpoint s has not committed to either.
This feature corresponds to the intuition that standpoints do not necessarily fix the
truth conditions and gaps of the whole language and, moreover, they do not tend to
fix sharp boundaries between unequivocal truth and borderline cases.
Finally, beyond the philosophical discussion and the adoption or rejection of theor-
etical positions disregarding higher-order vagueness as a meaningful phenomenon, we
believe that its exclusion from our framework is unlikely to be a hindrance for its in-
tended applications. On the contrary, the followed approach procures simpler semantic
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4.1 Introduction to a logic of standpoints
In the previous chapter we have introduced the key elements of our framework, namely
precisifications and standpoints, and we have justified our interpretation of truth and
validity. In this chapter we proceed to characterise the framework formally, revisiting
the notions discussed in its precedent and focusing on providing their formal definitions
and discussing their logical properties.
We present standpoint logic, a logic with which we can assert that a proposition holds
according to a particular standpoint, and that can express various relationships between
standpoints. As it is conceived here, it is a multi-modal logic with Kripke semantics,
in which modalities are used to model different interpretations of the semantics of the
vague terms of the language.
From the technical point of view, the proposed multi-modal logic has a set of op-
erators s, one for each standpoint s, each of which satisfies the axioms of KD45.
There is also a ‘universal standpoint’ operator ∗, which is a stronger modality (whose
accessibility relation is reflexive) that satisfies the axioms of S5.
Moreover, there are two main particularities of the standpoint logic with respect to
other well known multi-agent systems of modal logic. On the one hand, the standpoint
modal operators are partially ordered under the subset relation [AH10]. On the other
hand, the relations of the Kripke frames are unary rather than binary, i.e. they are
trivially binary (see section 4.2.2.4). This property is known to occur in KD45 systems
with a single modality [Pie09], but it does not normally extend to systems with multiple
modalities. However, the stronger interaction axioms of standpoint logic, namely AS4
and AS5 (see section 4.2.3.4), extend this property to our multi-modal framework,
consequently improving its computational properties as shown in subsection 4.4.2.
In this chapter we first describe in detail a propositional standpoint logic in section
4.2 by specifying its syntax (subsection 4.2.1), semantics (subsection 4.2.2) and proof
theory (subsection 4.2.3). We then prove soundness and completeness in section 4.3,
decidability and NP -complexity in section 4.4 and we conclude by introducing more
expressive logics in section 4.5, namely a description standpoint logic (subsection 4.5.1),
a predicate standpoint logic (subsection 4.5.2), and finally a two-dimensional standpoint
logic (subsection 4.5.3).
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4.2 Propositional Standpoint Logic, S0
In the current section we introduce a propositional logic for reasoning about stand-
points, the system of modal logic S0.
4.2.1 The formal language LS0
Our propositional standpoint logic S0 consists of a non-empty finite set of propositional
variables P = {P1 , . . . , Pn}, as well as connectives ¬φ, (φ ∧ ψ) and a partially ordered
set of standpoint operators s1 , . . . , sm , ∗.
Definition 1. The language LS0 is the smallest set of formulas, such that P ⊆ LS0
and, for all formulas α, β ∈ LS0 and all standpoint operators s1 , . . . , sm , ∗, we
have:
¬α, (α ∧ β), s α ∈ LS0
The language also includes formulas constructed with definable operators, which
have their usual definitions:
(α ∨ β), (α → β), (α ↔ β), ♦s α ∈ LS0
Beyond the standard definable operators ( ∨ , → , ↔ ,♦s), we can define other
useful operators in LS0 , namely:
• Is φ ≡def (♦s φ ∧ ♦s ¬φ) — means that the truth of φ is indeterminate (i.e.
borderline) according to standpoint s.
• Ds φ ≡def (s φ ∨ s ¬φ) — means φ has a determinate truth value according
to standpoint s.
One can easily see that Is ≡ ¬Ds given that
¬(♦s φ ∧ ♦s ¬φ) ≡ (¬♦s φ ∨ ¬♦s ¬φ) ≡ (s ¬φ ∨ s φ)
.
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In the case where these operators are employed with respect to the universal stand-
point, ∗, we have I∗ φ, which can be read as ‘φ is a borderline proposition’ and D∗ φ,
which can be read as ‘φ is a sharp proposition’1. Recall, from section 3.6.1, that ∗ is the
set of all admissible precisifications, and hence truth with respect to ∗ can be regarded
as super-truth.
Any further occurrences of the Ds operator in this work correspond to the defin-
itions just given, unless otherwise indicated. (In chapter 3 section 3.5.4 we discussed
some other interpretations of a determinacy operator, D, which have been proposed in
the literature on supervaluationism and vagueness.)
4.2.2 Semantics
In this section we present the formal semantics for standpoint logic. We begin by
introducing Kripke semantics in 4.2.2.1, to then define the class of models MS0 of
standpoint logic in 4.2.2.2 and provide formal definitions for validity as in standard
modal logics in 4.2.2.3. The two final subsections are devoted to the analysis of the
particularities of the classMS0 of Kripke models, namely the unary relations and their
binary counterparts (4.2.2.4) and the properties of such counterparts (4.2.2.5).
4.2.2.1 Introduction to Kripke Semantics
Kripke models2 (or variants thereof) are widely used to characterise the semantics
of contemporary modal logics. They are, for example, the basis for many modern
frameworks for reasoning about knowledge and belief [FHMV95], so that an agent’s set
of beliefs is characterised by a set of possible worlds that are interpreted as the states
of affairs that are possible given what the agent believes. It is easy to see that a parallel
can be drawn for a supervaluationist framework if we simply substitute the notion of
possible worlds by possible precisifications, so that an agent’s standpoint is the set of
possible precisifications of the language that are compatible with her statements.
1Note that in other logics, for instance Ground S5, a formula like (s φ ∨ s ¬φ) is considered to
be dishonest, because an agent ‘cannot know one of without knowing one of them’. However, in our
approach, standpoints are only structures that narrow the semantic variability of terms, and in that
sense, the Ds expresses the non trivial commitment that the valuation of φ is classical.
2 Kripke models are also referred as standard models [Che80]
65
4.2 Propositional Standpoint Logic, S0
A formal definition of a Kripke model reads as follows:
Definition 2. A Kripke model M is a triple 〈W,R, V 〉, where W is a set of points or
possible worlds, R is a binary relation on W ×W known as the accessibility relation
and V is the evaluation function V : P → 2W , mapping each propositional constant
p ∈ P to the set V (p) ⊆ W of worlds at which that proposition is true. Formulas are
interpreted as follows:
• (M, w) |= p if and only if w ∈ V (p),
• (M, w) |= ¬φ if and only if (M, w) 2 φ,
• (M, w) |= φ → ψ if and only if (M, w) 2 φ or (M, w) |= ψ,
• (M, w) |= φ if and only if (M, u) |= φ for all u such that Rwu.
This kind of structure can be easily generalised for logics with multiple modalities,
such that if the language contains a set of necessity operators {i | i ∈ I} then the
model has a set of accessibility relations Ri for each i ∈ I.
Definition 3. A Kripke model M for a multi-modal logic is a tuple 〈W,R1, . . . , Rn, |=〉,
where W is a set of points or possible worlds, each Ri is a binary relation on W and V
is the evaluation function V : P → 2W , mapping each propositional constant p ∈ P to
the set V (p) ⊆W of worlds at which that letter is true. Formulas are interpreted as in
Definition 2 except for the modal formulae, which are interpreted by:
• (M, w) |= iA if and only if (M, u) |= A for all u such that Riwu.
Kripke models with no restrictions on the relations determine the modal logic K,
which can be axiomatically specified as smallest modal logic containing axiom AK
[Che80].
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4.2.2.2 The class MS0 of Kripke models
In order to characterise the semantics of standpoint logic we narrow our attention to a
particular class of Kripke models for multi-modal languages, which we name MS0 .
Definition 4. A Kripke model of the class MS0 is a tuple 〈Π, (R,), δ〉 where:
• Π = {. . . , pii , . . .} is a set of points or precisifications.
• (R,) is a partial order of Rs1 , ..., Rsn , R∗ ∈ R under the sharper/subset relation
, where each Rsi is a unary accessibility relation on Π, i.e. a set of precisifica-
tions, and s1  s2 iff s1 ⊆ s2. In particular, R∗ = Π.
• δ : P → 2W is the evaluation function mapping each propositional constant p ∈ P
to the set δ(p) ⊆ Π of worlds at which that letter is true.
Π is a set of points that we call precisifications and are analogous to possible worlds.
(R,) is a partial order of accessibility relations Rs1 , ..., Rsn , R∗ ∈ R, which are
ordered under the subset relation (≡⊆)1. The relations in R are indexed by the
variables s and s′ or s1, . . . sn, ∗, as they model the notion of standpoint (see chapter
3, section 3.5). Hence, Rs  Rs′ is analogous to s  s′.
R∗ is the universal standpoint, such that Rsi  R∗ for all Rsi ∈ R. Each Rsi
(including the special case R∗) is a unary relation on Π, hence a set of precisifications,
and it is non empty. The relation between the unary Rsi and its binary counterpart
(standard in Kripke semantics) R′si is analysed in section 4.2.2.4. Finally, δ is the
interpretation function mapping each propositional constant p to the set δ(p) ⊆ Π of
worlds at which that proposition is true.
4.2.2.3 Validity
The notion of validity in Standpoint Logic is discussed in section 3.6 and is the standard
in modal logic. In this section we provide some formal definitions for subsequent use.
For further reading on validity in modal logics see [Che80].
1The symbol  is used to denote the relation sharper than which holds between standpoints. In
the semantics of the model, however, this is equivalent to the subset relation because standpoints are
modelled as sets.
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Definition 5. We write (M, pi) |= φ to mean that φ is true at precisification pi in model
M, and it is defined recursively as follows,
• (M, pi) |= p if and only if pi ∈ δ(p),
• (M, pi) |= ¬φ if and only if (M, pi) 2 φ,
• (M, pi) |= φ → ψ if and only if (M, pi) 2 φ or (M, pi) |= ψ,
• (M, pi) |= si φ if and only if (M, pi′) |= φ for all pi′ such that pi′ ∈ Rsi .
Definition 6. A formula φ is valid in M, written M |= φ, if it is true at every preci-
sification in M,
M |= φ iff M, pi |= φ for all pi ∈ Π .
Let MS0 be the class of models S0,
Definition 7. We write |=S0 φ to mean that φ is valid in the classMS0 of models and,
hence, φ is a theorem of propositional standpoint logic. This is defined by:
|=S0 φ iff M |= φ for all M ∈MS0
4.2.2.4 The accessibility relation R and its counterpart R′
The accessibility relation Rsi represents the set of precisifications that are admissible
or accessible relative to some standpoint si. In particular, if pi ∈ Rsi , then we can think
of pi as being a possible precisification that is compatible with all that the standpoint
si makes precise.
Following the former, Rsi is a unary relation that holds (or not) for any preci-
sification pi in Π. But, although it is natural to specify our semantics by associating
standpoints with sets of precisifications, it is sometimes convenient to recast this struc-
ture in terms of a standard (i.e. binary) Kripke relation over the precisifications. For
each si, we define a relation R′si over Π:
R′si ≡ Π×Rsi
The standard accessibility relation R′si determines, for a precisification pi, the set of
precisifications that are admissible (accessible) under a standpoint si. We can use this
equivalent specification to relate properties of our models to properties that are well
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known with regard to Kripke semantics (e.g symmetry, transitivity, . . . ), as well as to
proofs for the systems S5 and KD45 which our logic extends. However, in most of the
presentation we will use Rsi for simplicity and compactness.
Note that R being a unary relation reflects the fact that the framework assumes
that any speaker of the heterogeneous language is able to understand what are the
admissible interpretations of terms that are left open by any standpoint of the system,
under the assumption that understanding how words can be used is a crucial part
necessary for ‘speaking’ a language.
In practice, this means that assertions such as ‘φ is the case according to standpoint
s’ (s φ) have the same truth conditions regardless of the current state or precisification
(pi). While this approach may seem unrealistic at first glance, it is due to the fact that
standpoint operators do not model the epistemic state of agents. In fact, there is not
a relation one to one from agents to precisifications or standpoints. This is because,
instead of using fixed precisifications or standpoints themselves, the agents may change
standpoints depending on the situation. Moreover, it is considered that a fundamental
part of a speaker’s knowledge of the language is to understand how words can be used
differently in different settings, which justifies being able to access the precisifications
of a standpoint from any state or precisification.
For instance, let us consider that ‘according to the standpoint s Nena is tall’, form-
alised as s[NTall]. Then, regardless of her own standpoint, say s′, and of the pointed
precisification, say pi, the agent understands that ‘according to the standpoint s Nena
is tall’. Hence, any language user of a heterogeneous language can understand that
another agent is using an interpretation of a term (for example a very slack use of tall)
when that is made explicit, even though they would not consider using such standpoint
in such situation themselves.
This feature of the precisification space implies that the models in MS0 are a sim-
plified subset of standard Kripke models, which in turn provides the logic with good
computational properties as shown in the complexity proof in section 4.4.2. Moreover,
the possibility to simplify normal modal logics satisfying K45 has been already shown
in [PKP19] for systems with a single modality, where a similar treatment is given.
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4.2.2.5 Properties of the Accessibility Relations
Standpoint accessibility relations Rsi , or the binary counterpart R′si , represent the set
of precisifications that are admissible relative to some standpoint si, i.e. the set of
precisifications that are accessible through some standpoint si from each precisification
pi. As such, every R′si contains a tuple 〈pi, pi′〉 for all pi ∈ Π to all pi′ ∈ si. In particular,
if pi′ is such that 〈pi, pi′〉 ∈ R′si , then we can think of pi′ as being a possible precisification
from the standpoint si.
si
Figure 4.1: Accessibility relations for Rs1 .
Figure 4.1 shows the accessibility relations for standpoint s1, which contains three
of the five precisifications in the model. The grey dots are precisifications, the circle
denotes the set of precisifications si and the arrows are the relations 〈pi, pi′〉 ∈ R′si ,
connecting all pi ∈ Π to all pi′ ∈ Rsi .
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In figure 4.1, R′si consists of the tuples:
[〈pi1, pi1〉, 〈pi1, pi2〉, 〈pi1, pi3〉, 〈pi2, pi1〉, 〈pi2, pi2〉, 〈pi2, pi3〉, 〈pi3, pi1〉, 〈pi3, pi2〉, 〈pi3, pi3〉,
〈pi4, pi1〉, 〈pi4, pi2〉, 〈pi4, pi3〉, 〈pi5, pi1〉, 〈pi5, pi2〉, 〈pi5, pi3〉] (4.1)
Every standpoint accessibility relation R′si has the following properties:
1. Serial: For each x ∈ Π there exists some y ∈ Π such that R′sxy; or alternatively,
there exists some y ∈ Π such that Rsy. This holds as a result of standpoints being
non empty sets.
2. Transitive: R′sxy ∧ R′syz → R′sxz. Moreover, since R′sxy and R′syz we know that
Rsy and Rsz from any pi ∈ Π. Consequently, transitivity is a consequence of all
pi ∈ s being accessible between them.
3. Euclidean: R′sxy ∧ R′sxz implies that R′syz. This occurs again on the grounds
that all the precisificatons in a standpoint s are related among them under R′s. As
a result, if R′sxy ∧ R′sxz then y, z ∈ s and consequently R′syz.
4. Dense: R′sxz → (∃y ∈ Π | [R′sxy ∧ R′syz]). R′sxz implies that there is also R′szz,
hence the axiom holds easily for y = z.
In addition to the former, if we call R′ to the assignment of a binary relation R′s
to each standpoint s, then the assignment is monotonic since if s  s′ then we have
Rs ⊆ Rs′ and hence Π × Rs ⊆ Π × Rs′ so that R′s ⊆ R′s′ . Monotonicity ensures
that, whenever a precisification is accessible from pi under a standpoint s then it is
also accessible from pi under any other standpoint s′ such that s  s′. I.e. it is also
accessible from any standpoint that is less sharp than s.
The standpoint with label ∗ is universal, hence for all x, y ∈ Π, R′∗xy. This is the
case given that the standpoint ∗ encapsulates the notion of supertruth and consequently
something that is necessarily true in ∗ must be true in all the precesifications in the
language. Given that standpoint ∗ is the set of all admissible precisifications, it points
to the whole set of precisifications Π.
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Consequently, the relation R′∗ has the following additional properties:
1. Reflexive R′∗xx.
2. Symmetric R′∗xy implies R′∗yx
Finally, we discuss further restrictions or properties that hold in the models inMS0 ,
and that will be useful when proving completeness. These arise due to the interaction
axioms that involve two different modalities. We shall say that the relations are trans-
transitive, trans-dense1 and trans-euclidean, where the properties hold across different
relations in R′. This is shown in detail for two arbitrary relations R′s1 and R
′
s2 :




s1xz. This holds in any M ∈MS0 due
to the fact that:
(a) If R′s1yz, then z ∈ s1 and hence, for all p ∈ Π it is also the case that R′s1pz:
R′s1yz → ∀p ∈ Π[R′s1pz]
(b) For p = x the property holds
2. Trans-dense R′s1xz → ∃(y ∈ Π) [R′s2xy ∧ R′s1yz]: Whenever R′s1xz then for all
standpoints s2 there exists a y ∈ Π such that R′s2xy ∧ R′s1yz. This occurs on the
grounds that:
(a) Standpoints are non-empty, therefore for any standpoint s2 there exists a
precisification q ∈ Π such that q ∈ s2:
∃(q ∈ Π)[q ∈ s2]
(b) For all r ∈ Π and q ∈ s2, it is the case that R′s2rq:
q ∈ s2 → ∀(r ∈ Π)[R′s2rq]
(c) By 2(a) and 2(b) we have that for any r ∈ Π and any standpoint s2 there is
a q ∈ Π such that R′s2rq:
∀(r ∈ Π),∃(q ∈ Π)[R′s2rq]
(d) By 2(c) and the modified density axiom, let q be y and given that x is a
precisification (i.e. x ∈ Π), we have that:
R′s1xz → ∃(y ∈ Π)[R′s2xy] for any stanspoint s2
1Density and its corresponding axiom φ → φ hold in systems satisfying KD45, as they can
be derived from the rest of axioms. See [Che80] for the proof.
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(e) By 3(a) and 2(d): R′s1xz → ∃(y ∈ Π)[R′s2xy ∧ R′s1yz].
3. Trans-euclidean R′s2xy ∧ R′s1xz → R′s1yz: This is identical to the trans-transitive
case. Formally:
(a) If R′s1xz, then z ∈ s1 and hence, for all p ∈ Π it is also the case that R′s1pz:
R′s1xz → ∀p ∈ Π[R′s1pz]
(b) For p = y the property holds
The properties of the accessibility relations force the validity of the axioms that
we discuss in the following section 4.2.3 in any model of the class MS0 , making them
theorems of S0 by Definition 7, which will be proved in section 4.3.
4.2.3 Proof theory
We now specify a proof system for the logic S0. We write `S0 φ to mean that φ is a
derivable theorem of S0. We give a Hilbert-style axiomatic proof system for determining
the theorems of S0.
We shall specify a set of axioms and four inference rules for the modal Standpoint
logic with the partial order (R,), which capture significant aspects of the semantics.
The axioms are specified by schemas, where all occurrences of each of the meta-variables
(φ and ψ) may be instantiated by any formula of LS0 (all occurrence of a given meta-
variable must be substituted by the same formula, but where both φ and ψ occur in a
schema they may be substituted by different formulas). Since standpoint logic is built
upon an underlying classical logic, all classically valid formulas are theorems. We will
not give a particular axiomatisation for classical logic but assume that we have a sound
and complete method of determining which formulas are classically valid.
4.2.3.1 Axioms
S0 satisfies the following well-known modal axioms:
AK s(φ → ψ) → (s φ → s ψ)
AD s φ → ♦s φ
AT* ∗ φ → φ (note that AT* only applies to the universal operator ∗.)
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Additionally, two modal axioms govern interactions between the standpoint mod-
ality operators:
AS4 s φ → s′ s φ
AS5 ♦s φ → s′ ♦s φ
And finally the partial order axiom:
AP s φ → s′ φ for s′  s
Axiom AP captures the meaning of , by ensuring that any proposition considered
definite in a given standpoint is also considered definite in any sharper standpoint.
Moreover, we note that the well known modal axioms 4 and 5 are immediately
derivable as special cases of AS4 and AS5, where s′ = s. Thus, each operator s
obeys the axioms AK, AD, 4 and 5, which are standard axioms for the normal modal
logic KD45 and the ∗ operator satisfies an S5 modality. This is discussed in more
detail in section 4.2.3.4.
4.2.3.2 Inference Rules
The inference rules of S0 are: the rule that classical theorems are provable (RC), the
rule that all instances of the axioms are provable (RA), the classical modus ponens rule
(MP) and the rule of necessitation (RN):
RC. `S0 φ, if φ is a theorem of classical propositional logic (where we treat all modal
sub-formulas of φ as atomic propositions).
RA. `S0 φ, if φ is an instance of one of the modal axioms (AK, AD, AT*, AS4, AS5).
MP. If `S0 φ and `S0 φ → ψ, then `S0 ψ.
RN. If `S0 φ, then `S0 s φ, for all standpoints s ∈ S.
A proof of φ in S0 is a sequence of formulas, ending in φ, such that each formula is
either provable directly by RC or RA, or is derivable using MP or RN from formulas
that occur earlier in the sequence.
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4.2.3.3 Derivable theorems
We now list some theorems that are derivable using axioms ♦Df and AK and rules
RC, MP and RN and will be used in establishing properties of the system.
AK1. ♦s(φ ∧ ψ) → ♦s φ
AK♦. s(φ → ψ) → (♦s φ → ♦s ψ)
AC. s(φ ∧ ψ) ↔ s φ ∧ s ψ
AC♦. ♦s(φ ∨ ψ) ↔ ♦s φ ∨ ♦s ψ
4.2.3.4 Axioms AS4 and AS5: Embedded standpoint operators
The standpoint operator s, its special case ∗ and the rest of the definable syntax (♦s,
♦∗, . . . ) flatten when embedding another standpoint operator. Consequently, complex
propositions consisting of chains of two or more standpoint operators as well as nested
expressions can be simplified into a single standpoint operator.
This property is what we call flattening standpoints, which consists of the fact that
standpoint iteration is superfluous, not only for iterations of operators of the same
standpoint but for any modal operator. Consequently, any string of box or diamond
standpoint operators may be replaced by a single standpoint box or diamond, the last
one in the string.
This feature is common to other systems of modal logic with a single modality
satisfying the normal axioms 4 (φ → φ) and 5 (♦φ → ♦φ), which make the
iteration of modal operators redundant. An alethic interpretation of this feature would
be to say that a statement such as ‘It is necessary that it is necessary that pi’ says
nothing more than ‘It is necessary that pi’. Moreover, saying that ‘It is possible that it
is necessary that pi’ is the same as saying that ‘It is necessary that pi’.
Yet, our AS4 and AS5 are stronger than 4 and 5. Rather than being restricted to a
single modal operator (and its dual) as in epistemic logic, where positive introspection
reads as ‘if I know φ then I know that I know φ’ (Kiφ → KiKiφ) but not necessarily
‘if I know φ then x knows that I know φ’ (Kiφ → KxKiφ), in our system if φ is the
case according to standpoint s, then it follows that according to any other standpoint
s′ it is the case that φ is the case according to standpoint s: s φ → s′ s φ.
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Axioms Relations
Name Schema Property Schema
AK s(φ → ψ) →
(s φ → s ψ)
All
AD s φ → ♦s φ Serial ∀x,∃y R′sxy
A4 s φ → ss φ Transitive R′sxy ∧ R′syz → R′sxz
A5 ♦s φ → s ♦s φ Euclidean R′sxy ∧ R′sxz → R′syz
AS4 s φ → s′ s φ Trans-transitive R′s2xy ∧ R′s1yz → R′s1xz
AS5 ♦s φ → s′ ♦s φ Trans-euclidean R′s2xy ∧ R′s1xz → R′s1yz
AT* ∗ φ → φ Reflexive ∀x R′∗xx
AP s φ → s′ φ (s′  s) Monotonic R′sxy ∧ s  s′ → R′s′xy
Table 4.1: Correspondence between the axioms in S0 and the properties of the relations
of the models MS0 .
An example of how this feature reads goes as follows: if it is the case that ‘This is a
forest according to the FAO1’, which we formalise as FAO IsForest, then according to
any agent’s standpoint α, it can only be the case that ‘according to his standpoint (sα),
this is a forest according to the FAO2’, which can be formalised as αFAO IsForest.
4.2.4 Correspondence between model properties and axioms
Correspondence theory is well studied for normal modal logics [Che80], and states
that the restrictions in the Kripke or standard models (such as forcing relations to
be reflexive, serial, . . . ) correspond to the validity of certain axioms in the syntactic
counterpart (e.g. AT* and AD respectively). In this section we quickly overview
the correspondence between our semantics and syntax (displayed in table 4.1) before
proceeding to prove that the logic S0 is determined by the classMS0 of Kripke models.
It is known that, given that standpoint logic is a normal modal logic, AK holds for
all standpoints, being determined by the general class of Kripke models. Further, the
correspondence between relation properties and the theoremhood of the axioms in S0 is
1Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO)
2FAO
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as follows. Serial standpoint relations s correspond to the axiom AD being a theorem of
S0, the reflexive relation R′∗ to the axiom AT* holding for the modal ∗, transitive and
euclidean relations to the axioms A4 and A5 respectively, monotonicity corresponds
to the partial order axiom AP. Finally, as we prove in the following section, trans-
transitive and trans-euclidean relations correspond to our stronger interaction axioms
AS4 and AS5. The set of correspondences can be seen in detail in table 4.2.3.4. More
properties and axioms hold, such as density corresponding to φ → φ, but they
are derivable from the axioms and properties presented in this table1.
4.3 Soundness and Completeness of S0
Following [Che80], a system of modal logic is said to be sound with respect to a class
of models just in case every theorem of the system is valid in the class of models.
Conversely, a system is complete with respect to a class of models if and only if every
sentence valid in the class of models is a theorem of the system. Finally, a system of
modal logic is determined by a class of models when it is both sound and complete,
such that for every φ,
`S0 φ iff |=S0 φ
In this section we shall show soundness and completeness, hence determination, of
the system of modal logic S0 with respect to the class of models MS0 . Note that it is
possible that a system of modal logic be determined by more than one class of models
[Che80].
4.3.1 Soundness
We first record some preliminary definitions,
Definition 8. A proof in S0 is a finite sequence of sequents:
Γ1|θ1, ...,Γm|θm
where θi ∈ LS and Γi ⊆ LS are finite, such that for each i = 1, ...,m either the
formula θi is an instance of an axiom of S0 or for some j1, ..., js < i
1Axioms A4 and A5 are also derivable but we include them as they help illustrating our stronger
interaction axioms AS4 and AS5
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Γj1|θj1, . . . ,Γjs|θjs
Γi|θi
is an instance of one of the rules of proof.
Definition 9. For θ ∈ LS and Γ ⊆ LS, possibly infinite, we define:
Γ `S0 θ ⇐⇒ there is a proof Γ1|θ1, ...,Γm|θm in S0 such that
Γm ⊆ Γ and θm = θ
In this case, Γ1|θ1, ...,Γm|θm is called a proof of θ from Γ in S0.
Theorem 1 (Soundness). If Γ ⊆ LS and θ ∈ LS, then,
whenever Γ `S0 θ we must have Γ |=S0 θ .
Proof.
Let Γ1|θ1, ...,Γm|θm be a proof of Γ `S0 θ. Hence, Γm ⊆ Γ and θm = θ, and we
show by induction on k that Γk |=S0 θk for k = 1, 2, ...,m.
With M = 〈Π, (R,), δ〉 an interpretation structure in MS0 , we show that Γk `S0
θk → Γk |=S0 θk in the case (1) where Γk|θk is an instance of an axiom of S0 and in
the case (2) where Γk|θk is obtained by applying a rule of S0 to some Γ1|θ1, ...,Γm|θm
where 1, ...,m < k
4.3.1.1 Case 1. Γk|θk is an axiom of S0
AK. s(φ→ ψ)→ (s φ→ s ψ)
Let pi ∈ Π and (M, pi) |= s(φ→ ψ),
⇒ (M, pi′) |= φ→ ψ for all pi′ ∈ Rs (1)
Let (M, pi) |= s φ,
⇒ (M, pi′) |= φ for all pi′ ∈ Rs
⇒ (M, pi′) |= ψ for all pi′ ∈ Rs (by 1)
⇒ (M, pi) |= s ψ
⇒ (M, pi) |= s φ→ s ψ
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⇒ (M, pi) |= s(φ→ ψ)→ (s φ→ s ψ)
⇒ |= s(φ→ ψ)→ (s φ→ s ψ) as pi is arbitrary.
.
The case of ∗ follows in the same way.
AD. s φ→ ♦s φ
We must show that for all pi ∈ Π, (M, pi) |= s φ → ♦s φ. Let pi and pi′ be arbitrary
precisifications pi, pi′ ∈ Π,
(M, pi) |= s φ⇒ (M, pi′) |= φ for all pi′ ∈ Rs
⇒ (M, pi′) |= φ for some pi′ ∈ Rs as Rs 6= ∅ ⇒ (M, pi) |= ♦s φ
⇒ (M, pi) |= s φ→ ♦s φ
⇒|= s φ→ ♦s φ as pi is arbitrary.
AT. ∗ φ→ φ
Let pi ∈ Π, and assume (M, pi) |= ∗ φ,
(M, pi) |= ∗ φ
(M, pi′) |= φ for all pi′ ∈ Π
(M, pi) |= φ since pi ∈ Π
AP. s φ→ s′ φ iff (s′  s)
Let pi ∈ Π, and assume:
(M, pi) |= (s φ)
then,
(M, pi) |= (s φ) (*)
And since s′  s,
⇒ Rs′ ⊆ Rs and therefore for all p ∈ Rs then p ∈ Rs′ (**)
⇒ (M, pi′) |= φ for all pi′ ∈ Rs by *
⇒ (M, pi′) |= φ for all pi′ ∈ Rs′ by **
⇒ (M, pi) |= (s′ φ)
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AS4. s φ→ s′ s φ
Let pi ∈ Π, and assume (M, pi) |= s φ
(M, pi′) |= φ for all pi′ ∈ Rs (1)
Let pi′′ ∈ Rs′
〈M, pi′′〉 |= s φ by 1
(M, pi) |= s′ s φ
AS5. ♦s φ→ s′ ♦s φ
Let pi ∈ Π and assume (M, pi) |= ♦s φ,
(M, pi′) |= φ for some pi′ ∈ Rs (1)
Let pi′′ ∈ Rs′ ,
〈M, pi′′〉 |= ♦s φ by 1
(M, pi) |= s′ ♦s φ
4.3.1.2 Case 2. Γk|θk is obtained by applying a rule
Γk|θk is obtained by applying a rule of S0 to some Γ1|θ1, ...,Γm|θm where 1, ...,m < k
By the induction hypothesis we know that Γn |=S0 θn for n = 1, ...,m.
Our only rules are that classical theorems are probable (RC), the rule that all
instances of the axioms are provable (RA), Modus Ponens (MP) and the rule of neces-
sitation (RN). Modus Ponens and RC follow as in the propositional calculus, since the
verification always remains within one precisification. We have shown that all instances
of the axioms are provable (RA). It remains to show that |=S0 respects the necessity
rule:
RN s φ for any theorem φ (i.e. if φ is provable from no premisses).
In other words, we may assume |=S0 φ and we must show. |= s φ
Let pi ∈ Π. Since |=S0 φ we know,
(M, pi′) |= φ for all pi′ ∈ Π
⇒ (M, pi) |= s φ as any Rs is Rs ⊆ Π
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This finishes our soundness proof of S0 with respect to the class MS0 of Kripke
frames. Note that the same proof could be written with the analogous binary relations
R′s ∈ R′ without major differences.
4.3.2 Completeness
We show that every formula φ that is valid according to the semantics of standpoint
logic (i.e. |=S0 φ) is provable in the above proof system.
Theorem 2 (Completeness). If φ ∈ LS0, then
|=S0 φ⇒ `S0 φ
Completeness of multimodal KD45 systems with respect to transitive, serial and
euclidean Kripke frames has been proven. We first introduce some preliminary ideas
and methods used in the proofs. We then outline the completeness proof for multimodal
KD45 logics provided in [FHMV95] and proceed to prove completeness of the exten-
sion of KD45 presented here, namely standpoint logic S0 with respect to the class of
models MS0 .
4.3.2.1 Maximal Consistent Formula Sets
Definition 10. A set of sentences Λ is consistent in S0 or S0-consistent (ConS0Λ) just
in case a constradiction (φ ∧ ¬φ) is not deducible from Λ.
We write CønS0Λ just in case Λ is not consistent.
Definition 11. A set of sentences Γ is maximal consistent in S0 just in case it is
S0-consistent and has only S0-inconsistent proper extensions, i.e. for any φ ∈ LS0 ,
either φ ∈ Γ or ¬φ ∈ Γ.
All theorems of S0 are in every maximal S0-consistent set of formulas. Moreover,
maximal consistent sets are closed under entailment, meaning that deducibility and
membership coincide. We recapitulate theorem 2.12 from [Che80], where a proof is
provided:
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Theorem 3. Let Γ be a S0-maximal set of sentences and let T be the set of theorems
of S0 (i.e. T = {φ | `S0 φ}). Then:
1. φ ∈ Γ iff Γ `S0 φ.
2. T ⊆ Γ.
3. φ ∈ Γ for any formula φ that is a theorem of classical propositional logic.
4. φ 6∈ Γ if ¬φ is a theorem of classical propositional logic.
5. ¬φ ∈ Γ iff φ /∈ Γ.
6. (φ ∧ ψ) ∈ Γ iff both φ ∈ Γ and ψ ∈ Γ.
7. (φ ∨ ψ) ∈ Γ iff either φ ∈ Γ or ψ ∈ Γ.
8. (φ → ψ) ∈ Γ iff either φ 6∈ Γ or ψ ∈ Γ.
9. (φ ↔ ψ) ∈ Γ iff either φ, ψ ∈ Γ or ψ, φ 6∈ Γ.
The next theorem is known as Lindenbaum’s lemma. It is the proposition that
every consistent set of sentences has a maximal extension.
Theorem 4 (Lindenbaum’s lemma). If γ is S0-consistent, then there exists a Γ such
that (i) γ ⊆ Γ and (ii) Γ is a S0-maximal set of formulas.
A proof for Lindenbaum’s lemma is provided in [Che80].
4.3.2.2 The canonical model
One of the key ideas of this completeness proof is that of a canonical model for a system
of modal logic. A canonical model is a particular type of model where the set of points
is the set of all the maximal consistent sets of the language.
Definition 12. A canonical model of the system of modal logic S0 is a model MC =
〈Π, (R′,), δ〉 in which:
(a) Π is the set of all maximal S0-consistent sets of sentences. Hence, each precisific-
ation piΓ ∈ Π is identified with a maximal S0-consistent set of sentences, Γ.
(b) Each relation R′s ∈ (R′,) is such that (piA, piB) ∈ R′s iff {φ : s φ ∈ A} ⊆ B.
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(c) The evaluation function δ : P → 2W maps each propositional constant p ∈ P to
the set δ(p) ⊆ Π of precisifications {piΓ | p ∈ Γ}.
Remark 1. Each relation R′s ∈ R′ can alternatively be defined in terms of the diamond
operator such that (piA, piB) ∈ R′s iff {♦s φ : φ ∈ piB} ⊆ piA. Hence, {φ : s φ ∈ piA} ⊆
piB iff {♦s φ : φ ∈ piB} ⊆ piA (see [Che80] p.174).
Because in the canonical model each of the worlds or precisifications is an S0-
maximal set of sentences, then the sentences that are true at a world are those that are
contained by it, such that piΓ is the precisification determined by a S0-maximal sets of
sentences Γ.
Lemma 1. For φ an S0-consistent formula and Γ a S0-maximal consistent formula
set,
MC , piΓ |= φ iff φ ∈ Γ
The first part of our completeness proof consists of showing that any consistent
formula in the S0-language, φ ∈ LS0 , has a model: the canonical model. That is, we
prove that any consistent formula φ is true at some precisification of a model MC .
Subsequently, one must typically show that such a model is of the class of intended
models. As we will prove, the relations in MC are serial, trans-transitive and trans-
euclidean, but R′∗ is an equivalence relation rather than universal and relations can not
be simplified into sets. Hence, MC is in fact not of the class MS0 of intended models1.
However, we will then show that we can generate a submodel MCΓ of MC such that
R′∗ is universal and all relations can be simplified into sets.
Lemma 2. For each φ such that MC , piΓ |= φ, there is a model MCΓ equivalent to MC
with respect to Γ such that
MCΓ ∈MS0
1Note that it is possible that a system of modal logic be determined by more than one class of models
(see [Che80] p.60). Until this point, the proof of completeness shows that S0 is complete with respect
to the class of models that are serial, trans-transitive and trans-euclidean, where R′∗ is an equivalence
relation, and without further restrictions. Yet, because we are interested in simpler models, we will go
further in proving that S0 is also determined by the more restricted class MS0 .
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Note that the model MCΓ is equivalent to MC with respect to Γ if for any formula
φ then,
MCΓ , piΓ |= φ iff MC , piΓ |= φ
Before proceeding to the detailed proofs, let us visualise an example of a canonical
model MC for a small S0-language consisting of a single propositional variable. Let us
also visualise how a particular proposition φ in that language is satisfied by both MC
and a submodel MCΓ5 such that φ ∈ Γ5, and how the latter is of the class MS0 .
Example 4.3.1. Let us consider a LS0 consisting of the set of propositional variables
P = {p} and the standpoints s and ∗. Now, for the sake of example, let us imagine
that we want to see if the consistent sentence φ = p ∧ s ¬p is satisfiable.
We first proceed to build the canonical model. For the language LS0 the set of dis-
tinct maximal consistent sets is {Γ1,Γ2,Γ3,Γ4,Γ5,Γ6,Γ7,Γ8}, such that each maximal
consistent set is the closure under entailment of the following sets:
• {p, s p, ∗ p} ⊆ Γ1
• {¬p, s ¬p, ∗ ¬p} ⊆ Γ2
• {p, s p, I∗ p} ⊆ Γ3
• {¬p, s p, I∗ p} ⊆ Γ4
• {p, Is p, I∗ p} ⊆ Γ5
• {¬p, Is p, I∗ p} ⊆ Γ6
• {p, s ¬p, I∗ p} ⊆ Γ7
• {¬p, s ¬p, I∗ p} ⊆ Γ8
In figure 4.2, we an see the canonical model MC generated from the maximal con-
sistent sets, where each point pii is associated with the respective set Γi and where the
relations are established following the definition 12. Moreover, note that the canonical
model satisfies φ at point pi5,
φ ∈ Γ5 and MC , pi5 |= φ
It should be easy to see how MC does not belong to the class of intended models,
as ∗ is clearly not universal. However, the proof of Lemma 2 shows how for φ ∈ Γ5,
the submodel MCΓ5 , which includes Γ5 and is closed under the ∗ relation, belongs to the
class of intended models, MS0 , and equally satisfies φ.
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Figure 4.2: Representation of the canonical model MC for the language LS0 with P =
{p} and the standpoints s and ∗, as well as the model MCΓ5 which is equivalent to MC
with respect to the precisification pi5, such that φ ∈ pi5.
4.3.2.3 Completeness proof
We are now ready to prove completeness of the system of standpoint logic S0 with
respect to the class MS0 of Kripke models.
The proof is by a Henkin-style method. We show that every consistent formula has
a model; or, more precisely: for every formula φ that cannot be proved to be false,
there is a model in which φ is true at at least one precisification:
Lemma 3. For some M ∈MS0 and pi ∈ ΠM,
if 6`S0 ¬φ then M, pi |= φ .
Proof of Theorem 2 (Completeness).
To see that Lemma 3 entails Theorem 2 suppose, for the sake of contradiction,
that |=S0 φ and 6`S0 φ. From Lemma 3, if 6`S0 φ then M, pi |= ¬φ for some M ∈ MS0
and pi ∈ ΠM. This is however a contradiction with |=S0 φ, since, for φ to be valid,
¬φ must be false at every precisification of every model. Hence, we conclude that
Lemma 3 entails Theorem 2.
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Proof of Lemma 3.
In order to prove Lemma 3, we use Lindenbaum’s lemma (Theorem 4) to build a
maximal S0-consistent formula set Γ from φ. Then, by direct application of Lemma 1,
from φ ∈ Γ we get that MC , piΓ |= φ, where MC is the canonical model. Finally, by
Lemma 2 we know that there is an equivalent model MCΓ with respect to φ such that
MCΓ ∈MS0 . This suffices to prove Lemma 3 given that we show that for all φ ∈ LS0
there is a model MCΓ in which φ is true at least at one precisification, and that belongs
to the class MS0 of Kripke models, in correspondence with our proof theory.
Proof of Lemma 1.
In order to prove Lemma 1 we build the MC as follows. Given a set of formulas
Γ, and a standpoint si, we define
Γ/si = {φ | si φ ∈ Γ} .
We then let MC = 〈Π, (R′,), δ〉 be such that
• Π is the set of maximal LS0-consistent sets of sentences,
• each R′si in the partial order (R
′,) is R′si = {(piΓ, piΣ) | Γ/si ⊆ Σ},
• δ(piΓ, p) = t iff p ∈ Γ,
• δ(piΓ, p) = f iff p /∈ Γ.
Each precisification in MC corresponds to a maximal consistent set of formulas,
which are the formulas that are true according to that precisification. The accessibility
relation R′si relates each precisification piΓ to all those precisifications piΓ′ , such that for
every formula si φ that is true in piΓ, the formula φ is true in piΓ′ .
We now proceed to show that every consistent formula φ has a model, in particular
the canonical model MC . Recall that every consistent formula must be a member of
at least one maximal consistent set, and the canonical model contains a precisification
for every maximal consistent formula set. We will now show that the formulae true at
each precisification in the canonical model are exactly the formulae in the associated
maximal consistent formula set. Thus, φ will be true at at least one precisification in
the canonical model.
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We prove this by induction on the structure of φ, so that for all piΓ ∈ Π we have that
(MC , piΓ) |= φ iff φ ∈ Γ. We thus assume that Lemma 1 holds for all subformulas of
φ and we show that it also holds for φ.
(a) Base Case, φ is an atomic formula. Suppose φ is an atomic formula Pi. If
Pi ∈ Γ then MC , piΓ |= Pi and if Pi /∈ Γ then MC , piΓ 2 Pi, both by definition of δ.
(b) φ is a conjunction α ∧ β: If α ∧ β ∈ Γ then, by Theorem 3(6), α ∈ Γ and
β ∈ Γ. Assuming that the theorem has been established for α and β, it must be
the case that MC , piΓ |= α and MC , piΓ |= β. Therefore, according to the semantics,
MC , piΓ |= α ∧ β.
In the case where α ∧ β 6∈ Γ, the closure of piΓ under entailment ensures that at
least one of α and β is not in piΓ. Hence, either MC , piΓ 2 α or MC , piΓ 2 β or both.
Consequently, according to the semantics, MC , piΓ 2 α ∧ β.
(c) φ is a negation ¬α: If ¬α ∈ Γ then, by Theorem 3(5), we must have α 6∈ Γ.
So, if the theorem has been proved for α, then MC , piΓ 2 α. Hence, according to the
semantics, MC , piΓ |= ¬α.
In the case where ¬α 6∈ Γ then, because piΓ is maximal, we must have α ∈ Γ. Thus,
if the theorem has been proved for α, then MC , piΓ |= α. Hence MC , piΓ 2 ¬α.
(d) φ is a modal formula si α: We adapt and complete the proof provided in
[FHMV95]. We first show that if si α ∈ Γ then MC , piΓ |= si α. First, we know
that if si α ∈ Γ then α ∈ Γ/si . By the definition of R′si , if (piΓ, piΣ) ∈ R′si then
Γ/si ⊆ Σ, and hence α ∈ Σ. We now assume, by induction, that the theorem has
been proved for α ∈ Σ, so that MC , piΣ |= α for all Σ such that (piΓ, piΣ) ∈ R′si . Then,
according to the semantics, it follows that MC , piΓ |= si α.
For the other direction, we show that if MC , piΓ |= si α then si α ∈ Γ. As-
sume MC , piΓ |= si α. Then, for the sake of contradiction, assume that the set
(Γ/si) ∪ {¬α} is S0-consistent, such that α /∈ (Γ/si) and therefore si α /∈ Γ.
By Lindenbaum’s lemma (Theorem 4) (Γ/si) ∪ {¬α} would have a maximal S0-
consistent extension Σ and, by construction, we would have (piΓ, piΣ) ∈ R′si . By the
induction hypothesis we have MC , piΣ |= ¬α, and so MC , piΓ |= ¬si α, hence reaching
a contradiction.
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Since (Γ/si) ∪ {¬α} is not S0-consistent then there must be some finite subset
{ψ1, ..., ψn−1} ∪ {¬α} that is not S0-consistent.1 By the properties of deducibility and
consistency (see [Che80], p.49 for the formal proof), we have that {ψ1, ..., ψn−1} `S0 α.
CønS0({ψ1, ..., ψn−1} ∪ {¬α}) iff {ψ1, ..., ψn−1} `S0 α
Then again by the properties of deducibility and consistency (see [Che80], p.48 for
the formal proof), we have that
{ψ1, ..., ψn−1} `S0 ψn → α iff {ψ1, ..., ψn−1} ∪ {ψn} `S0 α
Hence, by iteration and propositional logic we can easily get that
`S0 ψ1 → (...→ (ψn → α)...).
And by the necessitation rule ,
`S0 si(ψ1 → (...→ (ψn → α)...)). (d.1)
By induction on n, together with axiom AK and propositional reasoning, we can
show
`S0 si(ψ1 → (...→ (ψn → α)...))
→ (si ψ1 → (...→ (si ψn → si α)...)). (d.2)
And from (d.1) and (d.2) we get
`S0 si ψ1 → (...→ (si ψn → si α)...).
By Theorem 3(2) it follows that
(si ψ1 → (...→ (si ψn → si α)...)) ∈ Γ. (d.3)
Given that {ψ1, ..., ψn} ∈ (Γ/si), then, by definition, {si ψ1, ...,si ψn} ∈ Γ.
Finally, by repeatedly applying Theorem 3(8) we get si α ∈ Γ as desired.
1Here, we are relying on a compactness property of the logic: a formula set is inconsistent iff it
has a finite subset that is inconsistent. This is true for first-order logic and most modal logics. In
the case of modal logics, compactness can be established by specifying a translation of modal formulae
into first-order formulae, which explicitly represent the association of propositions to possible worlds
and the accessibility relation between worlds. The properties of the accessibility relation also need to
be specified by first-order. Since our axioms correspond to simple local constraints on the accessibility
relation, it is clear that this can be done for S0.
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We have now shown that for every consistent formula φ there is a Kripke model
MC in which φ is true at at least one precisification. We now must prove Lemma 2,
which we used to show completeness with respect to the particular classMS0 of Kripke
models.
Proof of Lemma 2.
We show that for each φ such that MC , piΓ |= φ, there is a model MCΓ equivalent to
MC with respect to φ such that MCΓ ∈MS0 .
To do this, we first show, in Part 1, that the set of relations R′ of the canonical
model MC is such that:
1. All the relations R′s ∈ R′ are serial, transitive and euclidean.
2. R′∗ is reflexive.
3. The relations R′s ∈ R′ are trans-transitive and trans-euclidean.
4. The relations R′s ∈ R′ are partially ordered under the subset relation.
Then, we proceed to show, in Part 2, that for each φ such that MC |= φ, there is a
model MCΓ equivalent to MC with respect to φ where R′∗ is the universal relation and all
the relations R′s ∈ R′ are such that, if (piA, piB) ∈ R′s then for any piΓ ∈ Π, (piΓ, piB) ∈ R′s
and for any piΓ ∈ s (piA, piΓ) ∈ R′s. Hence the binary relations can be simplified into
their unary counterparts as specified in the semantics (section 4.2.2.2). Consequently
we show that MCΓ belongs to the class MS0 , hence finishing our completeness proof.
Part 1.
(1.1) Serial relations We first show that axiom AD forces the possibility relations
in the canonical model MC to be serial, i.e. for every piA ∈ Π there is a piB ∈ Π such
that (piA, piB) ∈ R′s.
To see this, recall that all instances of AD are true at all pi ∈ Π. Then if si φ ∈ A,
by AD we have ♦si φ ∈ A. Moreover, by RN, for φ a propositional tautology we
have si φ ∈ A. Finally, by the construction of MC we have {♦si φ : φ ∈ B} ⊆
A iff (piA, piB) ∈ R′s (see remark 1). Consequently,
♦si(p ∨ ¬p) ∈ A iff for some piB such that (piA, piB) ∈ R′s, (p ∨ ¬p) ∈ B
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Given that (p ∨ ¬p) is a theorem of propositional logic, then by and AD we get
♦si(p ∨ ¬p), and hence it must be the case that ♦si(p ∨ ¬p) ∈ A. Therefore there must
be some B such that (piA, piB) ∈ R′s and (p ∨ ¬p) ∈ B.
(1.2) Transitive relations We show that axiom A4 forces the possibility relations in
the canonical model MC to be transitive. To see this, suppose that (piA, piB), (piB, piΓ) ∈
R′si and recall that all instances of A4 are true at all pi ∈ Π.
It follows that, for any φ, if si φ ∈ A then also si si φ ∈ A by A4. Given
(piA, piB), (piB, piΓ) ∈ R′si and si si φ ∈ A, then by the construction of MC we have
si φ ∈ B and φ ∈ Γ. Therefore we have φ ∈ Γ for si φ ∈ A, i.e. (A/si) ⊆ Γ, and
hence by the definition of the canonical relations we have (piA, piΓ) ∈ R′si as desired.
(1.3) Euclidean relations We now show that axiom A5 forces the possibility rela-
tions in the canonical model MC to be euclidean, i.e. if (piA, piB), (piA, piΓ) ∈ R′si then
(piB, piΓ) ∈ R′si .
To see this, we recall that all instances of A5 are true at piA, and we suppose that
(i) (piA, piB) ∈ R′si , and hence {φ : si φ ∈ A} ⊆ B,
(ii) (piA, piΓ) ∈ R′si , and hence {♦si φ : φ ∈ Γ} ⊆ A,
(iii) ♦si φ ∈ A.
If (iii) then si ♦si φ ∈ A (by A5), and, given (i) we then have ♦si φ ∈ B. In
particular we have {♦si φ : si ♦si φ ∈ A} ⊆ B which is he same as {♦si φ : ♦si φ ∈
A} ⊆ B .
We recall that, by the construction of MC , we have that {♦si φ : φ ∈ Γ} ⊆
B iff (piB, piG) ∈ R′s. And, given that because of (ii) we have that {♦si φ : φ ∈ Γ} ⊆ A,
it follows that {♦si φ : φ ∈ Γ} ⊆ B and therefore (piB, piG) ∈ R′s as desired.
(1.4) Reflexive * relations We show that axiom AT* forces the * relations in the
canonical model MC to be reflexive, i.e. {φ : ∗ φ ∈ A} ⊆ A. To see this, recall that
all instances of AT* are true at all pi ∈ Π.
By the construction of MC , we have that {φ : ∗ φ ∈ A} ⊆ B iff (piA, piB) ∈ R′∗.
Then, suppose that ∗ φ ∈ A. It immediately follows from AT* that φ ∈ A. Hence it
is easy to see that {φ : ∗ φ ∈ A} ⊆ A and therefore we get (piA, piB) ∈ R′∗ as desired.
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(1.5) Partial orders We show that axiom AP [s φ→ s′ φ iff (s′  s)] forces the
relations in the canonical model MC such that (s′  s) to be partially ordered under
subsumption, i.e. if (piA, piB) ∈ R′s′ then (piA, piB) ∈ R′s .
To see this, we recall that all instances of AP satisfying the partial order are true
at any pi ∈ Π. We now suppose that there are two standpoints, si and sj , such that
(sj  si).
In order to show that for any pair (piA, piB) and the relation (sj  si), if (piA, piB) ∈
R′sj then (piA, piB) ∈ R′si , we show that (piA, piB) /∈ R′si and (piA, piB) ∈ R′sj entails a
contradiction in the presence of AP.
We suppose then, for the sake of contradiction, that (piA, piB) /∈ R′si and (piA, piB) ∈
R′sj . Hence we get {φ : sj φ ∈ A} ⊆ B and {φ : si φ ∈ A} * B. But from AP we
get sj φ ∈ A for all φ such that si φ ∈ A, and hence {φ : si φ ∈ A} ⊆ {φ : sj φ ∈
A}. It is now easy to see that this entails a contradiction because it can not be that
A/si ⊆ B, A/sj ⊆ A/si and A/sj * B. Hence we conclude that the relations
R′s ∈ R′ satisfy the partial order under subsumption.
(1.6) Further restrictions of AS4 and AS5 We show that our axioms AS4 and
AS5, from which we can derive A4 and A5, further restrict the possibility relations
in the canonical model MC to be trans-transitive and trans-euclidean. Precisely, such
that
(I) if (piA, piB) ∈ R′sj and (piB, piΓ) ∈ R′si , then (piA, piΓ) ∈ R′si .
(II) if (piA, piB) ∈ R′sj and (piA, piΓ) ∈ R′si , then (piB, piΓ) ∈ R′si .
Both (I) and (II) can be easily proven in the same way as regular transitive and
euclidean relations. We first show that axiom AS4 forces the relations in the canon-
ical model MC to be trans-transitive. To see this, suppose that (piA, piB) ∈ R′sj and
(piB, piΓ) ∈ R′si and recall that all instances of AS4 (and it’s inverse) are true at all
pi ∈ Π.
Suppose φ ∈ Γ. Then, by the construction of MC we have ♦si φ ∈ B and ♦sj ♦si φ ∈
A. Also, by the inverse of AS4, ♦si φ ∈ A . We recall that {♦si φ : φ ∈ Γ} ⊆
A iff (piA, piΓ) ∈ R′s. Therefore it straightforwardly follows that (piA, piΓ) ∈ R′si as
desired.
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Now we show that axiom AS5 forces the relations in the canonical model MC to
be trans-euclidean. To see this, suppose that
(i) (piA, piB) ∈ R′sj , and hence {φ : sj φ ∈ A} ⊆ B,
(ii) (piA, piΓ) ∈ R′si , and hence {♦si φ : φ ∈ Γ} ⊆ A,
(iii) ♦si φ ∈ A.
If (iii) then sj ♦si φ ∈ A (by AS5), and, given (i) we then have ♦si φ ∈ B. In
particular we have {♦si φ : sj ♦si φ ∈ A} ⊆ B which is he same as {♦si φ : ♦si φ ∈
A} ⊆ B .
Because of (ii), we have that {♦si φ : φ ∈ Γ} ⊆ A, and with {♦si φ : ♦si φ ∈ A} ⊆ B
it follows that {♦si φ : φ ∈ Γ} ⊆ B. By the construction of MC , we have that {♦si φ :
φ ∈ Γ} ⊆ B iff (piB, piG) ∈ R′si . Therefore it follows that (piB, piG) ∈ R′si as desired.
Part 2.
We now want to show that there is a model MCΓ such that for φ ∈ Γ, MCΓ |= φ iff
MC |= φ and MCΓ ∈MS0 . We first introduce some concepts,
Definition 13. (Submodel induced by Πsub) Let M = 〈Π, (R′,), δ〉 be a S0-model
and Πsub be a subset of Π. The submodel Msub = 〈Πsub, (R′sub,), δsub〉 induced by
Πsub is defined by:
• R′subi := R
′
si ∩Πsub for each i ∈ S
• δsub(p) := δ(p) ∩Πsub
Definition 14. (Submodel generated by Πsub) Let 〈Πsub〉 be the smallest superset of
Πsub that is closed with respect to all relations R′si in M, so that for all (pi, pi
′) ∈ R′si
and pi ∈ Πsub, then pi′ ∈ Πsub. Then Msub is the submodel generated by Πsub if it is the
submodel induced by 〈Πsub〉.
Lemma 4. Let M = 〈Π, (R′,), δ〉 be a S0-model and Msub = 〈Πsub, (R′sub,), δsub〉
be the submodel generated by the non-empty subset Πsub. Then for each pi ∈ Πsub and
each formula φ,
M, pi |= φ iff Msub, pi |= φ
The proof for Lemma 4 can be found in [Wo¨l15].
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(2.1) Universal * relations We have shown that in the canonical model MC the
relation R′∗ is an equivalence relation, as it is reflexive, symmetric and transitive, and
∗ is S5-consistent. A proof that there is an equivalent model where R′∗ is universal
goes along the lines of [Wo¨l15], where they prove it for the system S5 with a single
modality, and it goes as follows.
Let us consider a maximal LS0-consistent set Γ built from a proposition φ and a
canonical model MC . We have previously shown that R′∗ is an equivalence relation,
as it is reflexive, symmetric and transitive. Moreover, we have shown that any other
relation R′s is a subset of R′∗ by definition of * and AP.
Let MCΓ = 〈Πsub, (R′sub,), δsub〉 be the submodel generated by {piΓ} on MC . We
know that in MC , any pair (pi, pi′) ∈ R′si is also (pi, pi′) ∈ R′∗ because of the subsumption
of all relations under R′∗. Moreover, in the generated model from piΓ, Πsub is the smallest
superset of {piΓ} that is closed with respect to all relations, or what is the same, with
respect to R′∗. It is straightforward that this model is connected under R′sub∗ and, given
that R′∗ is an equivalence relation, then R′sub∗ is universal.
Finally, it directly follows from Lemma 4 that MCΓ , piΓ |= φ iff MC , piΓ |= φ and
hence we show that the system is complete with respect to models MCΓ with R′sub∗
universal.
(2.2) Unary relations We finally show that in MCΓ not only R′sub∗ is universal but
also the following holds for all R′subi
(piΓ, piA) ∈ R′subi iff for all piB ∈ Πsub , (piB, piA) ∈ R′subi
This restriction together with the rest of properties of the relations means that
we can generalise R′subi into a unary relation Rsubi containing the subset of accessible
relations under such standpoint, as specified in the semantics (section 4.2.2.2) and hence
MCΓ ∈MS0 .
Let MCΓ be the submodel generated by {piΓ} on all the relations R′subi ∈ R′sub. For
one direction, suppose that (piΓ, piA) ∈ R′subi . Let us consider another precisification
piB ∈ Πsub. By the construction of MCΓ we know that there is a path from piΓ to
piB, because Πsub is closed with respect to all relations from piΓ. Let us say, thus,
that there is a series of relations R′sub1 , . . . , R
′
subj
and a series precisifications pi1, . . . , pin
such that (piΓ, pi1) ∈ R′sub1 , . . . , (pin, piB) ∈ R′subj . By successive applications of trans-
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transitivity, we know that (piΓ, piB) ∈ R′subj . Moreover, if we know that (piΓ, piB) ∈ R′subj
and (piΓ, piA) ∈ R′subi , by the trans-euclidean property we get that (piB, piA) ∈ R′subi as
desired. The other direction is trivial.
We have now shown that the model MCΓ is in the class of models MS0 , determined
by Definition 4. We now assume that φ is an S0-consistent formula (Definition 10),
hence it is consistent with the axioms of S0. By Lindenbaum’s lemma (Theorem 4),
we can create a maximal consistent set Γ such that φ ⊆ Γ. Then it follows that φ is
satisfiable in MCΓ .
Corollary 1. S0 is a sound and complete axiomatisation with respect to MS0 for for-
mulas in the language LS0
Corollary 2. S0 is determined by the class of models MS0.
4.4 Decidability and Complexity of S0
In this section, we present results showing that in S0 whenever a formula is valid it is
decidable; that is, there is an algorithm that, when given a formula φ as input, will
decide whether φ is valid. Moreover, such algotithm is NP -complete.
We introduce some definitions,
Definition 15. The size of a formula φ in LS0 , denoted |φ|, is its length over the
alphabet P ∪ {¬, ∧ , (, ),s1 , . . . ,sn ,∗}, where P is the set of atomic propositions.
Definition 16. ψ is a subformula of φ if either ψ = φ or φ is of the form ¬φ′ or
φ′ ∧ φ′′ or si φ′ and ψ is a subformula of either φ′ or φ′′. Let Sub(φ) be the set of all
subformulas of φ. Then |Sub(φ)| ≤ |φ|.
4.4.1 Decidability
We say that a system of modal logic is decidable if there is an effective finitary method
for determining the theoremhood of a formula. This is shown to be the case if the
system is axiomatisable by a finite number of schemas or axioms and it has the finite
model property [Che80]. We have shown before that our system is axiomatisable by
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a finite number of axioms, presented in section 4.2.3, and hence the positive test for
theoremhood can be done by a proof with the axioms and rules of inference. We
therefore must show not that it has the finite model property so that we have a finite
negative test for theoremhood.
Definition 17. A modal logic has the finite model property if and only if each non-
theorem is false in some finite model of the logic [Che80].
We first note that if we have a finite model then there is a finite algorithm to
determine whether a formula is satisfiable in that model or not. Specifically,
Lemma 5. There is an algorithm that, given a finite Kripke structure MFIN and a
formula φ, determines, in time O(||MFIN || × |φ|), whether there is a state pi of MFIN
such that (MFIN , pi) |= φ, for |φ| be the size of φ and ||MFIN || be the sum of the number
of points pi in Π and the number of pairs in the relations R′s ∈ R′. I.e. there is an
algorithm for checking if φ is satisfied in MFIN.
See [FHMV95] for a proof of Lemma 5. The strategy to prove the finite model
property for S0 follows closely the proof on [FHMV95] and consists in using the result
that S0 is determined by the class of models MS0 in section 4.3 to show that S0 is also
determined by the class of MFINS0 of finite models, so that
`S0 φ iff |=FINS0 φ
Soundness is trivial becauseMFINS0 ⊆MS0 , and hence it remains to show completeness
with respect to MFINS0 . We first show that if a formula is S0-consistent, not only is it
satisfiable in some structure (such as the canonical structure constructed in the proof
of Theorem 2), but it is also satisfiable in a finite structure MFIN in the classMS0 . The
proof is actually just a variant of the proof of Theorem 2 (Completeness).
Theorem 5. If φ is S0-consistent, then φ is satisfiable in a structure in MS0 with at
most 2|φ| points or precisifications.
Proof.
Let Sub+(φ) be the set consisting of the subformulas of φ and their negations,
that is, Sub+(φ) = Sub(φ) ∪ {¬ψ | ψ ∈ Sub(φ)}. Let Con(φ) be the set of maximal
S0-consistent subsets of Sub+(φ). Theorem 3 can be used to show that every S0-
consistent subset of Sub+(φ) can be extended to an element of Con(φ). Moreover, a
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member of Con(φ) contains either ψ or ¬ψ for every formula ψ ∈ Sub(φ) (but not
both, for otherwise it would not be S0-consistent), so the cardinality of Con(φ) is at
most 2|Sub(φ)|, which is at most 2|φ|, since |Sub(φ)| ≤ |φ|.
We can now construct a structure MFIN = 〈ΠFIN , (RFIN ,), δFIN〉 in the class MS0
identical to the canonical model (Definition 12) except that Π = {piΓ | Γ ∈ Con(φ)}.
Note that the sets in Con(φ) are S0-consistent and that the axioms of S0 guarantee
the properties of the relations in MS0 and hence in MFIN (as we have proven in section
4.3.2). Therefore the following restrictions hold for the relations in (RFIN ,):
• R′s = {(piΓ, piΣ) | Γ/s = Σ/s , Γ/s ⊆ Σ}
• R′∗ = {(piΓ, piΣ) | Γ/∗ = Σ/∗ , Γ/s ⊆ Γ, Γ/s ⊆ Σ}
Finally, with a proof identical to that of Theorem 2(a)-(d)1, we can show that for
all ψ ∈ Sub+(φ) and Γ ∈ Con(φ), iff ψ ∈ Γ then (MFIN , piΓ) |= ψ. Hence, φ is satisfiable
in a structure in MS0 with as many points as the cardinality of Con(φ), which is at
most 2|φ| and, therefore we conclude that the provability problem is decidable.
4.4.2 Complexity
After showing that the validity and probablility problems are decidable, we now show
that they are in fact NP -Complete. In this section we partially use the proofs provided
in [FHMV95, HM92]
Theorem 6. The satisfiability problem for S0 is NP -complete, and thus so is the
validity problem for S0.
We first show that,
Lemma 6. An S0 formula φ is satisfiable if and only if it is satisfiable in a structure
M|φ| ∈MS0 with at most |φ| precisifications.
Proof.
Suppose that φ is satisfiable in a structure Mφ = 〈Π, (R,), δ〉 in MS0 . Thus there
must be at least one precisification pi ∈ Π such that (Mφ, piφ) |= φ. From Mφ, let us
1See the proof by induction on the structure of φ with respect to the canonical model
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define another structure Mm = 〈Πm, (Rm,), δm〉. This model Mm will be a small
submodel of Mφ that is sufficient to satisfy the truth-conditions of φ and contains less
than |φ| precisifications. It is constructed as follows:
Rm is the set of standpoints of φ such that Rmsi ∈ Rm iff there is a subformula of
the form si ψ or ♦si ψ in φ. (We need only consider standpoints that are actually
referenced in φ.) We now re-label the elements of the set Rm with the indexes 1, . . . , n
so that for any h, i, if sh  si then h < i. So the order starts with the sharpest
standpoints and proceeds to coarser standpoints until reaching standpoint ∗ if present.
Since  need only be a partial order, we may have neither sh  si nor si  sh, in which
case they can be numbered in any order. Thus, the re-indexed set of standpoints can
be in any strict order that is consistent with the original partial ordering induced by
the  relation.
For every standpoint si, we specify the formula set Fsi , containing all subformulae
of φ that are not necessary according to si. Formally we define:
Fsi = {¬ψ | ¬si ψ ∈ Sub+(φ) and (M, pi) |= ¬si ψ }
We now proceed to build the sets of precisifications for each standpoint.
Let us take Fsi for every Rmsi ∈ Rm in order of the newly assigned indices. Then, for
every formula ¬ψ ∈ Fsi , there is a precisification piψ ∈ Rsi such that (Mφ, piψ) |= ¬ψ.
We now specify the set of precisifications for each standpoint, as follows. There are
two cases:
Rmsi = {piψ | ¬ψ ∈ Fsi} ∪ {pi | pi ∈ Rmsh , h  i}
provided this set is non empty;
otherwise, if the above set is empty, we set
Rmsi = {pi′} for some arbitrary pi′ ∈ Rsi
In the first case, the set of precisifications of standpoint si has one precisification
piψ for each (¬si ψ) ∈ Sub+(φ) such that (M, piψ) |= ¬ψ, which is sufficient to satisfy
the formula. (Thus, for each subformula that is not necessary in the original model,
there must be a precisificaiton where it is false in the reduced model.) In addition, it
also includes all the precisifications from all sharper standpoints sh  si. The order of
creation and the subsumption of previous standpoints preserve the partial order, such
that whenever we calculate the set Rmsi , then any other standpoint subsumed by it, say
Rmsh such that h  i, has already been calculated.
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In the second case we ensure, by adding a precisification pi′ from Rssi in R
m
si that,
whenever the first case is an empty set, the standpoint si remains non empty and hence
we preserve seriality. (In other words, we ensure that all standpoints contain at least
one precisification, as required by the semantics.)
Now that we have specified the sets of precisifications Rm associated with each
standpoint, the rest of elements of the model Mm = 〈Πm, (Rm,), δm〉 can be defined
straightforwardly, as follows:




• δm is the restriction of δ to Πm — i.e. δm(p) = δ(p) ∩Πm ;
• and the partial order  is the same as in Mφ but restricted to Rm.
It is easy to see that the model Mm is such that |Πm| ≤ |φ|, given that the sum of
formulas in the sets Fs (or one for the empty Fs) is necessarily smaller than |Sub(φ)|,
which is in turn smaller than |φ|.
We now show that the reduced model Mm reproduces the truth valuation of the
original Mφ, with respect to all subformulae of φ. More precisely, we show that for all
precisifications pi ∈ Πm and all subformulas φsub ∈ Sub+(φ), then (Mm, pi) |= φsub iff
(Mφ, pi) |= φsub. We can show this by induction on the structure of φsub. If φsub is
atomic, then the specification of δm means that for any pi ∈ Πm, φsub is true at pi in Mm
if and only if it is true at pi in Mφ. Given that both models have simple truth-functional
semantics for evaluating formulae ¬α and α ∧ β at any given possible world, it must
hold that, if the models have the same valuations for α and β at pi, they must also give
the same valuations for ¬α and α ∧ β at pi. Thus, the only non-trivial case is when
φsub is of the form si ψ.
If (Mφ, pi) |= si ψ, then for all pi′ ∈ Rsi it is the case that (Mφ, pi′) |= ψ. Given
that Rmsi ⊆ Rsi and that Rmsi is non empty, then for any pi′′ ∈ Rmsi it is also the case that
(Mφ, pi′′) |= ψ, and by the induction hypothesis, (Mm, pi′′) |= ψ. Hence, by definition it
is the case that (Mm, pi) |= si ψ.
On the contrary, suppose that (Mφ, pi) 2 si ψ. This means that (Mφ, pi) |= ¬si ψ,
and hence ¬ψ ∈ Fsi . Therefore there is some pi′ ∈ Rsi such that (Mφ, pi′) |= ¬ψ and,
by the construction of Mm, pi′ ∈ Rmsi . By induction we get that (Mm, pi′) |= ¬ψ. So,
again by the construction of Mm, we know that if pi′ ∈ Rmsi and (Mm, pi′) |= ¬ψ then
(Mm, pim) |= ¬si ψ and hence (Mm, pim) 2 si ψ.
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Finally, since piφ ∈ Πm, we have (Mm, piφ) |= φ iff (Mφ, piφ) |= φ. Consequently,
Mm satisfies φ.
Proof of Theorem 6.
We now proceed to prove that the satisfiability problem is NP -complete giving an
NP -algorithm for deciding whether a formula φ is S0-satisfiable.
Such an algorithm involves, for a formula φ, nondeterministically guessing a struc-
ture M ∈MS0 with at most |φ| precisifications and exactly |Rφ| standpoints (Part 1),
and deterministically verifying that φ is satisfied in such M (Part 2). Part 1.
In particular, given a formula φ, we guess a structure M = 〈Π, (R,), δ〉 where (a)
Π is a set of n precisifications such that n ≤ |φ|, (b) R is a set of s subsets of Π such
that s = |{i | si ψ ∈ Sub(φ)}| and (c) δ(pi)(p) = f for all pi ∈ Π and all primitive
propositions not appearing in φ. Consequently, the nondeterministic guessing involves
(1) deciding the size of Π, n, (2) the valuation t or f of the primitive propositions p
appearing in φ at every point pii∈{1,...,n}, and (3) the membership or not of every point
in each standpoint in φ, i.e ∀pii ∈ Π, ∀Rsj ∈ R {pii ∈ Rsj ∨ pii /∈ Rsj}.
Such structure can be guessed in nondeterministic time O(m2) for m = |φ|. In order
to show this we must note that the number of primitive propositions in φ, pφ, plus the
number of distinct modal standpoint operators in φ, sφ is clearly less than the size of φ
(it easily follows from Definition 15). Therefore, given that (pφ + sφ) ≤ m, and there
is n ≤ m precisification, the structure can be guessed at O(m2) time.
Part 2.
We must now verify that φ is satisfied in such M, hence there is a pi such that
(M, pi) |= φ. We know by Lemma 5 that this can be done in time O(||M|| × |φ|),
for ||MFIN || the sum of the number of points pi in Π and the number of pairs in the
relations R′s ∈ R′. In the worst case we have n × n relations in each R′s and we have
at most s < m relations or standpoints. Consequently we know that we can verify it
deterministically in at least O(m3) time.
Moreover, we can show that, because of the particularities of the models in MS0 ,
we can check whether φ is satisfied at some state pi ∈ Π in time O(m2) (see Lemma 7
below).
Finally, by Lemma 6, we know that if φ is satisfiable then it will be satisfied by
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one of the models created in this way. If φ is not satisfiable, on the other hand, no
guess will be right. Thus, we have a nondeterministic O(m2) algorithm for deciding if
φ is satisfiable.
Lemma 7. There is an algorithm that, given a finite Kripke structure M of the class
MS0 and a formula φ, determines, in time O(|φ|2), whether (M, pi) |= φ for some
precisification pi of M, |φ| the size of φ and the upper bound of the number of standpoint
relations Rs ∈ R.
Proof.
Let Sub(φ) = {φ1, . . . , φm} so that the subformulas of φ are listed in order of length,
with ties broken arbitrarily. Thus we have φm = φ, and if φi is a subformula of φj ,
then i < j. There are at most |φ| subformulas of φ (Definition 16), so we must have
m ≤ |φ|.
We can label each precisification pi in M with φj or ¬φj depending on whether φj
is satisfied in M at pi, i.e. (M, pi) |= φj . Given that there are m subformulas and at
most m states, we are at least at complexity O(m2). Now, let us see a sketch of the
algorithm.
Let us take the subformulas of φ by order. For each subformula φj ∈ Sub(φ), if φj
is:
• An atomic proposition: for each pi ∈ Π we check if (M, pi) |= P (O(m)).
• A formula of the form ¬φi or φi ∧ φh: for each pi ∈ Π we check if pi is labelled
with ¬φi or both φi and φh respectively. (O(m)).
• A formula of the form s φi. We first check if all pi ∈ Rs (at most m) are labelled
with φi. Then, if they are, we label all pi ∈ Π with s φi. If not, we label all
pi ∈ Π with ¬s φi. (O(2m) => O(m)).
(Note that checking s φ formulae is more efficient than one might expect because
although they depend on all precisifications within the set associated with standpoint
s, the value of s φ must be the same at all precisifications, so only has to be computed
once.)
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Given that the size of Sub(φ) is at most m, we can easily see that the algorithm has
a complexity O(m2). This is thanks to the fact that formulas of the kind s φi have
the same valuation for all precisifications by the construction of MS0 .
4.5 More expressive logics
We now briefly consider the syntax and semantics of more expressive standpoint logics,
namely description standpoint logic SALC and predicate standpoint logic S1, as well as
the semantics for a two-dimensional modal logic for standpoints and possible worlds,
allowing us to express intensional and extensional meanings.
4.5.1 Description standpoint logic, SALC
In the following, we provide a formalisation for standpoint logic with an underlying
description logic language. Description logics are a family of languages that are (gener-
ally) more expressive that propositional logic but less than predicate logic, and that are
normally interesting for their computational properties: the decidability and complex-
ity of the reasoning problems in relation to the expressivity drives a substantial part of
the research, and various languages are characterised by different sets of mathematical
constructors (e.g. ALC, SHOIN and SROIQ are common description logics). Moreover,
description logics are widely used in AI, and in particular the ‘de facto’ language for
representing formal ontologies (OWL) is based on description logics [Baa03].
Modal frameworks with an underlying description language have been proposed.
The reader can refer to [BKW10] for a summary and, for related work, Lutz [LWZ08]
provides a survey on modal description frameworks focusing on temporal extensions,
Krieger [Kri16] integrates graded knowledge and temporal change in a modal fragment
of owl (however with non-standard modal logics) and in [DNR97] a framework for
autoepistemic description logics is developed.
In this section we specify the syntax and semantics of standpoint logic with an
underlying ALC logic, following the lines of [BKW10].
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4.5.1.1 The formal language and syntax of SALC
The language of the description standpoint logic LSALC with n+ 1 unary modal oper-
ators s1 , . . . ,sn ,∗1 consists of three sets:
• A set NC of concept names: C0, C1, . . .
• A set NR of role names: R0, R1, . . .
• A set NO of object names: a0, a1, . . .
The concepts and roles of SALC can be inductively defined in the following way:
• The concept names Ci ∈ NC and > are concepts.
• If C and D are concepts and R is a relation, then the following are concepts:
C uD, C unionsqD, ¬C, ∀R.C, ∃R.C, sC.
• The role names Ri are roles.
• If R is a role, then sR is a role.
Finally, a formula or axiom is defined as follows:
• If C and D are concepts, R is a role and a and b are object names, then C v D,
aRb and a : C are atomic formulas or axioms.
• If φ and ψ are formulas, then the following are formulas: φ ∧ ψ, ¬φ, s φ.
4.5.1.2 Semantics
A Kripke model for the modal description logic SALC is a tuple M = 〈Π, 〈/,〉,∆I , .I〉,
where
• Π is a set of points or precisifications,
• 〈/,〉 = /1, . . . , /n, /∗ is a partial order of unary accessibility relations on Π×Π,
ordered under the subset relation and where /∗ is universal,
1Note that we omit the diamond operators ♦si here and in the rest of the section because they can
be defined in terms of the box operators.
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• ∆I is a non empty set called the domain of the interpretation I, and
• .I is a function associating every precisification with an ALC-interpretation, such
that it maps every object name a ∈ NO to an element of ∆I and, for every pi ∈ Π,
every concept name Ci ∈ NC to a subset of the domain CI,pii ⊆ ∆I and every role
name Ri ∈ NR to a subset of relations RI,pii ⊆ (∆I ×∆I), such that:
– >I = ∆I and ⊥I = ∅.
– (C uD)I,pi = CI,pi ∩DI,pi,
– (C unionsqD)I,pi = CI,pi ∪DI,pi,
– ¬C = ∆I\CI,pi,
– (∃R.C)I,pi = {x ∈ ∆I | There is some y ∈ ∆I such that (x, y) ∈ RI,pi and y ∈
CI,pi},
– (∀R.C)I,pi = {x ∈ ∆I | For all y ∈ ∆I if (x, y) ∈ RI,pi, then y ∈ CI,pi},
– (si C)I,pi = {x | for all pi′ ∈ /i, x ∈ CI,pi
′}.
– (si R)I,pi = {(x, y) | for all pi′ ∈ /i, (x, y) ∈ RI,pi
′}.
A pair 〈∆I , .I,pi〉 for a pi ∈ Π is what is called in standard ALC semantics an
interpretation I. In our case, we need different interpretation functions for the differ-
ent points (precisifications) of our models, but given that the standpoint framework
presented here assumes a constant domain of quantification we only need one set ∆I .
We write (M, pi) |= φ to mean that φ is true at precisification pi in model M and is
defined as in standard ALC description logic except for the sentences of the form si φ,
for which:
(M, pi) |= si φ iff (M, pi′) |= A for all pi′ such that pi′ ∈ /i
To summarise, the former syntax and semantics for description standpoint logic are
the natural extension of the logic presented so far to the description logicALC. For more
material on this topic we refer the reader to [BHS08] for an introduction to description
logics and [BKW10] for a general overview on modal extensions to description logics.
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4.5.2 Predicate standpoint logic, S1
In this section we provide a specification of standpoint logic with an underlying first-
order language, which allows us to reason about the semantic variability of terms with
a more expressive language, desirable to model a variety of scenarios.
4.5.2.1 The formal language LS1
Our formal language LS1 is an extension of classical first-order calculus including nu-
merical symbols and comparison relations (= and <) as well as the usual boolean
operators and quantifiers.
The non-logical symbols of the language are specified by a vocabulary, which is a
tuple of the form:
V = 〈N,X,P,F〉 ,
where:
• N is a set of nominal constants,
• X is a set of nominal variables,
• P = (P1,∪ . . . ∪ Pn ∪ . . .) is the set of predicate symbols, whose subsets Pn, are
the sets of n-ary predicate symbols,1
• F = (F1,∪ . . .∪Fn∪ . . .) is the set of function symbols, subsets Fn, being the sets
of n-ary function symbols,
4.5.2.2 Terms.
The language has two types of terms: one type refer to individual entities and the other
refer to numerical magnitudes:
• Tn = N ∪ X is the set of nominal terms of the language.
• Tm = TD ∪ {f(τ1, . . . , τn) | f ∈ Fn ∧ τ1, . . . τn ∈ Tn} is the set of magnitude
terms.
10-ary predicates (propositional constants) have been omitted to simplify the presentation but could
easily be added.
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The set Tm includes the set TD of decimal numerals, as well as terms formed by ap-
plying function symbols to nominal terms, which give the value of some scalar property
of an entity (e.g. height) or tuple of entities (e.g. the distance between two entities).
4.5.2.3 Atomic Propositions.
The language has the following forms of atomic proposition:
• P (τ1, . . . τn), where τ1, . . . τn ∈ Tn,
• τ1 = τ2, where τ1, . . . τ2 ∈ (Tn ∪ Tm),
• τ1 ≤ τ2, where τ1, . . . τ2 ∈ Tm
P (τ1, . . . τn) asserts that predicate P holds of the nominal terms τ1, . . . τn (which
are named entities and/or quantified variables).
τ1 = τ2 is the usual equality relation, that can hold either between named entities
and/or variables.
LS1 contains all atomic propositions that can be formed using the vocabulary V.
4.5.2.4 Complex Propositions.
For any φ, ψ ∈ LS , and x ∈ X the following complex propositions are also in LS :
• ¬φ, (φ ∧ ψ), (φ ∨ ψ), (φ → ψ), (φ ↔ ψ) — the standard boolean propositional
operators,
• ∀x[φ], ∃x[φ] — the standard first-order quantifiers,
• s φ meaning φ is true in standpoint s, i.e. in all precisifications compatible with
standpoint s.
LS1 is the smallest set containing all atomic propositions and all complex proposi-
tions formed by these constructions.
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4.5.2.5 Semantics
A Kripke model for our language LS1 is a tuple M = 〈Π, D, (R,), ρ, δ〉 where:
• Π is the set of precisifications,
• D is a non-empty set, the domain of individuals,
• (R,) is a partial order of Rs1 , ..., Rsn , R∗ ∈ R under the subset relation,
– Rsi : (2Π/ ∅) is an accessibility relation mapping to a non-empty set of pre-
cisifications,
• ρ = ρn ∪ ρm, where:
– ρn : Tn → D maps each nominal term to an element of the domain of
individuals,
– ρm : Tm → Q maps each magnitude term to a rational number.
• δ : P ×D × Π → {t, f}. So δ maps, each n-ary predicate, n-tuple of individuals
and precisification to a truth value.
4.5.2.6 Semantic Interpretation Function
With respect to an interpretation structure M = 〈Π, D, (R,), ρ, δ〉 , formulas of LS1
are interpreted as follows:
• [[P (τ1, . . . τn)]]piS1 = δ(P, 〈ρ(τ1), . . . ρ(τn〉, pi)),
• [[(τ1 = τ2)]]piS1 = t if ρ(τ1) = ρ(τ2), else = f ,
• [[(τ1 ≤ τ2)]]piS1 = t if ρ(τ1) ≤ ρ(τ2), else = f ,
• [[¬φ]]piS1 = t if [[φ]]piS1 = f , else = f ,
• [[φ ∧ ψ]]piS1 = t if [[φ]]piS1 = t and [[ψ]]piS1 = t, else = f ,
• [[∀x[φ]]]piS1 = t if ( [[φ]]piS′ = t, for every interpretation structureM = 〈Π, D, (R,), ρ, δ〉,
such that ρ′ is identical to ρ, except that ρ′(x) may have a different value from
ρ(x) ), else = f ,
• [[s φ]]piS1 = t if [[φ]]
pi′
S1 = t for all pi
′ ∈ Rs, else = f ,
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4.5.2.7 Quantifier Axioms.
The universal quantifier satisfies its classical axioms, which are covered by axiom C
above. Moreover, since our semantics is based on a single domain of individuals, its
models will satisfy the Barcan formula:
AB ∀x[s φ(x)] → s ∀x[φ(x)]
The single domain of quantification can be disputed. One can argue that if we
change the precisification according to which the world is classified, the set of entit-
ies in the domain is likely to change. For example, under one precisification pi of a
vocabulary about forestry, a particular tree-covered area might form a single forest
(forest(o1)), whereas under another precisification pi′ the same area may consist of two
forests separated by a band of heathland (forest(o2) ∧ forest(o3)). Hence, there are
two objects (o2 and o3) in pi′ where there is a single one (o1) in pi.
However, we take the contrary approach, in which the set of entities (or candidate
objects) can be regarded as the same even though their classification changes. This is
consistent with a de dicto view of vagueness, in which it is linguistic descriptions that
are vague, not the reality that they describe. In the previous example, the domain of
quantification in both pi and pi′ is the same, and consists of the three objects o1, o2 and
o3. Further, in pi it is the case that forest(o1) ∧ ¬forest(o2) ∧ ¬forest(o3) and in pi′
it is the case that ¬forest(o1) ∧ forest(o2) ∧ forest(o3). Under the later view, AB
is appropriate for the s and ∗ operators.
4.5.3 Two-dimensional standpoint logics, S1A
4.5.3.1 Incorporation of necessity and contingency
The logics discussed so far in this chapter are modal in nature and consider the eval-
uation of truth with respect to points in a Kripke model, which are interpreted as
precisifications. Hence, these points do not represent possible worlds as in other modal
logics. Instead, they represent possible interpretations of the language with respect to
a single state of affairs.
Beyond the possible limitations for reasoning about scenarios that require the rep-
resentation of multiple states of affairs, such logics do not support the distinction
between the intensional and extensional semantics of interpretations. In order to ac-
count for intensional meaning we are required to consider possible worlds and dif-
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ferentiate necessity from contingency. Hence, in this subsection we briefly present a
two-dimensional modal logic that incorporates possible worlds and the usual operators
for necessity and possibility (which we name ◦ and ♦◦ to avoid confusion with the
standpoint operators). In a similar but even more expressive line [LYV16] proposes a
three-dimensional semantics.
4.5.3.2 Syntax
LS1A is an extension of LS1 including the complex propositions formed with the necessity
operator, here named ◦ for a clearer distinction with the standpoint operators s.
• ◦ φ — means φ is true in all possible worlds.
4.5.3.3 Semantics
A Kripke model for our language LS1A is a tuple M = 〈Π,W,D, (R,), ρ, δ〉 where:
• Π is the set of precisifications,
• W is the set of possible worlds,
• D is a non-empty set, the domain of individuals,
• (R,) is a partial order of Rs1 , ..., Rsn , R∗ ∈ R under the subset relation,
– Rsi : (2Π/ ∅) is an accessibility relation mapping to to a non-empty set of
precisifications,
• ρ = ρn ∪ ρm, where:
– ρn : Tn → D maps each nominal term to an element of the domain of
individuals,
– ρm : Tm → Q maps each magnitude term to a rational number.
• δ : P × D × Π × W → {t, f}. So δ maps, each n-ary predicate, n-tuple of
individuals, precisification and world to a truth value.
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4.5.3.4 Semantic Interpretation Function
With respect to an interpretation structure M = 〈Π,W,D, (R,), ρ, δ〉 , formulas of
LS1A are interpreted as follows:
• [[P (τ1, . . . τn)]]wpiS1A = δ(P, 〈ρ(τ1), . . . ρ(τn〉, pi, w)),
• [[(τ1 = τ2)]]wpiS1A = t if ρ(τ1) = ρ(τ2), else = f ,
• [[(τ1 ≤ τ2)]]wpiS1A = t if ρ(τ1) ≤ ρ(τ2), else = f ,
• [[¬φ]]wpiS1A = t if [[φ]]wpiS1A = f , else = f ,
• [[φ ∧ ψ]]wpiS1A = t if [[φ]]wpiS1A = t and [[ψ]]wpiS1A = t, else = f ,
• [[∀x[φ]]]wpiS1A = t if ( [[φ]]wpiS′ = t, for every interpretation structure
M = 〈Π,W,D, (R,), ρ, δ〉, such that ρ′ is identical to ρ, except that ρ′(x) may
have a different value from ρ(x) ), else = f ,
• [[◦ φ]]wpiS1A = t if [[φ]]
w′pi
S1A = t for all w
′ ∈W , else = f ,
• [[s φ]]wpiS1A = t if [[φ]]
wpi′
S1A = t for all pi
′ ∈ Rs, else = f ,
4.5.3.5 Proof theory
Besides the axioms holding for the predicate standpoint operators and the common
axiomatisation of the aletic operators, ◦ and ♦◦, which satisfy S5, it is questionable
whether there are interaction axioms holding between them. In particular, [LYV16]
suggests commutativity, such that ‘Necessarily definitely φ iff definitely necessarily φ’. In
our terms this would mean that ◦s φ ↔ s◦ φ. This should not extend, however,
to other interactions, so the interaction between operators is not expected to be trivial.
For instance the following should not hold ◦ ♦s φ ↔ ♦s◦ φ.
In order to see this, let us consider two propositions, ◦ ♦∗ φ and ♦∗◦ φ. Let us
then consider in 4.2 some of the models that satisfy them. As we can see, the models
(A) and (B) are the same for both propositions. Yet, the column (C) shows models that
do not hold interchangeably. In a model where φ holds in 〈w1, pi1〉 and 〈w2, pi2〉 (but not
in 〈w1, pi2〉 nor 〈w2, pi1〉), the proposition ‘In all worlds, in some sense φ’ ◦ ♦∗ φ holds
but the proposition ‘It is arguable that in all worlds φ’ does not, for it requires that,
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Table 4.2: Iteration of the standpont and necessity operators.
at least according to one precisification (pi1 in the last model of the table), φ holds in
all worlds.
Moreover, whether the Barcan formula (AB) is suitable for the necessity operator
◦ is another issue. It is arguably unreasonable to expect the set of entities to be the
same at every possible world. However, taking account of this would require a more
elaborate semantics than we have given. In this thesis we do not commit to a full
specification of the interaction axioms between the two dimensions of modal operators.
We do believe, however, that this issue can be further investigated and that further
rules of interaction may arise in closer inspection.
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So far, we have introduced the problem in chapter 1 and reviewed the literature, fo-
cusing on logic frameworks to model vagueness in chapter 2. We have then presented
standpoint logic, a multi-modal logic for reasoning with multiple perspectives or stand-
points on the semantics of vague terms, and specified both the theoretical interpretation
of the elements of the framework (in chapter 3) and the formalisation of its syntax and
semantics with different underlying logics in chapter 4, together with the proofs for
soundness, completeness and complexity for the case of predicate logic.
In this chapter, we proceed to show how such logics, based on the supervaluationistic
view of vagueness, can be used to reason about the different standpoints that an agent
may have on the meanings of vague or semantically variable terms.
5.2 A propositional example
Let us begin by considering a set of propositions that display the perspectives of dif-
ferent agents (Lewis Carroll, Brandon, Lucia and Judi) with regards to the semantics
of vague predicates, in particular the pair sane/lunatic and the notion of being able to
do logic.
Example 5.2.1. Consider the following syllogism:
(1). [It is unequivocal that] If Alice is a lunatic then she is not fit to serve on a jury.
(2). According to Lewis Carroll, if Alice is sane then she can do Logic.
(3). Lucia and Brandon agree with Lewis Carroll’s standpoint.
(4). According to Lucia, if Alice did not get distinction1 in Knowledge Representation,
then she can’t do logic.
(5). According to Brandon, if Alice got distinction in Knowledge Representation then
she can do logic.
1Distinction and merit are qualifications used in some universities in the United Kingdom. Dis-
tinction is equivalent to a numerical mark greater than or equal to 70, and merit is a numerical mark
greater than or equal to 60 and smaller than 70.
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(6). According to Brandon, it is indeterminate (borderline) whether Alice can do logic
if she got merit.
(7). According to Judi, if Alice screams in the corridors then she is a lunatic.
(8). [It is unequivocal that] Alice screams in the corridors.
(9). [It is unequivocal that] Alice got merit.
(10). [It is unequivocal that] If Alice got merit, then she did not get distinction. (pen-
umbral connection)
The former is a variation of a problem proposed by Lewis Carroll in [Car00] that
includes additional standpoints. In the propositions that do not display semantic vari-
ability we add the prefix ‘[It is unequivocal that]’ for the sake of clarity. Then, we add
Brandon and Lucia’s standpoints, that agree with Lewis Carroll’s original judgement
that being sane is a sufficient condition to be able to do logic, and Judi’s, for whom it
is screaming in the corridors that is sufficient for being a lunatic (not sane).
Moreover, Brandon’s and Lucia’s standpoints on whether Alice can do logic depend
on the grades that she got in the Knowledge Representation exam. For Lucia, it is
certain that if she got less than 70 (distinction) then she cannot do logic, while Brandon,
more generously, judges that it is definite that with more than 70 (distinction) she can,
and that it is indeterminate if she got more than 60 (merit). It must be remarked that,
in this example, the applicability of the predicate Alice-can-do-logic (L) depends on
the understanding that Lucia and Brandon have of ‘being able to do logic’, which may
involve her having a different set of necessary skills and to a different level of expertise,
and that they have the capacity to assess those. Consequently, the problem that we
intend to represent relates to the semantic variation of the predicates rather than the
epistemic lack of knowledge about the state of affairs, in this case, Alice’s actual skills.
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5.2.1 Representation
The following is a formalisation of the syllogism (Eg 5.2.1) in standpoint propositional
logic, S0:
Example 5.2.2. The formalisation goes as follows,
(1). ∗[¬S → ¬J].
(2). Carroll[S → L]
(3). sLucia  sCarroll and sBran  sCarroll
(4). Lucia[¬D → ¬L]
(5). Bran[D → L]
(6). Bran[M → IBran L]
(7). Judi[C → ¬S]
(8). Judi C
(9). ∗M
(10). ∗[M → ¬D]
We now consider the representation of the standpoints, the relations between stand-
points and the notion of universal-truth.
5.2.1.1 Standpoints
Statements relative to a standpoint are generally represented by means of the different
modal operators indexed with the corresponding identification label. Determinate pro-
positions relative to a standpoint, such as those expressed in propositions EG5.2.1.2
or EG5.2.1.4, express semantic commitments and hence they are formalised with the
box operator s (see EG5.2.2.2 and EG5.2.2.4). For example, EG5.2.1.2 expresses
the semantic commitment that forces all precisifications contained in Carrol’s stand-
point to satisfy the proposition ‘if Alice is sane then she can do Logic’, thereby ensuring
consistency within the standpoint.
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One can also make non-definite assertions relative to a standpoint, such as ex-
pressing its possible truth, formalised with a diamond operator ♦s, or indefiniteness,
formalised with the Is operator, as we can see in EG5.2.2.6. Moreover, in the form-
alisation of proposition (6), EG5.2.2.6, we see an example of nested operators, which
can be further simplified with the interaction axioms AS4 and AS5.
5.2.1.2 Relations between standpoints
The relations between standpoints expressed by proposition EG5.2.1.3 are presented
in our formalised example as sLucia  sCarroll and sBran  sCarroll (EG5.2.2.3),
indicating that Lucia’s and Brandon’s standpoints are subsumed by Carrol’s standpoint.
However, the reader may note that neither the lone standpoints sCarrol, sBran and
sLucia nor the sharper symbol  are part of the object language. Indeed, while we use
such notation in EG5.2.2.3 for the sake of convenience and expressivity, in practice, we
syntactically formalise the standpoint relations by instantiating the axiom AP for the
corresponding standpoints. Hence, the relations sLucia  sCarroll and sBran  sCarroll
imply the following schemas:
EG5.2.2.(11). Carroll φ → Lucia φ
EG5.2.2.(12). Carroll φ → Bran φ
5.2.1.3 Universal standpoint
In our example, propositions EG5.2.1.3, EG5.2.1.3 and EG5.2.1.3 are preceded by
‘It is universally agreed that’, denoting that, rather than referring to a particular stand-
point, they are propositions that hold according to all standpoints and precisifications
of the language. They can hence be considered non-vague propositions given that all
agents using the language agree on their truth conditions. Consequently, we use the
universal standpoint ∗ to formalise these formulas, as we can see in the examples
EG5.2.2.1, EG5.2.2.9 and EG5.2.2.10.
5.2.1.4 Naked propositions
In standpoint logic, we call naked propositions to those that are not preceded by any
standpoint operator in a formula, and hence, according to the semantics of standpoint
logic, they are modelled by the current precisification. Unlike in other modal logics
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where one may want to have a privileged point for capturing notions such as ‘the ac-
tual state of affairs’ (in epistemic logic) or the ‘the current world’ (in some temporal
logics), the standpoint logic model of vagueness does not have a notion of ‘the ac-
tual precisification’. Instead, all precisifications are admissible in the same right and,
consequently, the precisification that ‘happens to be the current one’ is arbitrary.
With that in consideration, the natural way of expressing facts in our framework
involves avoiding using naked propositions when reasoning about standpoints. Instead,
we use the universal standpoint modalities to state facts that are unequivocal and
distinct standpoint modalities when representing judgements relevant to particular in-
terpretations of the language, as illustrated in our propositional example.
It is possible, however, to formalise the same scenario making use of naked pro-
positions and statements with the determinate operator, D∗ . We could do this by
stating that a proposition (e.g. Alice got merits, M) is determinate (not vague) and
then stating whether it holds or not in the actual world:
Example 5.2.3. .
(1). D∗M
(2). M (or ¬M)
It is easy to see that, by axiom AT*, we can infer ♦∗(¬)M, and with the definiteness
definition ♦Df we can get either ∗M or ∗ ¬M. Consequently, if it were deemed more
intuitive, one could formalise unequivocal statements by asserting the determinacy of
the non-vague propositions using D∗ φ, and, subsequently, stating whether they hold
or not using naked propositions (φ or ¬φ). We are thereby relying on the fact that if
they are the case in the current arbitrary precisification, then they must be the case in
all the precisifications of the model.
Finally, one could easily restrict the language LS0 so that naked propositions are
not allowed, in a similar vein as in [BD14] for the language of the modal logic MEL
and in [PS07] for consensus logic.
5.2.1.5 Definiteness
The definiteness operators are useful for reasoning in a variety of scenarios, such as
the one described in the section above. Recall that Ds φ means that φ is either true
in every precisification in standpoint s or false in every precisification of standpoint s.
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Thus, definiteness allows us to infer from possibility to necessity (Ds φ, ♦s φ `S0 s φ)
and from negated necessity to necessary negation (Ds φ, ¬s φ `S0 s ¬φ).
Proof — Ds φ, ♦s φ `S0 s φ. .
(1) ♦s φ (assumption)
(2) Ds φ (assumption)
(3) Ds φ ↔ (s φ ∨ s ¬φ) (DDf)
(4) s φ ∨ s ¬φ (2,3)
(5) ¬s ¬φ (1, ♦Df)
(6) s φ (4,5)
Proof — Ds φ, ¬s φ `S0 s ¬φ. .
(1) ¬s φ (assumption)
(2) Ds φ (assumption)
(3) Ds φ ↔ (s φ ∨ s ¬φ) (DDf)
(4) s φ ∨ s ¬φ (2,3)
(5) s ¬φ (1,4)
The universal definiteness operator, D∗ , states that a proposition is ‘not vague’. In
other words, it either true in every precisification or false in every precisification. Hence,
it is also either definitely true in all standpoints or defintely false in all standpoints of
the model. In some scenarios, one may want to make assertions of this kind to separate
those parts of the language that do not display semantic variability (SVoNLT).
In a similar vein to their universal counterpart, standpoint definiteness operators
Ds assert that a predicate or proposition is not vague or semantically variable within
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one standpoint (i.e. across all the precisifications in the standpoint). This is useful to
represent standpoints that have a sharp interpretation of generally variable terms. For
instance, there may be a standpoint ssharpTall such that every person is judged to be
either tall or not tall (with certainty with regards to that standpoint). This can occur
where some legislation or institutional framework makes precise stipulations regarding
the interpretation of terminology that is vague in ordinary natural language.
5.2.2 Reasoning
Let us examine now, using the example provided in section 5.2, some inferences that
we can make with propositional standpoint logic. In particular, we may ask ourselves:
‘Is Alice fit to serve in a jury?’
We can infer, from the previous sentences, that according to Lucia’s and Judi’s
standpoints Alice is definitely not fit to serve in a jury, while according to Brandon
(and hence generally) in some sense she is not fit to serve: Lucia ¬J, ♦Bran ¬J, Judi ¬J
and hence ♦∗ ¬J.
Proof — Lucia ¬J. .
(1) ∗M → ∗ ¬D (EG5.2.2.10, AK)
(2) ∗ ¬D (1, EG5.2.2.9)
(3) Lucia ¬D (2, AP)
(4) Lucia ¬D → Lucia ¬L (EG5.2.2.4, AK)
(5) Lucia ¬L (3, 4)
(6) Lucia[S → L] (EG5.2.2.2, AP)
(7) Lucia[¬L → ¬S] (6, rw)
(8) Lucia ¬L → Lucia ¬S (7, AK)
(9) Lucia ¬S (5, 8)
(10) Lucia[¬S → ¬J] (EG5.2.2.1,AP)
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(11) Lucia ¬S → Lucia ¬J (10, AK)
(12) Lucia ¬J (9, 11)
(In the following proofs we skip some obvious steps for the sake of brevity)
Proof — ♦Bran ¬J. .
(1) Bran M → Bran IBran L (EG5.2.2.6, AK)
(2) Bran IBran L (1, EG5.2.2.9)
(3) Bran[♦Bran L ∧ ♦Bran ¬L] (2, IDf)
(4) Bran ♦Bran L ∧ Bran ♦Bran ¬L (3, AC)
(5) ♦Bran L ∧ ♦Bran ¬L (4, AS5)
(6) ♦Bran ¬L (5, PL)
(7) Bran[¬L → ¬S] (EG5.2.2.2, AP)
(8) ♦Bran ¬S (6, 7, AK♦)
(9) Bran[¬S → ¬J] (EG5.2.2.1, AP)
(10) ♦Bran ¬J (8, 9, AK♦)
Proof — Judi ¬J. .
(1) Judi ¬S (EG5.2.2.8, EG5.2.2.7)
(2) Judi[¬S → ¬J] (EG5.2.2.1,AP)
(3) Judi ¬J (1, 2)
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In Chapter 4 it was proved that the satisfiability problem of propositional standpoint
logic S0 is NP-complete, which makes it a reasonably efficient logic in the context of
modal frameworks1. However, its lack of expressivity imposes limitations into the
kind of statements that can be represented with it, for instance propositions explicitly
tackling aspects of the semantic variability of certain predicates.
In the rest of this chapter, we examine the different varieties of vagueness that can be
represented with more expressive underlying logics, namely description and first-order
standpoint logics.
5.3 Sorites vagueness and judgements regarding graded
predicates
The problem of formalising and reasoning with sorites susceptible predicates is the
subject of a vast amount of debate in the philosophical literature. In the sorites variety
of vagueness, as introduced in the literature review (section 2.3.2), the applicability
of a vague predicate depends on the value of one or more graded properties for which
there is no clear-cut threshold that determines truth or falsity, giving raise to borderline
cases. Some of the examples commonly given to illustrate this are predicates such as
tall, whose applicability depends on the property height, or heap, whose applicability
depends on the number of grains (assuming an appropriate spatial arrangement). A
common formulation of the semantics of graded adjectives is in terms of an uncertain
threshold value defined with respect to a particular measurement scale [Cre76].
Let us consider the example of tallness to illustrate how can we formalise the se-
mantic variation of sorites susceptible predicates with our framework standpoint logic,
in this case with the first-order variant S1.
Example 5.3.1. .
(1). ∗[height(Tara) = 186cm]
(2). ∗[height(Nena) = 160cm]
(3). s1 [∀x[Tall(x) ↔ height(x) > t tall]]
1For instance, the well known framework of epistemic logics is PSPACE for multiple modalities,
and the underlying propositional calculus is NP itself.
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(4). s1 [t tall < 185cm]
(5). s2 [¬tall(Nena)]
(6). s2  s1
Formulae EG5.3.1.1 and EG5.3.1.2 express objective, non-vague facts that are
taken to be true for all precisifications: the height of Tara and Nena. Following,
EG5.3.1.3 fixes the conditions of standpoint s1 for tallness, in particular a height
greater than an unspecified threshold, namely t tall, whose possible values are restricted
in EG5.3.1.4. Finally, standpoint s2 is a sharpening of s1 (EG5.3.1.6) according to
which Nena is unequivocally not tall according to standpoint s2 in EG5.3.1.5.
Given EG5.3.1.3, EG5.3.1.1 and EG5.3.1.4 we can see that s1 [Tall(tara)].
EG5.3.1.6 tells us that s2 is sharper than s1, so by using AP we can infer that
s2 [Tall(tara)].
Proof. — (s1 [Tall(tara)] ∧ s2 [Tall(tara)])
(1) s1 [∀x[Tall(x) ↔ height(x) ≤ 185] (EG5.3.1.3, EG5.3.1.4)
(2) s1 [Tall(tara)] (1, EG5.3.1.1)
(3) s2 [Tall(tara)] (2, EG5.3.1.6-AP)
One of the features that make single-dimensional sorites cases the paradigmatic
examples of vagueness is that there is a total order governing the applicability of the
vague predicate (on the property in which it depends), creating what is known as the
‘slippery slope’ effect. Consequently, statements of the kind ‘person a is “more tall”
than person b’ are always definite, and so, if person b is tall, then we can infer that a
is tall as well.
This is illustrated in the example 5.3.1, which uses the total order governing the
property height: The fact that Nena is not tall (EG5.3.1.5) entails the narrowing of
the variability of the predicate tall in the standpoint s2, so that its threshold can not
be lower than Nena’s height.
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Proof. — (s2 [t tall ≥ 160cm])
(1) s2 [¬Tall(Nena)] (EG5.5.1.1, EG5.3.1.5)
(2) s2 [∀x[¬Tall(x) ↔ ¬(height(x) > t tall)] (EG5.3.1.3, Neg)
(3) s2 [¬(height(Nena) > t tall)] (1, 2)
(4) s2 [¬(160cm > t tall)] (3, EG5.3.1.2)
(5) s2 [t tall ≥ 160cm] (4, rw)
Finally, we must remark that, while predicate standpoint logic S1 offers expressivity
for the representation of sorites predicates with variable thresholds of applicability, its
complexity makes it an inappropriate formalism for many computational applications.
In contrast, description standpoint logics SALC with numerical domains (see [BHS08])
are expressive enough to represent such scenarios, only giving up on modelling the
threshold of applicability as a variable on its own right. Along these lines, a similar
example is as follows:
Example 5.3.2. .
(1). ∗ hasHeight(Tina, 186)
(2). ∗ hasHeight(Nena, 160)
(3). s1 [∃hasHeight.(≥, 185) v Tall]
(4). s2 [¬Tall(Nena)]
(5). s2  s1
From the previous we can deduce that
(6). s1 Tall(Tina)
(7). s2 Tall(Tina)
Moreover, if we want to be able to infer that any subject shorter than Nena is
also not tall from s2(Nena : ¬Tall), then we need to add further constraints. A
formalisation for this goes as follows:
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• ∗(shorterThan ≡ (hasHeight ◦ < ◦ hasHeight−)
• ∗(∃shorterThan.¬Tall v ¬Tall)
It must be noted that the latter formula requires our description logic to allow for
cyclic definitions. This can be done with a description logic with fixpoint semantics
(see [CDG03, BHS08]).
5.4 Conceptual or non-numerical variation
As discussed in section 2.3.3, the semantic variability of most natural language terms
gives rise to borderline cases that cannot be expressed exclusively in terms of the
variation in degree of a reduced set of properties or dimensions. Instead, the lack
of clarity on which attributes or conditions are essential to the meaning of a given
term brings about qualitative differences in the characterisations coming from different
perspectives.
For example, the scenario where we have two conceptualisations of a domain, and
we have partial knowledge about how they are related is common in computational
domains. Let us see a simplified example in forestry concerning the standpoints of two
fictional forestry organisations, FO1 and FO2:
Example 5.4.1. .
1. According to FO1,
(a) Land can be classified into either Forestland or Shrubland (but not both).
(b) Palms are not considered to be trees.
2. According to FO2,
(a) Land can be classified into either Forestland, Savanah or Shrubland.
(b) Borderline cases may occur between Forestland and Savanah and between
Savanah and Shrubland, but not between Forestland and Shrubland.
(c) Palms are classed as trees.
3. Forestland is predominantly covered by trees.
4. Land that is definitely Forestland according to FO1 is at least possibly Forestland
according to FO2.
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A formalisation is as follows:
Example 5.4.2 (Propositional formalisation of example 5.4.1 ). .
(1). FO1[L → (F ∨ S)]
(2). FO1[F ↔ ¬S]
(3). FO1[P → ¬T]
(4). FO2[L → (F ∨ S ∨ Sa)]
(5). ♦FO2 F ↔ ¬♦FO2 S
(6). FO2[P → T]
(7). ∗[F → T]
(8). FO1 F → ♦FO2 F
From the previous statements, if we also know that an area of land is (unequivocally)
predominantly covered by palms (∗ P), we can infer that FO1 S and FO2[S ∨ Sa].
Proof — (FO1 S). .
(A) ∗ P (assumption)
(1) FO1 P (A, AP)
(2) FO1[¬T → ¬F] (EG5.4.2.7, AP (and transposed))
(3) FO1[P → ¬F] (follows easily from EG5.4.2.3, 2)
(4) FO1 S (1,3 then EG5.4.2.2 )
Proof — (FO2[S ∨ Sa]). .
(5) ♦FO2[S] (3, EG5.4.2.8)
(6) ¬♦FO2[F] (EG5.4.2.5, 4)
(7) FO2[S ∨ Sa] (EG5.4.2.4, 5)
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In cases like this, where multiple and overlapping classification systems coexist
within a domain, propositional logic can be a sufficiently expressive formalism for rep-
resentation and reasoning, as long as we can reason about each piece of land independ-
ently. In more complex scenarios, where either quantification or relations are necessary
(for example to quantify over trees or to relate adjacent pieces of land) or where sorites
parameters play a role in some or all the interpretations, more expressive logics may
be necessary.
For example, we may re-examine the propositional example provided in section 5.2,
where the characterisations of notions like Sane or LogicCapacity are qualitatively dif-
ferent across standpoints. The following is a slight adaptation of our previous example
to illustrate this.
Example 5.4.3. .
(1). It is unequivocal that no lunatics are fit to serve on a jury.
(2). According to Lewis Carroll, everyone who is sane can do Logic.
(3). Lucia and Brandon agree with Lewis Carroll’s standpoint.
(4). According to Lucia, no student with less than distinction in Knowledge Repres-
entation can do logic.
(5). According to Brandon, no student with less than merits in Knowledge Represent-
ation can do logic.
(6). According to Judi, those who scream in the corridors are lunatics.
(7). According to Judi, those who have lunatic friends are lunatics.
If a more expressive logic such as SALC is used, then we can further reason about
individual students that may have got different marks as well as about relations.
Moreover, the formalisation expresses more explicitly the semantic variation of the
vague terms predicates involved. A formalisation is as follows.
Example 5.4.4 (Description logic formalisation of example 5.4.3 ). .
(1). ∗[¬Sane v ¬Jury]
(2). Carroll[Sane ≡ LogicCapacity]
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(3). sLucia  sCarroll and sBrandon  sCarroll
(4). Lucia[∃hasMark.(<, 70) v ¬LogicCapacity]
(5). Brandon[∃hasMark.(>, 70) v LogicCapacity]
(6). Brandon[∃hasMark.(>, 60) v IBran LogicCapacity]
(7). Judi[ScreamsCorridors v ¬Sane]
(8). Judi[∃hasFriend.(¬Sane) v ¬Sane]
(9). ∗(ScreamsCorridors(Tina))
(10). ∗ hasMark(Tina, 78)
(11). ∗ hasFriend(Tina,Nena)
(12). ∗ hasMark(Nena, 65)
5.5 Penumbral connections
Standpoint semantics regards precisifications as applying to the whole language. This is
a strategy to prevent the meaning of related vague concepts from varying independently,
as a means to ensure consistency. For instance, we do not allow for precisifications in
which related concepts are given conflicting interpretations (e.g. someone can be both
‘tall’ and ‘short’) — in fact, retaining this kind of penumbral connection is recognised
as one of the main advantages of supervaluationistic frameworks [KS96a].
Along these lines, standpoint logic enables us to impose penumbral connections
between concepts, both applying to all possible interpretations, using the ∗ operator,
and also from the point of view of a particular standpoint s, by means of the s
operator. An example of this can be found in our previous example 5.2.2, where the
formula EG5.2.2.10 expresses the condition that the two predicates M and D, standing
for merits and distinction, are mutually exclusive over all precisifications. Similarly,
the following is an extension of example 5.3.1 that includes the predicate Short and its
connection to Tall.
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Example 5.5.1. .
(1). ∗ ∀x[(Tall(x) ↔ ¬Short(x))] (a penumbral axiom).
(2). ∗[height(Tara) = 186cm]
(3). ∗[height(Nena) = 160cm]
(4). s1 [∀x[Tall(x) ↔ height(x) > t tall]
(5). s1 [t tall < 185cm]
(6). s1 [Short(Nena)]
(7). s2  s1
(8). s2 [t tall = 180cm]
All precisifications must now satisfy the penumbral connection axiom EG5.5.1.1:
someone cannot be both Tall and Short. Thus, EG5.5.1.1 will be true in all precisific-
ations and will force the threshold for tallness to be higher than 160cm (the proof is
identical to that of example 5.3.1 after inferring s1 [¬Tall(Nena)] from the penumbral
axiom EG5.5.1.1 and EG5.5.1.6). Finally, for the example 5.3.2, in description stand-
point logic, we can formalise the same penumbral connection with:
(1). ∗(Tall v ¬Short)
(2). ∗(Short v ¬Tall)
5.6 Generality, context and ambiguity
In chapter 2, we introduced the concept of the SVoNLT and the notions that can be
subsumed in it. Moreover, in section 2.3.5, we discussed phenomena that is some-
times confused with the semantic variability or vagueness of natural language terms,
but which we differentiate from it. In this section, we go back to these phenomena
and discuss the possibilities and limitations of the standpoint framework to represent
scenarios in which they play a role.
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5.6.1 The role of context
In this work we have taken the frequent stance that vagueness (or more generally the
SVoNLT) is an independent phenomena from context-dependence, even though they
often co-occur. One of the common reasons to justify this position is the prevalence of
the sorites paradox even within a well delimited context:
Fix on a context which can be made as definite as you like (in particular,
choose a specific comparison class, e.g. current professional American bas-
ketball players): ‘tall’ will remain vague, with borderline cases and fuzzy
boundaries, and the sorites paradox will retain its force. [KS96a]
Yet, contextualism has been proposed as a philosophical approach to vagueness,
using indexicality to provide an account of the sorites paradox. A general introduction
to the contextualist approach to vagueness can be found in [Sor18]. An interesting
example is that of Shapiro, who incorporates the concept of open-texture1 to his view
in contextuality [Sha06]. According to him, borderline cases are predications that are
dependent on the judgement of the speaker: ‘they come out true in virtue of the speaker
judging them to be true’. Moreover, competent speakers of the language are aware that
such borderline cases could be judged differently by other agents. In this work, Shaphiro
proposed the use of Kleene’s three-valued logic [Kle52, Kle38] in order to model vague
predicates.
While the standpoint logic is not developed to implement contextualist theories of
vagueness, it is easy to see that it can accommodate, to some extent, the representation
of scenarios where contextuality is understood along these lines. We could do this
by linking each standpoint to a pair of agent and context, whose contents are the
open-textured (not fully or precisely defined) interpretations of terms, including any
judgements on borderline cases. With standpoint logic we could then reason with
different arrangements of standpoints, belonging to pairs or sets of agents and contexts,
for instance with the set of contexts attached to one agent or with the set of agents
attached to one context.
In order to illustrate this, let us recover the propositional example of the Carrol
sylogism (example 5.2.2). We know that, according to Judi, those who scream in the
1The term, due to Waismann, denotes ‘the inability of certain concepts to be fully or precisely
defined or of regulations to be exhaustive and leave no room for interpretation.’[Bla08]
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corridors are lunatics. Yet, we may want to specify the context, hence having: according
to Judi when she works in the School of Computing, those who scream in the corridors
are lunatics. We could model this with the intersection of the two relevant standpoints,
Judy∩WSoC)1. For an example of more elaborate modelling with agents and contexts,
we may want to include another judgement: according to Judi when she goes to a
rugby match, those who scream in the corridors are possibly not lunatics, which can be
formalised with Judy∩rugby. Further, if we intersect the standpoint of working in the
School of computing (sWSoc) to the standpoints of Lucia and Brandon, we can then also
reason about the set of judgements from the general sWSoc standpoint in opposition to
others. The combination operations are explored in more detail in section 5.7.
Finally, further work could be done in extensions explicitly formalising contexts and
or agents associated with standpoints, rather than only allowing for custom standpoint
labels. However, we are not pursuing further such a line of research.
5.6.2 Generality
As we have seen in section 2.3.5.1, we do not regard generality as contributing to the
SVoNLT. Instead, in this thesis generality is understood as a relation between the
semantics of terms or interpretations rather than a property of a term itself (as in ‘p
is a general predicate’). On the one hand, we can express that a term is more general
than another: i.e. ‘this month’ is more general than ‘today’, as we would normally do in
classical logic. On the other hand, we can also express that a standpoint or perspective
is more general than another with the partial order of standpoints.
It must be noted that, whenever we say that a standpoint is more general than
another (s1  s2), we mean that s1 has the same or more borderline cases than s2,
and those apply to the whole language rather than to a term in particular (generality
holds between standpoints here, not between terms). In contrast, when we say that
a term is more general than another, it is normally meant that the more precise one
is subsumed by the more general one, so that whenever the general one holds, so
does the more precise one. This can be represented in the standard way with any
of the underlying logic used in a standpoint framework, such as propositional, e.g.:
∗ Today → ThisMonth, or first-order logic, e.g.: ∗ ∀x [OakForest(x) → Forest(x)].
1Here we have used the intersection operation, which will be described subsequently in section 5.7.
We could, alternatively, provide a custom tag sJudy@WSoC
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5.6.3 Ambiguity
Last but not least, we consider the formalisation issues regarding ambiguous predicates.
We recall, from section 2.3.5.3, that ambiguity is understood here as homonymy.
A traditional test to detect ambiguity, conjunction reduction, can be used to illus-
trate the reasons why the phenomenon can not be directly represented in standpoint
semantics. For this example, let us consider two sentences, ‘The colours are light’ and
‘The feathers are light’. It would be plausible for an agent in a particular context
to make both judgements without it being regarded as contradictory or nonsensical;
hence, both of them could be stated from a particular standpoint on the SVoNLT, say
s1. However, if both sentences are formalised using the same predicate, say Light(x),
then, from ‘[According to s1] The colours are light’ and ‘[According to s1] The feathers
are light’, the following can be inferred: ‘[According to s1] The colours and the feathers
are light’. This is what is called zeugma in the linguistic literature, which refers to a
certain absurdity of the merged meaning. Hence, it is not desirable for a logic theory
to make this kind of inference.
One intuition would be to presume that the agent may be taking two different
standpoints in the same context, one for the tone of colours and one for the weight.
While this would prevent the framework from deducing a zeugmatic fact, it would imply
that each precisification can only formalise either colour lightness or weight lightness,
but not both. This is not ideal. In contrast, we suggest that the most sensible solution
for many scenarios of this kind is to represent homonym terms as different predicates,
say LightColour(x) and LightWeight(x).
Finally, we acknowledge that, in some cases, the line between polysemy and am-
biguity can be blurry. In such cases, the strategy for formalisation (as SVoNLT or
as ambiguity) must be chosen in relation to the context and intended use. When the
terms are homonyms with distinct meanings, the standpoint framework does not offer
more tools for reasoning than those provided by the underlying logics that it uses. The
strength of standpoint logic is its capacity to represent different standpoints regarding
the meanings of terms, while respecting penumbral connections and the self-consistency
of the interpretations. This is irrelevant in the case of ambiguity, where the different
senses are not at all semantically connected.
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5.7 Standpoint relations and combinations
When working with systems with a variety of standpoints, it is often useful to reason
not only about what can be inferred from individual standpoints, but also about the
relations that hold between them and the consequences of these relationships. For that
purpose, we will examine some significant relations and combinations of standpoints.
5.7.1 Relations
Our framework supports the relatively straightforward analysis of the relations that
hold between standpoints. In particular, we identify four main logic relations between
the standpoints, roughly analogous to set-theoretic relations, to be inferred by the
system with respect to a formula ψ (typically consisting of our knowledge base). These
are:
1. Equivalence: s1 ≡ s2. The set of precisifications of s1 is the same as the set of s2
at all models. Hence, for all φ, then ψ |=S0 s1 φ if and only if ψ |=S0 s2 φ.
2. Subsumption: s2 ⊆ s1. The set of precisifications of s2 is a subset of the set of s1
at all models. Hence, for all φ, if ψ |=S0 s2 φ then ψ |=S0 s1 φ.
3. Disjointness: s1  ∗\s2. The set of precisifications of s1 is disconnected from
the set of s2 at all models. Hence, their theories are contradictory. This can be
verified with the addition of the schema s1 φ ↔ s2 φ to ψ, if then ψ becomes
S0-inconsistent.
4. Overlap: None of the previous (NP) relations hold between s1 and s2. Thus, at
least some models will display an overlap between the sets of s1 and s2.
Relations between standpoints show, to some degree, the connections among them.
While overlap is the most common scenario, other relations such as subsumption and
disjointness provide valuable information to the agent, to the point of inter-operation
becoming trivial (such as when information is linked to a standpoint that is subsumed
by the agent’s standpoint) or not feasible because of explicitly conflicting commitments
(in the case of disjoint standpoints). Moreover, the previous relations, in particular
subsumption, may hold for a formula ψ even if the standpoints have not been said to
satisfy the partial order explicitly. In this sense, the relation is discoverable.
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Combinations
Logic definitions
s1 ≡ s2 s2 ⊆ s1 s1 ⊆ s2 s1 ⊆ ∗\s2 NP
Union s1 ∪ s2 s1, s2 s1 s2 s1 ∪ s2* s1 ∪ s2
Intersection s1 ∩ s2 s1, s2 s2 s1 ∅ s1 ∩ s2
Complement s2 \ s1 ∅ ∅ s2\s1* s2 s2\s1
Table 5.1: The combinations (columns) between s1 and s2 and the result with respect
to the relations holding between them.
It must be noted that the former relations are logical, i.e. they constrain the
possible arrangements of standpoints in the models but they do not fix them completely.
Consequently, the relations can not be inferred from the set-theoretical counterpart
relations that may hold between the standpoints in a single model of ψ. For instance, if
s1 and s2 overlap, it may be that in a model M1 the sets Rs1 and Rs2 are disconnected
while in another model M2 they may overlap. Similarly, if s1 is subsumed under s2,
in a model M3 the sets Rs1 and Rs2 may be equal while in another model M4 Rs1
may be smaller than Rs2 . This occurs particularly in reduced models such as those
constructed in the complexity section 4.4.2. This is because standpoints correspond to
sets of precisifications in the models Mi, but there are different possible models/sets,
even for the same set of precisifications Π.
5.7.2 Combinations
In order to support the additional specification of custom standpoints from existing
ones, we define some basic combinations between standpoints. Let us consider the
models M of a formula φ in the standpoint class of models MS0 .
1. Union: s1 ∪ s2. For all models M, for all the precisifications pi ∈ (s1 ∪ s2) then
either pi ∈ s1 or pi ∈ s2 (or both). Hence, s1  s1∪2 and s2  s1∪2, and for all
formula ψ, then φ |=S0 ♦s1∪2 ψ if and only if φ |=S0 ♦s1 ψ or φ |=S0 ♦s2 ψ.
2. Intersection: s1 ∩ s2. For all models M, for all the precisifications pi ∈ (s1 ∩ s2)
then pi ∈ s1 and pi ∈ s2. Hence, s1  s1∪2 and s2  s1∪2, and for all formula ψ,
then φ |=S0 s1∩2 ψ if and only if φ |=S0 s1 ψ and φ |=S0 s2 ψ.
132
5.8 Standpoint normal form
3. Difference: s2 \ s1. For all models M, for all the precisifications pi ∈ (s2\s1) then
pi ∈ s2 and pi /∈ s1. Hence, s2  s2\1, and for all formula ψ, if φ |=S0 s2 ψ
then φ |=S0 s2\1 ψ (AP), otherwise, if φ 2S0 s2 ψ and φ |=S0 s1 ψ then
φ |=S0 s2\1 ¬ψ.
Table 5.1 shows the analysis of these combinations with respect to the relations
holding between s1 and s2, which allows for the simplification of the result in some
scenarios and shows the combination to be trivial or the empty set (∅) in others. In the
table, two cases are marked with a star (*), the union of two disjoint standpoints and
the complement of a standpoint s1 subsumed in s2. Albeit legal, both combinations are
potentially problematic and the agent should be aware of the explicit inconsistencies
between s1 and s2 in the former, and the subsumption of s1 in s2 in the latter.
Moreover, we must recall that whenever the operation results in the empty set, the
calculated standpoint is not legal in the system.
5.8 Standpoint normal form
While modal logics are central formalisms for multi-agent systems, the intractability
of major reasoning tasks limits their applications. Normal forms are sub-languages of
logical languages consisting of formulae with a limited range of structures. Typically
they are chosen so that every formula is equivalent to some formula in the normal form.
Normal forms can be useful for simplifying proof procedures.
We finish this chapter by providing a normal form in which all formulas in LS0 can
be expressed. Several normal forms have been proposed for modal logics in general,
and for multi-agent modal logics in particular. For instance, a disjunctive normal form
is defined in [BFM10] for a (single-agent) modal logic satisfying S5. Moreover, the
prime implicate normal forms (PINFs) [Bie08] have been proposed for the description
logic ALC, which is a syntactic variant of a multi-agent modal logic K, and the cover
disjunctive normal forms (CDNFs) [CCMV06] support single-modal logics KD45 and
S5 as shown in [HFD11] and have been extended for a multi-agent modal logic KD45
in [HFD12].
In what follows, we extend the single-agent CDNFs in [HFD11] to the standpoint
modalities, and we name the extension Cover logic Multi-modal Prenex Normal Form
(CMPNF). For this purpose we will first introduce a generalisation of the prenex normal
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form to the multiple modalities of standpoint logic.
Definition 18 (Multi-modal prenex normal form). A formula in multi-modal prenex
normal form is specified by the following abstract syntax:
α = δ or α = (α′ ∨ α′′)
That is, a formula α is either a disjunction of formulas α′ ∨ α′′ or a term δ such that:
δ = r or δ = s r or δ = ♦s r or δ = (δ′ ∧ δ′′)
where r is a propositional formula.
Lemma 8. Every formula in S0 is equivalent to a formula in multi-modal prenex nor-
mal form.
Lemma 9. We have the following equivalences in S0:
• s(φ ∨ (ψ ∧ s′ β)) ↔ (s(φ ∨ ψ) ∧ s′ β) ∨ (s φ ∧ ¬s′ β))
• s(φ ∨ (ψ ∧ ♦s′ β)) ↔ (s(φ ∨ ψ) ∧ ♦s′ β) ∨ (s φ ∧ ¬♦s′ β))
Proof. This is proven in [MH04] for every formula in a logic S5 with a single modality
(hence s and s′ are the same) and extended to KD45 in [HFD12]. It is easy to see
that with the stronger standpoint interaction axioms AS4 and AS5 instead of 4 and
5, the exact same proof holds for S0.
Proof of Lemma 8. A proof that every formula in S5 is equivalent to a formula in
prenex normal form is provided in [MH04]. Such a proof applies also to the case
of a KD45 single modal logic, as shown in [HFD11], and also to standpoint logic
following Lemma 9 and the multi-modal theorems `S0 s′s φ→ s φ and `S0
s′¬s φ→¬s φ instead of `φ→ φ and `¬φ→¬φ .
Next, we introduce the Cover logic Multi-modal Prenex Normal Form.
Definition 19 (Cover logic multi-modal prenex normal form). A formula in Cover
logic Multi-modal Prenex Normal Form (CMPNF) is specified by the following abstract
syntax:
α = δ ∧
∧
s∈S
∇sΓ or α = (α′ ∨ α′′)
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where δ is a propositional formula, Γ is a set of propositional formulae and the cover








Lemma 10. Every formula in S0 is equivalent to a formula in Cover logic Multi-modal
Prenex Normal Form.
This has been proven for the prenex normal form in [HFD11] and applies in exactly
the same way to the multimodal case as shown in [HFD12]. In the latter paper, ad-
ditional work is done in order to account for nested modalities. However, this is not
necessary in the case of standpoint logic as we have previously shown.
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In the thesis so far we have reviewed the problem of the semantic variability of nat-
ural language, introduced the standpoint logic framework, presented the syntax and
semantics of the logic and generally illustrated its expressivity to represent and reason
about different aspects of the SVoNLT, such as with graded predicates and in the
presence of penumbral connections.
In this chapter, we engage in a case study in the domain of forestry, with the aim
of demonstrating some applications of standpoint logic in a real world scenario. In
particular, we hope to provide both direct insight into how to apply our framework
to address some of the challenges that the SVoNLT presents for the forestry domain,
but also more generally we hope to illustrate its possibilities in the broader field of
Geographical Information Systems (GIS) and other domains where it becomes relevant
to reason within different points of view.
It is well known that forest definitions have a fundamental impact on the measure-
ment and reporting of forest dynamics and processes, such as global changes in forest
extension and occurrences of deforestation and degradation. Moreover, with ecological
and climate concerns being at the top of the current international agenda, interdiscip-
linary collaboration and data dissemination and interoperation are key to gain better
understanding of the state and dynamics of our forests.
Moreover, it must be noted that the particular case of the term ‘forest’ is interest-
ing in several aspects. On the one hand, there is an actual debate that has motivated
researchers to discuss appropriate definitions and the SVoNLT is a recognised challenge
for practitioners that make use of forestry data. The political, ecological, environmental
and economic implications of what a forest is highlights the importance of handling the
variability. On the other hand, forests are geographical objects and, as such, they
display particular features that make them challenging to model and particularly af-
fected by vagueness in many aspects, as reflected in the wide literature in the domain
of Geographic Ontology.
Our case study is focused on the formal representation of the standpoints of various
institutions on the semantics of ‘forest’ (and related concepts such as ‘tree’) and the
reasoning that can be done with them. We first provide a short literature review on
the issues and challenges derived from the SVoNLT. There is a relatively wide body
of research on this topic, ranging from the general discussion and assessment of the
impact of the vagueness of ‘forest’ in the multidisciplinary scale, to specific case studies
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of the benefits and disadvantages of using different definitions in a particular area
and for a particular purpose. We provide a broad overview and point at relevant
literature in section 6.1.1, and subsequently, we select two prominent public resources
to derive knowledge from: the forest data repository Global Forest Watch (GFW) and
the environmental ontology EnvO, both of which are discussed in section 6.1.2. We then
proceed to present our case study, which focuses on the reported need for analysing the
interaction between a subset of forest definitions and their associated data at a global
and local level in section 6.1.3.
In order to address the scenario and use cases considered in section 6.1.3, we con-
sider representational aspects of geographical objects in 6.2. We differentiate between
the functions of classification, individuation and demarcation, that comprise our inter-
pretation of predicative terms, and we apply them to the interpretations of the term
‘forest’ relative to the standpoints under consideration. We then present in section 6.3
the full formalisation of all the standpoints relevant to our case studies, and we proceed,
in section 6.4, to dissect some application scenarios for the framework where reasoning
about the aforementioned standpoints serves to address several use cases in the domain.
We finish the chapter with an analysis of the opportunities of the framework in relation
to formal ontologies in section 6.5 and a conclusion.
6.1 Preliminaries
6.1.1 Forest Definitions
There are many definitions of forest in the literature [Lun07, CBL16] (more than 600
were reported in [Lun07]), which have been specified for different purposes, thereby
leading to very different estimates [Gra08].
Traditionally, two main categories have been discussed: land cover and land use
definitions [Lun02]. While the former characterise forest in terms of the ecological
layer and the physical characteristics of the land, the latter do it concerning the pur-
pose to which the land is put to use by humans [MT94]. Definitions favouring one
or another (or both) approaches, together with other relevant features, are linked to
different perspectives and management objectives, the most relevant ones being tim-
ber management, conservation of ecosystems, increasing carbon stocks and landscape
restoration [CBL16]. For example, definitions used for the analysis of carbon stocks
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generally focus on land cover features but ignore aspects like connectedness or distinc-
tions between natural or planted forests, because they are not relevant to describe the
carbon potential. The opposite happens when defining forest for landscape restoration
purposes, where together with land use information, they become crucial aspects for
understanding the effects on ecosystem services and forest-based livelihoods. These dif-
ferences are linked to scale and disciplinary compartmentalisation and, while justified
by the specific needs of the purposes for which the definitions were created [CBL16],
they pose limitations on the construction of global knowledge [Gra10] and data inter-
operability.
Moreover, beyond the semantic variability of the concept itself, reflected in a wide
variety of specifications, most definitions of forest (and other geographic features), both
in the academic literature and in administrative regulations, are not ‘precise’1 [HTL14,
TSG09], which questions consistency even within a particular research community or
monitoring project. This limits the understanding of data and may impair management
decisions or distort research findings.
Awareness of these issues exists and there is an extensive literature reporting it, both
in academia [BRP57, BW88, Lun07] and in policy [HP03, MJP15]. However, a global
agreement on the meaning of such words does not seem reachable, as the variation
is relevant for different contexts of application. Part of the community has focused
on precisely defining ‘forest’ and other natural resource terms for different purposes.
Other research has focused on examining the reasons for definitional problems. Many
papers have advocated the need to accommodate a variety of definitions [CBL16, Gra10]
and have also pointed to consequent challenges, particularly for data integration and
multidisciplinary work [Gra10]. This chapter follows these lines and proposes the use of
the standpoint framework to enable the coexistence, analysis and comparison of formal
knowledge and information referring to different partial characterisations of ‘forest’.
6.1.2 Resources
Efforts on measuring the location, extent and evolution of forests and other geographical
features have contributed to both the increase of available data and to the development
1Logically one would rather say that they are partial, in that they do not commit, for instance, to
the semantics of secondary concepts used for the characterisation, nor to aspects that do not play an
important role in the intended applications of the definition.
139
6.1 Preliminaries
and formalisation of semantic infrastructures to represent the domain. In order to illus-
trate the applications of standpoint logic in this context, we will construct our examples
using well established definitions in the literature in Forestry and two prominent infra-
structures, Global Forest Watch and the Environment Ontology [BMS+13], so that the
representations developed in this chapter refer to data structures and ontology concepts
that are publicly available and widely used in research.
6.1.2.1 Global Forest Watch
Global Forest Watch (GFW) is an online platform that distributes and visualises data
produced by different institutions about the world’s forests [Wor02]. It publishes annual
maps of tree cover, tree cover loss and tree cover gain derived from Landsat satellite
observations [HPM+13], a collection of global and local land cover and land use maps
(e.g. [RAW+13] for Indonesia) and instant deforestation alert maps among others. In
this chapter, we will look at the representations and inferences that we can make using
the data structures and definitions from [HPM+13] and [RAW+13]. These studies will
be described in the scenarios S1 (section 6.1.3.1) and S2 (section 6.1.3.2) respectively.
GFW can be seen as a tool that facilitates the use and access to forest data beyond
the scientific community to include decision-makers from governments, companies, and
civil society organisations [CSH+18]. However, the fact that each dataset responds to
a different conceptualisation of ‘forest’ hinders the capacity of its users to interpret and
integrate the information as a whole.
6.1.2.2 Ontologies and semantic data: EnvO
The Environment Ontology, EnvO, is an ontology conceived to specify a wide range
of environments relevant to multiple life science disciplines and to accommodate the
terminological requirements of all those needing to annotate data using ontology classes
[BMS+13]. Especially since its expansion in the representation of habitats and environ-
mental processes in [BPL+16], EnvO has become one of the main ontologies formalising
the domain of forestry at a reasonable level of detail. We shall note that EnvO is ex-
pressed in OWL, based on a description logic language.
However, as one might expect, in the process of defining a general-purpose ontology,
addressing the semantic heterogeneity of some terms may be challenging, as is the case
with ‘forest’. Indeed, the specific need for adding several forest characterisations in
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Figure 6.1: General overview of the main concepts and relations in EnvO on the domain
of forestry. 141
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EnvO was noted in [BPL+16] (in a similar vein to the more elaborate analysis in
[CGV11]1), but it does not seem to have been addressed to date. In that respect, our
use of standpoint logic with the concepts of EnvO in our examples can be seen as a
strategy to address this issue.
As for October 2019, forests in EnvO are represented via two main classes, namely
forested area and forest ecosystem. Forested area has ‘forest’ as a related synonym and
links to the forest entry of Wikipedia among other database cross-references. It is hence
the ‘de facto’ concept for forest. Moreover, a Forested area is said to overlap with a
forest ecosystem, for which the same textual definition is provided. The latter concept
is reportedly intended at characterising the communities of plants that constitute the
ecosystem, rather than its spatial extent. Finally, additional classes subsumed in ve-
getated area seem to refer to forests (e.g. area of evergreen forest), yet they are not
explicitly related to the class forested area. A general overview of the main concepts
and relations in EnvO on the domain of forestry can be seen in figure 6.1.
Across this chapter we will model forest standpoints using EnvO concepts and, like
EnvO itself, relations from the Relation Ontology (RO). The reader is encouraged to
refer to the figure 6.1 for a better understanding and context to the representations
provided here.
6.1.3 The Scenarios
We finish this section by narrowing our attention to two scenarios which have been
reported in the literature, and around which our representation examples and use cases
revolve. They will be referred as (S1:Global scenario) and (S1:Indonesia scenario)
in the rest of the chapter.
6.1.3.1 S1: Global scenario
In the first place, we consider the quantification of global forest extent, degradation
and forest gain, and how the divergences in the estimates produced by both academic
1Carrara [CGV11] holds that, for family resemblance concepts (conceptual or non-numerical vague-
ness), including the representations of a variety of meanings or interpretations of the same term may
be useful for the users of an ontology, and favours a ‘descriptive strategy’ that consists on producing
a series of formalisations of the primary meanings of a term to deal with its semantic variability, as if
there were a series of homonymic terms in the ontology.
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and policy institutions challenge the acquisition of knowledge about the current state
of affairs.
It has been recently claimed in different pieces of research both that ‘global forest
cover’ has increased and that ‘forests’ have decreased: Song et al. [SHS+18] show that
‘contrary to the prevailing view that forest area has declined globally, tree cover has
increased by 2.24 million km2 (+7.1% relative to the 1982 level)’. On the other hand,
the NYDF 2019 Report on the New York Declaration on Forests [SSR19] states that ‘on
average, an area of tree cover the size of the United Kingdom was lost every year between
2014 and 2018’. While these are in appearance contradictory statements, several factors
explain the extreme divergences in the highlighted estimates. One that plays a major
role is the different semantics attributed to the term forest and its variants (such as
forest cover) and the consequent differences between the actual phenomena that are
examined in those pieces of research.
The work in [SHS+18] uses Vegetation Continuous Fields (VCF), consisting of per-
centages of tree canopy (TC) cover, short vegetation (SV) cover and bare ground (BG)
cover, to represent the land surface. Trees are defined as all vegetation taller than 5
meters in height. TC refers to the proportion of the ground covered by the vertical
projection of tree crowns. In related work ([HPM+13]), the category of tree cover is
generally attributed to land with a minimum of 30% of canopy cover, although estim-
ates are provided for several thresholds. While both [SHS+18] and [HPM+13] clarify
that TC is not equivalent to ‘forest’, they use the terms ‘forest cover’ and ‘tree cover’
interchangeably across the research.
Conversely, in the NYDF 2019 report [SSR19] it is noted that, although the defini-
tions used vary by government, organisation, and intended use, they must satisfy that
a forest is ‘an area of land of minimum 0.5-1 hectares with a tree cover density of 10-
30%, where trees have potential to reach a minimum height of 2-5 meters at maturity
in place’.
6.1.3.2 S2: The case of REDD+ in Indonesia
For our second scenario, we narrow our attention to Indonesia. We examine a piece of
research that analyses the impact of the use of several forest conceptualisations on the
estimation of forest emission levels and the distribution of the drivers of deforestation in
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the context of REDD+ monitoring1 [RAW+13]. Three forest definitions are considered,
the FAO definition, the current national definition of the Ministry of Environment and
Forestry of Indonesia (MoFI) and the ‘natural forest definition’, which is often employed
as the preferred forest definition by conservation agencies.
[RAW+13] provides the mappings to classify the areas associated to different land
cover types published by the MoFI (and available in GFW) into different classes, most
notably forested area and not forested area, according to each of the considered defin-
itions. By formally representing this, we explore how standpoint logic can be used to
infer new knowledge from their analysis.
6.1.3.3 Set of Standpoints and definitions
We now establish the following set of standpoints with the semantic commitments based
on the definitions and constraints about ‘forest’ and related terms that can be found
in the aforementioned publications:
D1.1. sSong - Tree canopy: proportion of the ground covered by the vertical projection
of tree crowns.
D1.2. sSong - Tree: all vegetation taller than 5 meters in height.
D1.3. sHansen - Tree/forest cover: Area with tree canopy greater than a percentage,
by default 30%.
D1.4. sNYDF - Forest: area of land of minimum 0.5-1 hectares with a tree canopy of
10-30 percent.
D1.5. sNYDF - Tree: trees have potential to reach a minimum height of 2-5 meters
at maturity in place.
D2.1. sFAO - Forest: area of land of minimum 0.5 hectares with a canopy cover of
more than 10 percent. 2.
D2.2. sFAO - Tree: trees have potential to reach a minimum height of 5 meters at
maturity in place.
1REDD+ is a program developed by the UN that aims at diminishing, halting and reversing forest
cover loss and carbon emissions in developing countries
2The paper uses the FAO definition from 2000 [RAW+13], which has been updated in [MJP15]
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D2.3. sFAO - Land-use categories: forest land, cropland, grassland, wetlands, settle-
ments and other land. Land categories are mutually exclusive.
D2.4. sMoFI - Forest: vegetation cover dominated by intertwined tree crowns with
canopy cover of more than 60%.
D2.5. sMoFI - Bush: Vegetation coverage dominated by trees, with 25-60% canopy
cover
D2.6. sMoFI - Shrubland as shrubs with height of more than 0.5 m and more than
25% coverage.
D2.7. sNFD - Forest: Excludes tree plantations.
6.2 Representation of forests
In this section, we tackle the problem of representing the semantic variability of the term
‘forest’, first in a broad way, taking into account both the challenges reported in the
forestry literature and building on the research of the ontological issues of geography,
and then proceeding to provide representations for the scenarios considered in section
6.1.3, namely (S1:Global scenario) and (S2:Indonesia scenario).
In our study of the particular characteristics of the geographical domain, we con-
sider three main aspects that may be present in the representations of the different
interpretations of ‘forest’ encoded by standpoints, namely the classification, individu-
ation and demarcation of geographical objects. We analyse them and provide formal
examples implementing some of the standpoints considered in section 6.1.3.3. Finally,
we present a formal representation of the set of standpoints from section 6.1.3.3.
6.2.1 Representation of the geographic domain
Given the complexity of the geographic space, its special characteristics [Ege93] and the
variety of ‘things’ it can include [SM98, Var01], much discussion has been raised when
trying to answer concisely the question of what is a geographic concept [TK04]. Some of
the most interesting characteristics pointed by ontologists and geographic information
scientists include location, topology, boundaries and mereology. It is surprising thus
that, in ‘forest’ definitions, little attention has been paid to those aspects.
Among the most challenging issues affecting forest representations are the following:
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Aspects of forest concept definitions
1. Classification
1.1 Qualitative characteristics (of the
whole object)
A typical example would be the land use
1.2 Presence (or absence) of features E.g. roads, trees of more than 5m, shrubs, ...
1.3 Density, uniformity and scale of
features
Canopy cover should be measured not only
in terms of the density of trees, but also in
terms of the uniformity and or scale, given
that the predicate can be applied to regions
with different characteristics.
1.4 Location restrictions Some definitions are contextualised in one
area, like tropical forest
2. Individuation
2.1 Morphological restrictions. Such as shape or minimal area
2.2 Metrical restrictions We may want to evaluate the proximity of
constituents
2.3 Topological restrictions Is the forest necessarily self-connected? Does
the forest have holes?
2.4 Mereological restrictions Is the forest the same forest (whole) if it loses
one part?
2.5 Rough location Part of the identity of the object is linked to
its geographical rough position
3. Demarcation
3.1 Fine grained threshold Determines the precise boundary of the forest
3.2 Fuzzy threshold? We may allow for fuzzy boundaries
Table 6.1: Compilation of features of forest definitions from different sources.
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• The dichotomy of the object-field representations. In order to represent geo-
graphic phenomena, ontologies have to encapsulate not only the meanings linked
to specific concepts but also the way these meanings are handled and represented
[Aga05]. Thus, a precisification of a concept such as forest must embed informa-
tion about its mode of specification, typically either in terms of an object model
(as in the case of the FAO definition) or a field (as in the Hansen definition and
data).
• Individuation criteria. How are entities such as mountains, rivers and forests indi-
viduated within a landscape? Although the possession of a boundary is one mark
of individuality, in the geographical domain boundaries give rise to a number of
ontological conundrums and may themselves be difficult to individuate [CSV98].
• Topology, mereology and location. In the geographic space, topology is considered
to be first-class information, whereas metric properties, such as distances and
shapes, are used as refinements that are frequently less exactly captured [EM95].
A general theory of spatial location is necessary to relate an entity with the spatial
region that it occupies and, finally, topology is crucial as mereology alone cannot
account for some very basic spatial relations, such as the relationship of continuity
between two adjacent objects or the relation of one thing being entirely inside or
surrounding some other thing [CSV98]. For instance, a clearance is distinguished
from other bare land by being entirely inside a forest or entirely surrounded by
it, depending on whether the standpoint on forest considers the clearance to be
part of the forest or not.
• Scale and granularity. A conceptualisation of the geographic space may have
several levels of granularity, each of which will be appropriate for problem solving
at different levels of detail [EM95]. The inclusion of such information in the
formalisation of the relevant standpoint may, in some cases, allow for relevant
inferences, particularly in field representations.
6.2.1.1 Characterisation of geographical objects
With the previous in mind, we have compiled a set of relevant features for forest defin-
itions in Table 6.1, which we have grouped in three main categories, namely classifica-
tion, individuation and demarcation. These categories refer to three main purposes of
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definition identified as particularly relevant for characterising geographical objects in
[GA´B17]. It must be noted that our understanding of classification and individuation
matches with the notions suggested in [GW09] for the general domain of ontology, and
the additional category of demarcation is specific to the geographical domain.
To illustrate the three purposes, we may consider three simple questions using the
term ‘forest’ and the different aspects of its meaning to which they relate. These
questions are used as guidelines to link cognitive conceptualisations of the geographical
space with relevant notions in the domain of philosophy and ontology, as well as with
actual research questions around the topic of global forest monitoring.
(a) Is this land a forest? – Classification
(b) What forests are there in this region? – Individuation
(c) What area is occupied by this forest? – Demarcation
Question (a) should be interpreted as Is this land of the type ‘forest’?, where the
mass noun ‘forestland’ is typically interpreted in terms of a field conceptualisation of
the geographical space. This is the implicit approach in both the papers [HPM+13] and
[SHS+18] (and which is encoded in the standpoints sHansen and sSong), where the global
land-area is organised as a grid of land-pieces which are then systematically classified
in terms of the canopy cover. It must be stressed that the entities to be classified are
land parcels. Hence, a relevant standpoint for ‘forest’ (or rather ‘forestland’) for this
study is exclusively concerned with fixing the characteristics that a piece of land needs
to display in order to satisfy a certain classification.
Question (b), however, requires the individuation of forests in order to be able
to count them, thus taking an object-model approach. Characterising individuation
criteria of objects is hard and, as seen in Table 6.1, relies strongly on spatial (and also
temporal) factors. As Chazdon exposes in her analysis of forest definitions [CBL16],
identity criteria are necessary in order to characterise forest for many management
objectives. For instance, for landscape restoration purposes and conservation of natural
ecosystems, it is important to understand the dynamics of individual forests, and to
track whether they merge, split, appear or disappear, even if the global amount of
forestland remains constant. In our scenarios, identity criteria is necessary, for example,
to infer what forests are there according to sFAO from the data published in [HPM+13].
Question (c) asks for the demarcation (or extension) of a forest. In order to give
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a precise answer, appropriate thresholds and footprint algorithms need to be selected.
Demarcation criteria are particularly relevant for assessing forest loss and gain and for
generating visualisations, among others. It is often presumed that forests need to be
demarcated in order to answer the question (b). However, this need not necessarily
be the case: in some cases, we may be able to differentiate (and hence count) forests,
without committing to their exact boundaries.
In the following sections, we analyse these functions in-depth and illustrate how
can standpoint logic be used to provide accurate interpretations of the term ‘forest’ for
them. As we will see, the generality of the standpoint framework enables us to adapt to
the particularities of the geographical domain and to fix fine-grained standpoints that
respond to different needs and use cases. We hope this, in turn, supports the value of
the standpoint logic for reasoning in scenarios where rigorous reasoning is fundamental,
yet different interpretations of the SVoNLT must be managed.
6.2.2 Classification
Almost all predicates, among them ‘forest’, incorporate some classification features. In
this work, we consider that an object x is classified under a predicate φ if it satisfies
the necessary and sufficient conditions that govern φ’s applicability. Formally we can
express the classification of the objects in a particular domain of individuals as:
∀x[φ(x)→ Φ(x)] and ∀x[Ψ(x)→ φ(x)] (where φ does not occur in either Φ or Ψ).
Common examples of classification tasks in the geographic domain include both
the assignation of a category to an already individuated geographical object, such as
classifying a particular forest f into a forest type tropicalForest(f) or a tree t into a
species oak(t), and the assignation of a category to a portion of a mass term, typically
a region landpixel, for example into forestland(landpixel). The latter, which focuses on
the properties that characterise whether the concept foresthood applies to a given land
parcel, is at the basis of the analysis in [SHS+18] and [HPM+13].
This kind of characterisation does not incorporate any specification of individuality,
which is not required to answer questions of the sort (a). It assumes that an appro-
priate division of land into parcels has already been made (e.g. as raster cells) and
characterises ‘forest’ or ‘forestland’ as a mass term. Thus, the predicate is not con-
cerned with forest objects. Moreover, although φ can be used to determine the total
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area of forestland over the entire domain under consideration, it does not determine
the amount or the extension of individual forests, and, as it happens in section 6.1.3.1
(S1:Global scenario), the total area of forestland will be different from the total area
of the forests contained, for example when some parcels of forestland are isolated from
any significant forest.
6.2.2.1 Representation of classification problems with standpoint logic
The representation of classification aspects in standpoint logic is considerably natural
and consists of the encoding of its necessary and sufficient conditions, which may or may
not be the same. For example, using an underlying description logic, we can formalise
the standpoint sNYDF on what constitutes a Forested area (in the EnvO ontology) in
the following way:
• ∗(∃hasCanopy. envo :Canopy ≡= 1 ro :has part. envo :Canopy)
• ∗(hasCanopyRatio ≡ hasCanopy ◦ ratio)
• (NYDF envo :Forested area) ≡ envo :Vegetated area u size ha.(≥, 0.5) u
hasCanopyRatio.(≥, 30)
• (♦NYDF envo :Forested area) ≡ envo :Vegetated area u size ha.(≥, 0.5) u
hasCanopyRatio.(≥, 10)
Moreover, we may want to differentiate necessary from sufficient conditions, for
example:
• NYDF ( envo :Forested area v envo :Woodland area u size ha.(≥, 0.5))
• NYDF ( envo :Forested area v ∃hasCanopyRatio.(≥, 30))
• ♦NYDF ( envo :Forested area v ∃hasCanopyRatio.(≥, 10))
• NYDF (envo :Vegetated areauoverlaps.envo :Primary forest v envo :Forested area)
In some cases, more fine-grained specifications for the classification criteria of forest-
land could be required. In the framework proposed in Table 6.1 we consider certain
aspects of the classification that tend to be overlooked, even in attempts to provide
concise definitions, such as [MJP15]. Following the framework, a precisification of
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forestland may combine, first, (1.1) qualitative attributes, such as the legal land use of
the area. Then, (1.2) the presence of certain features, such as the trees and the absence
of other elements such as roads or buildings (these classificatory features may, of course,
make reference to other kinds of object or land cover defined in the ontology, which in
turn may also be subject to issues of vagueness and of finding an appropriate individu-
ation). Next, (1.3) the density, uniformity and scale of features. Finally, (1.4) some
location restrictions (e.g. the area must be within the tropics for tropical-forestland(x))
may be added in order to improve contextual adaptation.
6.2.3 Individuation
The notion of individuality is fundamental in the study of ontology and essential when
adopting an object model of representation. However, formally characterising the full
criteria for the individuation of particular types of object tends to be extremely hard
[GW09], and is not addressed in the majority of actual ontologies. In contrast, dif-
ferent standpoints can be adequate to adapt the individuation criteria of objects to
the intended use of the conceptualisation that they refer to. Studies in Cognitive Sci-
ence show that humans identify and individuate objects using at least three sources of
information: spatio-temporal information, property (featural) information, and sortal
information [Xu07]. Moreover, among them, spatial features such as shape are typically
more salient than other properties [Xu07].
Within the philosophical literature, it is considered that individuation requires both
identity and unity. The former involves distinguishing a specific instance from others
(by means of a characteristic property unique to that object), and the latter requires
discriminating the parts or constituents of an instance from the rest of the world.
Existence conditions differ from classification in that the latter express the necessary
and sufficient conditions for an object to be an instance of a class while the former
explicitly specify the necessary and sufficient conditions to infer the ‘existence’ of an
object. Below is a constructive existential axiom that specifies that, whenever a set of
conditions Φ(x1, ... , xn) are satisfied for some objects of the domain x1, ... , xn, then an
object of kind K must exist in that domain, and a relation holds between the original
group and the existent object Ψ(x1, ..., xn, y).
∀x1...∀xn[Φ(x1, ... , xn)→ ∃y[K(y) ∧Ψ(x1, ... , xn, y)]]
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∀y[K(y)→ ∃x1...∃xn[Φ(x1, ... , xn) ∧Ψ(x1, ... , xn, y)]]
The identity criteria I of a concept determine the conditions under which it can
be established that two references refer to the same object, that is, the characteristics
that are unique to a single specific instance [GW00].
∀x∀y[(K(x) ∧K(y))→ (Ik(x, y)↔ (x = y))]
Finally, the notion of unity refers to the problem of describing the parts of objects
and the specific conditions (UC) under which the object constitutes a whole. A general
axiomatic characterisation of this, in terms of a unifying relation among the parts of a
whole is given in [GW09]. In modelling the standpoints of a particular domain or type
of object, it is likely that more specific unity criteria will be required.
Example 6.2.1. A forest may be regarded, by a hypothetical standpoint su, as a
spatially connected region of forested land, which is of maximal extent (i.e. is not part
of a larger spatially connected forested region).
Assuming a predicate Forested has been defined and applied to all parcels of forest-
land, then the following assertion expresses the content of the standopint (where P
is the parthood relation and SCON is the property of being spatially self connected),
capturing the unity condition for a possible standpoint of forest:
u ∀x[Forest(x)→ Forested(x) ∧ SCON(x) ∧ ¬∃y[P(x, y)
∧¬(x = y) ∧ Forested(y) ∧ SCON(y)]
A variety of situations can hinder the specification of a unified criteria for identity
and unity. Some of them are drastic evolutions of objects through time, situations in
which objects merge or split and objects whose boundaries are ill defined or affected by
sorites vagueness, thus creating confusion about self-connectedness and parthood. It is
in these scenarios that the specification of tailored commitments associated to different
standpoints becomes relevant.
Underlying axiomatisations of the space and mereotopology are key to provide ap-
propriate notions of parthood. In some cases, a set theoretical view where two sets are
the same if and only if they have exactly the same elements is appropriate to model the
space. However, for most objects, a looser identity criteria that allows one to accept
the continued existence of an object even after the loss of certain parts is necessary.
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6.2.3.1 Individuation of geographical objects
The consideration of the individuation of forests entangles in the extensive bibliography
about the ontology of geographical features, their characterisation and their boundaries.
Difficulties tend to arise both regarding the unification of geographical features (e.g.
deciding whether something is part or not of a forest) and their identity (e.g. deciding
whether a forest now is the same forest as one that existed 100 years ago) particularly
if there have been substantial changes in vegetation or location [Ben02]. Moreover,
while most of the objects in the physical world have a bona fide boundary that acts as
one of the main marks of their individuality, geographical boundaries are often fuzzy or
otherwise indeterminate [CSV98], which makes the individuation even more challenging
and the demarcation of most geographical objects non trivial.
A simple example of individuation relevant for our use cases is as follows:
1. ∗(∃hasCanopy. envo :Canopy ≡= 1 ro :has part. envo :Canopy)
2. ∗(hasCanopyRatio ≡ hasCanopy ◦ ratio)
3. NYDF [ envo :Site u ∃hasCanopyRatio.(≥, 30) v Tree covered region]
4. ♦NYDF [ envo :Site u ∃hasCanopyRatio.(≥, 10) v Tree covered region]
5. ∗(part of tree covered area v ro :part of)
6. ∗(connected tree cover v ro :connected to)
7. ∗(Tree covered region v= 1part of tree covered area. envo :Woodland area)
8. ∗(∃connected tree cover.> vTree covered region u
∀connected tree cover.Tree covered region)
9. ∗(connected tree cover ◦ part of tree covered area v part of tree covered area)
10. ♦NYDF ( envo :Woodland area u size ha.(≥, 0.5) v envo :Forested area)
11. NYDF ( envo :Woodland area u size ha.(≥, 1) v envo :Forested area)
This formalisation encodes the individuation for the sNYDF definition, accord-
ing to which a forest is a self-connected area with a minimum canopy cover and
size ( see section 6.1.1). It fixes the unity conditions in (6) by establishing that
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any area previously classified as Tree covered region must be part of a single envo :
Woodland area1. Subsequently, identity criteria are represented in lines (7) and (8),
stating that whenever a Tree covered region is connected to another, then, by (8), they
are parts of the same envo :Woodland area (this is achieved via the composition oper-
ator ◦, by which Rxy ◦Ryz → Rxz). Finally, the envo :Woodland area is classified as
a envo :Forested area if its size is greater than the given threshold.
6.2.4 Demarcation
Finally, by demarcation we mean the act of determining the spatial extension of an
object, or equivalently, of establishing its boundary. Once this extension/boundary is
established, it may be referred to as ‘the demarcation’ of the object; or, in cases where
the boundary is unclear or debatable, it may be regarded as one of many possible
demarcations of the object, relative to one precisification.
Establishing an object’s demarcation may be straightforward or extremely problem-
atic. Although this may be because of the characteristics of the particular object under
consideration, it is usually strongly related to the ontological category of the object. For
example, physical artefacts (e.g. cups, tables) are typically easily demarcated because
they consist of solid matter, forming an integral whole that is not physically connected
to any other matter. On the contrary, for aggregate objects such as ‘forest’ demarc-
ation is often problematic, both because it may not be clear which entities should be
counted as constituents and because there is no unique way to determine the spatial
extension of something that is made up of many disconnected constituents (e.g., trees
and other elements of the ecosystem, or pieces of land in abstracted representations).
Distinguished regions within field-like objects, which are again prevalent in geography
(e.g. soil type regions) also give rise to significant demarcation problems [MC89].
Although the study of suitable algorithms for the demarcation goes beyond the
scope of this chapter, it must be noted that many standpoints will be associated to
different demarcation strategies for ‘forests’, yet the explicit semantic commitments
are often limited to the establishment of of sets of thresholds (e.g. [MJP15]). A more
careful analysis of some strategies for demarcation that can be used to provide more
precise standpoints on the demarcation of forests can be found in [DG09], and useful
1In EnvO, envo :Forested area (i.e. forest) is a envo :Woodland area that has a size greater than a
certain threshold.
154
6.2 Representation of forests
ontological analysis considering the sort of data that is available for this purpose can
be found in [CFW04, CFW05].
However, given that computing the demarcation of spatial objects tends to be a
computationally expensive task, it is expected that non-logical systems will implement
such strategies, and that the calculated areas will be subsequently associated with
the relevant objects. We will, therefore, not provide formalised examples in this area.
However, we consider that the additional encoding of axioms and rules regarding the
demarcation of the objects that a standpoint refers to can, potentially, enhance the
inferences that we can make from our data and standpoint knowledge base.
6.2.4.1 Interpreting the extension of standpoints
In the case of geographical information the spatial projection of the instances can be
particularly relevant to complement the analysis of the relations that hold between
standpoints. One might expect that the possible relations holding between standpoints
(equivalence, subsumption, inverse subsumption, overlap and disjunction) would map to
the analogous RCC5 relations (equal, proper part, inverse proper part, partial overlap
and discrete) between the total spatial area covered by sets of instances satisfying
each standpoint. However, as with the models of the standpoint relations, that does
not necessarily need to be the case. Instead, relations between standpoints restrict the
space of possibilities while leaving some variation open, and this is in fact what provides
insight to the user.
In Table 6.2 we show possible relations holding in the different scenarios. While the
analogous to RCC5 is the ‘expected’ relation to hold, other possibilities are allowed,
which may be symptomatic of different circumstances. Take, for instance, the case
where the spatial projection of s1(Forest) is equivalent to that of s2(Forest). It may
be the case that s1 and s2 are equivalent. But it could also be the case that s1 is broader
(less sharp than) than s2, by allowing some borderline cases which however never
manifest in the available data about the state of the world (this can help, for instance,
assessing what semantic commitments have a considerable impact in the interpretation
of the data and which do not). In fact, it could even be the case that s1 and s2 describe
forest in a logically different way (e.g. one uses tree proximity and the other canopy
cover) that is highly correlated, and therefore both map to the same objects while
only holding an overlap relation. In other cases this may be due to mere exemplar
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s1 ≡ s2 s2  s1 s1  s2 NP
Expected
The sharpness of s1
with respect to s2
does not manifest
in any instance.
The sharpness of s2




instances of s1 and s2




















Impossible Impossible Impossible Expected
Table 6.2: Relations between the logical relations between two standpoints, s1 and
s2 (columns), and the RCC5 spatial relations holding between the projections of the
instances satisfying a formula si φ for i = 1 represented in blue and i = 2 represented
in green.
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clustering1. Even when the expected spatial relation holds between the projections, it
is expected to be useful for the agent to know how populated are the intersections or
borderline scenarios of the definitions under consideration.
However, we must add a word of caution. The former type of analysis is indeed
useful but can only be carried out whenever the demarcation of the spatial objects is
constant across the precisification space. For instance, in our application scenario this
applies to LandPixels. Conversely, whenever the demarcation (which in turn is likely
to depend in the unity conditions among others) is variable, the logic relations become
less straightforward and can not be interpreted by these simple observations.
6.3 Formal representation of the use cases
We now proceed to present the full representation of the set of standpoints introduced
in section 6.1.3.3. We intend to maximise the use of the EnvO ontology in our form-
alisations (for reference, figure 6.1 reveals the main classes and relations that relate to
forestry). In what follows, relations from the Relation Ontology will be preceded by
the prefix ‘ ro : ’, and concepts from EnvO by the prefix ‘ envo : ’. Moreover, knowledge
from EnvO is considered supertrue and therefore, any statement will be assumed to be
preceded by ∗. While this is appropriate for our use cases, it may not be adequate
if we were modelling a system in which we used more than one ontology. In the latter
situation, it would be more appropriate to consider that knowledge from EnvO relates
to a standpoint sEnvO, which some other standpoints may subsume if they are known
to comply with the ontology.
Let us begin with the standpoints relevant to the scenario (S1:Global scenario)
(section 6.1.3.1). In the first place, we have the representation used in [SHS+18],
denoted by standpoint sSong and described in D1.1. According to it, forest cover is
measured as the ratio of canopy cover present in the terrestrial surface. Their data
represents the vegetation composition of every ‘land pixel’ by associating it with its
ratio of tree cover, short vegetation cover and bare ground.
1In ordinary situations, objects that exhibit one property, will very often also exhibit another
property and vice versa, even though there is no necessary connection between the properties. The
cause may be because of patterns and regularities that are essentially contingent [Ben05].
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The relevant standpoint commitments are as follows:
R1.1. Song[LandPixel v envo :Site]
R1.2. Song[LandPixel v= 1 ro :has part. envo :Canopy.ratio.(≥, 0)]
R1.3. Song[LandPixel v= 1 ro :has part. envo :
(Vegetation layer u ¬ envo :Canopy).ratio.(≥, 0)]
R1.4. Song[LandPixel v= 1 ro :has part.¬( envo :Vegetation layer).ratio.(≥, 0)]
Note that we use the class envo : Canopy rather than envo : Woodland canopy or
envo :Forest canopy because those entail parthood in a Forest or Woodland ecosystem,
which may or may not be the case.
Moreover, in [SHS+18], it is specified that the requirement for the vegetation cover
to be considered tree cover is a height greater than or equal to 5m.
R1.5. sSong t  (sSong ∩ sTree sh)
R1.6. Tree sh[ envo :Canopy v envo :Vegetation layer.height m.(≥, 5)]
Additional penumbral connections to enable further inferences could be established,
for example, stating that two different LandPixels can not partially overlap or that they
only have three parts, whose ratios sum up 100. This sort of knowledge is only relevant
to the standpoints sharper than or equal to sSong but can be used to deduce new facts
from its data. We will nevertheless omit the formalisation of those rules as they are
not useful for our use cases.
Departing from the same conceptual framework, Hansen et al. [HPM+13] further
classify land pixels into the class tree cover or forest cover (both names are used inter-
changeably) whenever the canopy ratio is higher than a certain threshold, by default
set to 30% and at least 10%.
R1.7. ∗(∃hasCanopy. envo :Canopy ≡= 1 ro :has part. envo :Canopy)
R1.8. ∗(hasCanopyRatio ≡ hasCanopy ◦ ratio)
R1.9. Hans[Tree covered region v LandPixel u ∃hasCanopyRatio.(≥, 10)]
R1.10. ♦Hans[Tree covered region] ≡ LandPixel u ∃hasCanopyRatio.(≥, 10)
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We must note that the sHans definition, like most definitions, do not specify what
sizes of land are admissible for their categories to be applicable. While we understand
that a fair variation is admissible, if we establish the minimum standpoint semantic
constraint, using the concept envo : Site, then we could infer that vast expanses of
land with zones of high canopy density are tree-covered areas as a whole. For the sake
of example, the Amazon rainforest has enough canopy density such that the whole of
Peru would be classed as a Tree covered region for a canopy ratio higher than 30%.
Consequently, when implementing logic-based standpoints, these aspects, captured in
the table on forest definitions, must be taken into account and added to the common-
sense definitions conceived to be applied by humans. For this reason, in this case we
use the specific predicate LandPixel, for which appropriate restrictions in dimensions
should be specified.
Note that, as mentioned in chapter 5, section 5.3, description logic is not expressive
enough to allow for the use of variables, which is the most natural way to represent
sorites thresholds. This limits what we can formally represent with regards to the
sHans standpoint when using SALC . A way to circumvent this is by creating subsumed
standpoints with the desired threshold sharpenings, which could be established ‘on
demand’ by an agent.
Following, we consider the classification criteria for the standpoint sNYDF .
R1.11. ♦NYDF [ envo :Woodland area u size ha. ≥ 0.5 v envo :Forested area]
R1.12. NYDF [ envo :Woodland area u size ha. ≥ 1 v envo :Forested area]
R1.13. NYDF [ envo :Woodland area v ∃hasCanopyRatio.(≥, 30)]
R1.14. ♦NYDF [ envo :Woodland area v ∃hasCanopyRatio.(≥, 10)]
R1.15. NYDF [ envo :Canopy ≡ envo :Vegetation layer.height m.(≥, 5)]
R1.16. ♦NYDF [ envo :Canopy ≡ envo :Vegetation layer.height m.(≥, 2)]
The former characterisation requires us to have a candidate Woodland area from
which we can evaluate the size, to subsequently classify it as a Forested area (i.e. forest),
and which can not be trivially done unless we establish individuation criteria. For this,
we recover the formalisation provided and discussed in section 6.2.3:
R1.17. NYDF [ envo :Site u ∃hasCanopyRatio.(≥, 30) v Tree covered region]
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R1.18. ♦NYDF [ envo :Site u ∃hasCanopyRatio.(≥, 10) v Tree covered region]
R1.19. ∗[part of tree covered area v ro :part of]
R1.20. ∗[connected tree cover v ro :connected to]
R1.21. ∗[Tree covered region v= 1part of tree covered area. envo :Woodland area]
R1.22. ∗[∃connected tree cover.> v Tree covered region u
∀connected tree cover.Tree covered region]
R1.23. ∗[connected tree cover ◦ part of tree covered area v part of tree covered area]
Finally, for the second scenario, (S2:Indonesia scenario) in section 6.1.3.2, we
focus our attention on the case of Indonesia. In [RAW+13], Romijn et al. analyse the
different interpretations of forest that the FAO (sFAO), the Ministry of Environment
and Forestry of Indonesia (sMoFI) and the natural forest definition (sNDF ) have, and
their impact on the development of the REDD+ reference emission levels. In their
study, they use a map of the land cover data released by the government (whose land
cover base classification will be subsequently referred as lci :) and they explore what
categories fit under the forest definition according to the different interpretations. As
reported in the paper, we can formalise the following mapping between land cover
classes and forest standpoints:
R1.24. sFIN = s(FAO ∪ MoFI ∪ NFD)
R1.25. FIN [(lci:Primary Upland Forest unionsq lci:Primary Mangrove Forest unionsq
lci:Primary Swamp Forest) v
( envo :Forested area u ∃ ro :overlaps. envo :Primary forest)]
R1.26. FIN [(lci:Secondary Upland Forest unionsq lci:Secondary Mangrove Forest unionsq
lci:Secondary Swamp Forest) v envo :Forested area]
R1.27. FAO[(lci:Forest Plantation unionsq lci:Shrubland unionsq lci:Bushy swamp unionsq
lci:Palm oil plantation) v envo :Forested area]
R1.28. MoFI [(lci:Forest Plantation v envo :Forested area]
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R1.29. MoFI [(lci:Shrubland unionsq lci:Bushy swamp unionsq lci:Palm oil plantation) v
¬ envo :Forested area]
R1.30. NFD[(lci:Forest Plantation unionsq lci:Shrubland unionsq lci:Bushy swamp unionsq
lci:Palm oil plantation) v ¬ envo :Forested area]
R1.31. FIN [(lci:Savanna unionsq lci:Upland agriculture unionsq lci:Upland agriculture mixed bush unionsq
lci:Rice field unionsq lci:Fishpond unionsq lci:Settlement unionsq lci:Transportation unionsq
lci:Open land unionsq lci:Mining unionsq lci:Water body unionsq lci:Swamp unionsq
lci:Airport) v ¬ envo :Forested area]
R1.32. NFD ∪ MoFI [(lci:Shrubland unionsq lci:Bushy swamp ) v envo :Scrubland area]
We define the standpoint sFIN as the union of the three standpoints sFAO, sMoFI
and sNFD to represent the common ground between them. Moreover, all the land cover
classes of lci are, by definition of the Ministry of Environment and Forestry of Indonesia,
definite (D∗ ), mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive (MECE), but we omit
the formalisation of these features here for the sake of brevity (the formalisation is easy
but verbose).
The advantage of departing from an already individuated dataset is that the formal-
isation of the standpoint commitments is substantially simplified. On the other hand,
some features that determine the classification of the instances into one or another
standpoint are not explicit (i.e. the actual underlying characteristics of the land), and
hence the inferential power is reduced.
6.4 Use cases
In this section, we consider a set of use cases that are relevant to the scenarios (S1:Global
scenario) and (S2:Indonesia scenario), as introduced in section 6.1.3. They illus-
trate how we can reason and query the formal representations provided in the previous
section 6.3, together with the underlying use of the resources introduced in 6.1.2.
For this purpose, let us assume that we have a standpoint logic endpoint from which
a user can modify and query a standpoint knowledge base consisting of the representa-
tions in 6.3 and the EnvO ontology, and which is populated with the publicly available
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data in GFW. Moreover, let us also assume that we have a GIS tool that visualises the
spatial projection of the elements that are retrieved from each query.
6.4.1 Use Case 1: Analysing the differences between standpoints
Given that in the global scenario (S1:Global scenario) described in section 6.1.3.1
both pieces of research use different data sources and methods that lead to different
estimates, it may be difficult to assess to which extent the semantic differences play
a role in the final quantification. Consequently, different agents working in either
research or policy may want to analyse what are the semantic commitments that play
a significant role on the estimates in forest cover that can be visualised in platforms
such as GFW.
h TC ≥ 30%
h TC ≥ 10%
h SV ≥ 30%
h SV ≥ 10%
h BG ≥ 60%
h BG ≥ 10%
h (Any) ≤ 10%
Figure 6.2: A sample area, Aα, divided in 10 × 10 landPixels. The cover of each
landPixel is represented via three vertical stripes, indicating its composition in BG, SV
and TC following the legend.
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In particular the agent may want to compare the maps provided in [SHS+18],
and exemplified for a hypothetical area Aα in figure 6.2, to the following three quer-
ies/visualisations:
UC1.1:- The visualisation of Hansen’s account of tree/forest cover (D1.3) at dif-
ferent thresholds.
UC1.2:- The visualisation of the previous if we relax the tree height condition down
to 2m, in line with D1.5.
UC1.3:- The visualisation if we add the minimum size requirement for an area to
be a forest (i.e, if we use definition D1.4).
For UC1.1, the user may want to establish, in addition to the standpoints in 6.3, the
following:
UC1.S1:- sHans 10−30  sHans
UC1.S2:- Hans 10−30[Tree covered region] ≡
∗[ envo :LandPixel u ∃hasCanopyRatio.(≥, 30)]
UC1.S3:- sHans 20−30  sHans 10−30
UC1.S4:- ♦Hans 20−30[Tree covered region] ≡
∗[ envo :LandPixel u ∃hasCanopyRatio.(≥, 20)]
The former are the bridging commitments that the agent may want to assess. Sub-
sequently, they simply may query:
UC1.Q1:- [MO]Hans 10−30 ∩ Song t[Tree covered region]?
UC1.Q2:- [MO]Hans 10−30 ∩ Song t[¬Tree covered region]?
UC1.Q3:- [MO]Hans 20−30 ∩ Song t[Tree covered region]?
UC1.Q4:- [MO]Hans 20−30 ∩ Song t[¬Tree covered region]?
Where [MO]s is a shortcut that stands for all modal operators (s, ♦s, Is and Ds ).
Hence, each query of the form [MO]s[φ] is in fact a set of four queries, one with each of
the operators. One must note that both s φImpossible♦s φ and Is φImpossible♦s φ.
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Hence, we will only display ♦s in the visualisation whenever the knowledge base entails
♦s φ but not s φ nor Is φ.
The visualisation of the queries UC1.Q1 and UC1.Q2 on the area Aα (whose land
pixels were represented in figure 6.2), can be seen in figure 6.3. In particular we show,
as specified in the lengend, which areas are unequivocally tree covered, which areas are
borderline and which areas are unequivocally not tree covered according to the sHans
standpoint with a tree cover threshold between the 10% and the 30%.
h Hans 10−30 ∩ Song t Tree covered region
h IHans 10−30 ∩ Song t Tree covered region
h Hans 10−30 ∩ Song t ¬Tree covered region
Figure 6.3: Visualisation of the areas that are unequivocally tree covered, indetermin-
ately tree covered and unequivocally not tree covered according to sHans in Aα. The
colour indicates that the corresponding fact in the legend can be derived from the
østandpoint knowledge base.
For the second visualisation, UC1.2, the following standpoints may be established:
UC1.S5:- sSong lt  sSong
UC1.S6:- Song lt[ envo :Canopy] ≡ [ envo :Vegetation layer.height m.(≥, 5)]
UC1.S7:- ♦Song lt[ envo :Canopy] ≡ [ envo :Vegetation layer.height m.(≥, 2)]
Here sSong lt encodes a standpoint that is sharper than sSong for which the criteria
for a plant to be a tree is vague, in contrast to the previously used sSong t. In this case,
according to sSong lt something is unequivocally a tree if it is higher than 5m as for
sSong t, and it is in some sense a tree if it is higher than 2m.
164
6.4 Use cases
Next, the agent can perform the following queries, with the previous pattern:
UC1.Q5:- [MO]Hans 10−30 ∩ Song lt[Tree covered region]?
UC1.Q6:- [MO]Hans 10−30 ∩ Song lt[¬Tree covered region]?
UC1.Q7:- [MO]Hans 20−30 ∩ Song lt[Tree covered region]?
UC1.Q8:- [MO]Hans 20−30 ∩ Song lt[¬Tree covered region]?
h Hans 10−30 ∩ Song lt Tree covered region
h ♦Hans 10−30 ∩ Song lt Tree covered region
h IHans 10−30 ∩ Song lt Tree covered region
h ♦Hans 10−30 ∩ Song lt ¬Tree covered region
h Hans 10−30 ∩ Song lt ¬Tree covered region
Figure 6.4: Visualisation of the areas that are tree covered according to the standpoint
sHans 10−30 ∩ Song lt in the area Aα. The colour indicates that the corresponding fact
in the legend can be derived from the østandpoint knowledge base.
As we can see in figure 6.4, despite the fact that figure 6.2 does not contain inform-
ation about the tree cover of vegetation from 2m to 5m, we can still infer a variety of
facts. In particular, we use the knowledge that BG is not an envo : Vegetation layer
and hence it can determine unequivocally not Tree covered region, and those areas that
have certain envo :Canopy for vegetation of more than 5m certainly retain at least that
ratio for the lower threshold. In the figure 6.4 we represent the most specific modality
that can be inferred. In particular it must be reminded that both necessity (s) and
indeterminacy (Is ) entail possibility (♦s).
Finally, for the visualisation UC1.3 we may use the standpoints sNYDF , that go
through the individuation of the forests in function of the forest pixels as we described
in the representation section 6.2. We could, of course, consider further standpoints with
different minimum sizes, canopy covers and tree sizes. For this example, we create the
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sNYDF lc and sNYDF mc standpoints, with determinate thresholds on canopy cover at
the 10% and 20% respectively, and the full sNYDF admissible range of minimum sizes:
UC1.S8:- sNYDF lc  sNYDF
UC1.S9:- NYDF [ envo :Site u ∃hasCanopyRatio.(≥, 10) v Tree covered region]
UC1.S10:- sNYDF mc  sNYDF
UC1.S11:- NYDF [ envo :Site u ∃hasCanopyRatio.(≥, 20) v Tree covered region]
Together with the standard standpoint for trees, sSong t, we perform the following
queries:
UC1.Q9:- [MO]NYDF lc ∩ Song t[ envo :Forested area]?
UC1.Q10:- [MO]NYDF mc ∩ Song t[ envo :Forested area]?
As we can see in figure 6.5, in which the area of each land pixel is assumed to be
0.25ha, the sparse tree covered areas are unequivocally not forests after the individu-
ation process, regardless of their individual extent of canopy cover.
h NYDF ∩ Song t Forested area
h INYDF ∩ Song t Forested area
h NYDF ∩ Song t ¬Forested area
Figure 6.5: Representation of UC1.Q9 for the query, showing its parts. The colour
indicates, in this case, that the land pixels are part of, or not, of a detected forested
area (as shown in the legend) and can be derived from the østandpoint knowledge
base.
It must be noted that more in-depth comparative studies on the impact of using
terms with different semantics can be (and are) undertaken by experts in the domain,
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using a variety of GIS tools and techniques. [RAW+13] is an example of that, which
we have used in 6.3. However, integrating knowledge representation formalisms like
standpoint logic, which allow for automated reasoning on semantic heterogeneity, may
not only facilitate this sort of analysis but also enable a broader audience to perform
them and tailor them to the specific needs of their research.
For example, the in-depth study in [RAW+13] for (S2:Indonesia scenario) ana-
lyses the general implications of using one or another conceptual framework on a cer-
tain scale, in this national, and concludes that the most appropriate standpoint for
the REDD program is the adoption of the natural forest definition (sNFD). However,
another hypothetical team researching the livelihoods of communities in a particular
region of the country may find that the results of the national study (the insight that
the natural forest definition is best suited) may not be relevant to the specific geo-
graphic features of their area of interest. However, if using a standpoint framework,
the latter can instead reuse the formalised standpoints, hence facilitating subsequent
analysis over the same interpretations.
6.4.2 Use Case 2: Sharing knowledge derived from a standpoint
Data repositories such as GFW contain datasets produced by different institutions
and provide tools for their geographic visualisation. In GFW, each dataset encodes
information represented in either a field-model or in an object-model (see section 6.2.1),
and can be visualised as an independent layer on a GIS map.
Moreover, if the data is linked to a semantic framework such as the EnvO Ontology,
one can query and retrieve complex information derived from it. However, inferences
that rely on the spatial co-occurrence of phenomena (for example the presence of forest
in a region x at time t1 and the lack of it at time t2) could be deemed sufficient to infer
that an envo : deforestation process takes place at the region x. However, this would
not be adequate adequate whenever the conceptual frameworks behind the facts from
x at t1 and x at t2 may not be compatible1. In this case, such inference should only be
made if t 1 Forest ⊆ t 2 Forest, i.e. both the case where the conceptual framework is
the same and when the latter is less strict than the former for the forest category.
1For instance, the data produced by the FAO is not temporally consistent, because their conceptual
framework and requirements for admissibility of definitions of forest from different countries have
changed within the last ten years.
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With this, we want to illustrate both that it is generally desirable to share knowledge
that is either represented (e.g. an area of forest) or has been inferred (e.g. a deforest-
ation process) from one or more datasets by linking it to an ontology such as EnvO,
and also that by establishing their relevant standpoints and appropriate penumbral
connections, one can enhance the inferencing power of the knowledge base without
compromising the generality of the concepts represented in an ontology.
A particular use case for the subsequent retrieval of the generated knowledge from
establishing the standpoints sFAO, sMoFI and sNFD in relation to the land types of
(ici :) is as follows:
Let us consider a research project interested in the study of the impact of forest
change on the ecological stability of sites of the Alliance for Zero Extinction (AZE)1.
They want to target three areas to perform their case studies in Indonesia: one with an
unperturbed ecosystem, one with confirmed habitat degradation and one with poten-
tial habitat degradation, which is not recognised by the Ministry of Environment and
Forestry of Indonesia. In order to narrow the areas in which to look for a location for
each of their case studies, they want to:
1. Retrieve the intersection of the AZE sites and the areas that are unequivocally2
primary forest and are not experiencing deforestation or degradation processes.
2. Retrieve the intersection of the AZE sites and the areas that are unequivocally
forests experiencing deforestation or degradation processes.
3. Retrieve the intersection of the AZE sites and the areas that are possibly forests
experiencing deforestation or degradation processes but not according to the
MoFI.
For this purpose, they may perform the following queries using the standpoint sFIN
and its subsumptions, as represented in section 6.3:
UC2.Q1:- FIN (AZE site u envo :Forest area u ∃ro :overlaps. envo :Primary forest u
¬∃ ro :overlaps.( envo :deforestation unionsq envo :ecosystem decay))?
1The protection of AZE sites is a recognised indicator for the Convention on Biological Diversity’s
Aichi Targets [FCLF17].
2In this case we refer to unequivocally for all the specified standpoints.
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UC2.Q2:- FIN (AZE site u envo :Forest area u ∃ ro :overlaps.( envo :deforestationunionsq
envo :ecosystem decay))?
UC2.Q3:- FIN\MoFI(AZE site u envo : Forest ecosystem u ∃ ro : overlaps.( envo :
deforestation unionsq envo :ecosystem decay))?
Three sample areas that would satisfy these queries can be visualised in figure 6.4.2.
6.4.3 Use Case 3: Agents using sets of standpoints
In some scenarios, different conceptualisations may entail the same facts. While it is
sometimes useful to dissect the semantic differences between different representation
choices, in many cases an agent may want to reason about what is unequivocally the
case, without needing to consider the different ways in which this is materialised.
For instance, imagine an agent that must pick any box that is either red or orange
(or both). For this task, the threshold of applicability between red and orange is not
relevant, because any specific threshold will validate that a borderline case between red
and orange is either red or orange. Similarly, agents handling complex scenarios may
benefit from the same feature. A particular use case is as follows:
An automated agent produces deforestation alerts for an agency in Indonesia, using
a set of information sources. In the first place, it uses the GLAD deforestation alerts,
that detect loss of tree cover [PFVB19]. However, as they declare, GLAD alerts do not
differentiate actual deforestation from other phenomena such as regular harvesting in
plantations.
Consequently, the agent uses additional data about forest area according to three
standpoints: The FAO definition, the MoFI definition and the Natural Forest Defini-
tion. In particular, the agency is interested in detecting the loss of tree cover in natural
areas, which can be forests or scrublands, but not in other land types. The automated
agent must fire a definite alarm whenever the detected event unequivocally occurs in
a forest or scrubland, and an arguable alarm whenever the loss of tree cover occurs in
an area that is only in some sense a forest or scrubland. In the latter case, the agency
may use an expert to assess the environmental relevance of the alert and manually






Figure 6.6: Representation of sample areas for queries UC2.Q1-UC2.Q3. AZE areas
are the light green shade overlapping large areas of the map. (a) shows an area sat-
isfying query UC2.Q1, (b) shows an unequivocal forest area (primary forest) with
deforestation alerts, satisfying query UC2.Q2, and (c) shows an area where deforest-
ation is restricted to areas that are in some sense a forest but not according to the
MoFI, namely grasslands (lci:Shrubland), satisfying query UC2.Q3.
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The automated agent, in order to detect the events of deforestation, regularly per-
forms the following queries:
UC3.Q1:- FIN ( envo :Forested area unionsq envo :Scrubland area)
u ∗ ∃ ro :overlaps.GLAD alert
UC3.Q2:- ♦FIN ( envo :Forested area unionsq envo :Scrubland area)
u ∗ ∃ ro :overlaps.GLAD alert
Note that an instance of a GLAD alert in an area that is a forest according to
some interpretations and a scrubland according to others, such as the instances of the
original ici : shrublands, will prompt a definite alert, while instances from plantations
or crops will be only in some sense true, as they are not ( envo :Forested area unionsq envo :
Scrubland area) in all precisifications.
Figure 6.7: GLAD alerts over different land cover type areas in a region of Indonesia.
In the figure 6.7 we can see some definite fires (blue dots) that are located in unequi-
vocal forests and forest-scrublands (note that the legend refers to the icl: classification),
and some arguable alerts in areas that are in some sense a forest, in the legend plant-
ation forests and croplands.
6.5 ‘Intra’ and ‘inter’ ontology applications
Following the discussion in this chapter, we suggest that, beyond purpose built mul-
tiagent systems with standpoint knowledge bases, there are two promising applications
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for standpoint logic as a tool to enrich existing formal ontologies . We name them the
intra-standpoint ontology approach and the inter-standpoint ontology approach.
While the value of ontologies is now well established [Gua98], their support of vague-
ness and semantic heterogeneity1 remains challenging. One of the main advantages of
ontologies is that they improve the interoperability of systems, acting to enforce a con-
sensus view reached by a community regarding a certain domain by formalising the
semantics of the terminology in some logic formalism [GA´B17].
Typically this process involves the cooperation of domain experts and results in a
unified decision on the formalisation of the semantics of the terminology. However, as
a result of the semantic heterogeneity and vagueness of the concepts to define, strong
semantic commitments favour specific interpretations of language and involve a loss of
generality, thus restricting the opportunities for interoperability. On the other hand,
approaches with shallower semantics rely fundamentally on taxonomic relationships,
such as subsumption and mutual exclusivity, thus leaving uncertainty on the specific
semantics of instances of these terms, and potentially compromising the sound reuse of
information.
The intra-standpoint ontology approach consists on ‘supervaluating’ the concepts
of an ontology, to preserve, on the one hand, the advantages of providing a common
high-level conceptual structure for a domain while, on the other hand, making explicit
the more fine-grained semantic commitments linked to different interpretations that
are relevant to different uses of the ontology.
We thus see the potential for supervaluated ontologies by design, that are not the
fruit of the integration of different models but a direct formalisation of a domain in
which the semantic variablility of its terms is sufficiently meaningful and/or relevant to
be represented in the ontology. Our claim is that stanpoint logic can provide a natural
framework to accommodate such discrepancies in meaning.
On the other hand, following an inter-standpoint ontology approach, we suggest
that stanpoint logic can be an adequate representation language to bridge between the
conceptualisations linked to different ontologies, each of which can be associated to a
particular standpoint.
Moreover, in the context of knowledge sharing, operations between standpoints are
1Occurs when ontologies, schemas or datasets of the same domain present differences in meaning
and interpretation of categories and/or data values, thus challenging interoperability.
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expected to be useful for two main purposes, namely concept negotiation and specific-
ation of combined standpoints. In practice, concept negotiation not only involves the
analysis of the objective meaning and ontological commitments formalised on the dif-
ferent standpoints, but also of the models of such commitments. With an expressive
enough framework, an agent can gain insight from both the logical relation between
the interpretations themselves and from what can be inferred from the available data,
for example, how many instances actually fall within the borderline areas and which
instances are consistent with all the relevant standpoints.
With regards to the domain of individuals, we must note that often we will be
dealing with ontologies that have been applied to formalising the meaning of certain
datasets. In some cases, as we have considered in this chapter, we will know that
two standpoints have been applied to the same objects. In practice, this may not
be the case, and identifying objects between different ontologies may be non-trivial
and involve complex issues. These issues are related to the problems of establishing
correspondences between entities at different possible worlds and/or precisifications
that were noted in the section 6.2.3 (and briefly commented at the end of chapter
4, section 4.5). For present purposes we simply assume that certain entities can be
identified between ontologies, be that trough formal constraints that determine the
identity1 or trough external strategies used in the domain of ontology matching.
Summary
In this chapter we have explored the potential of the proposed logic to enable com-
munication between agents holding diverse standpoints, in this case by relying on a
shared ontology and supporting the establishment of standpoints on its vague terms.
In particular, we have shown how the standpoint logic can be an adequate formalism to
represent multiple aspects of the semantic variability of geographical concepts, which
can manifest in the specification of the classification, individuation and demarcation
criteria.
Moreover, in this application scenario we have considered uses of the standpoint
framework both to enable agents to link data to the ontology according to their precise
interpretation and also to query and reason within the ontology according to a spe-
1For instance by the use of the same proper name and rough location or because certain parts of
the objects in all precisifications refer to the same entities in some database
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cific standpoint, which can be modified during the interaction. In a context of sharing
information, the proposed framework can offer tools that enable the analysis of the
relations that hold between standpoints or interpretations and the execution of modi-
fying operations such as calculating the intersection or union of a pair of standpoints.
This, together with information on the instances satisfying these standpoints, serves as
a support to the agent for the specification of the semantics with which vague terms
are used, guaranteeing integrity and enabling interoperation with the ontology.
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7.1 Thesis overview and contributions
In this thesis we have developed a formalised theory of the notion of standpoint and
explored its capabilities for representing the semantics of terms within a supervalu-
ationistic theory of vagueness. According to this view, vagueness can be explained
in terms of the existence of a range of possible precise interpretations of a language.
Each of these interpretations corresponds to some reasonable and mutually compatible
interpretation of its terms, a precisification. In such a setting, Standpoints play the
role of narrowing the semantic variability of the language in order for it to suit a spe-
cific context or an agent’s viewpoint; and the capability of referring to several different
standpoints allows these viewpoints to be compared and contrasted.
After setting the background and providing a literature review (chapter 2) we
presented a formal language of Standpoint Logic (chapter 3), which we believe is well-
suited for describing the variability of vague concepts and also for expressing relation-
ships between different points of view regarding concept meaning, in a way that is
suitable for use in KR applications where such issues are important.
We have developed our formalism as a modal logic. Such logics have been used for
many purposes in knowledge representation, especially when dealing with information
that cannot be simply expressed in terms of truth and falsity. Indeed many approaches
to vagueness have employed modal logic, and some have been given different forms of
supervaluation semantics. This is an obvious combination because of the similarity
between the idea of a precisification and the notion of a possible world, which forms
the basis of the standard Kripke semantics for modal logics. Nevertheless, the idea of
formalising the notion of standpoint as a modal operator is a distinctive feature of our
logic. Although other modal approaches do explain some of the kinds of reasoning that
standpoint logic supports, they do not represent the notion explicitly. In considering the
idea of a standpoint, we immediately recognise that there can be multiple standpoints.
Hence standpoint logic is a multi-modal framework in which particular relationships
between its modalities hold.
We have considered detailed examples of the capacities of the framework to reason
about different forms of semantic variability, such as graded predicates like ‘tall’ and
qualitative variations as in ‘forest’, and also how it can be used to reason about re-
lationships between different standpoints. The logic can easily incorporate complex
logical constraints that must hold between terms even though their interpretation is
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vague (i.e. penumbral connections). This can either be done generally (using ∗) or
with respect to a particular standpoint (with s). We have also seen how the logic can
represent and reason about particular combinations of standpoints and the differences
between them.
In chapter 4 we gave both a semantics and a set of axioms for our formal language.
In its current form, we do not envisage our axiom set being used directly as practical
inference mechanism. But it can provide a framework within which one could define
more limited sub-languages, suitable for particular data interpretation tasks; and it
also provides a specification of a proof theory for which it may be possible to develop
more practical proof algorithms.
The most characteristic features of standpoint logic are the interaction axioms AS4
and AS5. These are stronger than the well known A4 and A5 axioms and correspond
to what we call trans-transitive and trans-euclidean relations in the Kripke models.
Moreover, a partial order on standpoints may be enforced using axiom AP, which
encodes the sharper relation that can hold between standpoints (notion N9).
We have proved the soundness, completeness and decidability of propositional stand-
point logic, and established the complexity of the satisfiability problem as NP-complete.
This is a significant ‘good’ result. It may be regarded as a consequence of the stronger
interaction axioms AS4 and AS5 and contrasts with the higher complexity of other
multi-modal logics such as epistemic logic, that is PSPACE-complete. Finally, we also
provide the syntax and semantics for standpoint logic with more expressive underlying
logics, namely description logic and first-order logic.
In order to illustrate the applicability of standpoint logic, we have explored an
application scenario in chapter 6 that tackles the difficulties that the semantic variability
of the term forest poses in the context of the scientific multi-disciplinarity of the forestry
domain. In addressing it, we proceed to analyse the literature on ontological issues of
geographical objects and we determine three main aspects in which the semantics of
forest vary, namely the classification, individuation and demarcation criteria. We then
provide formal representations for standpoints corresponding to selected definitions and
characterisations of forest from leading organisations that map into publicly available
data. Finally, we illustrate how the framework can handle four use cases through




In this section we highlight a number of areas that we believe are deserving of further
research, some of which we intend to carry out in the near future. The proposed future
work concentrates on two areas. On the one hand, on the development of methods
for automated reasoning with the propositional standpoint logic. On the other, on the
further analysis of the framework with richer underlying languages.
An automated theorem prover for propositional standpoint logic.
The existence of models that are small in terms of the number of precisifications,
and also the possibility to greatly simplify formulae into a normal forms, indicate
promising routes to the design of an automated theorem proving algorithm. The
small models suggest the possibility of a tableau-style procedure to test for satis-
fiability, whereas the normal forms could provide the basis for a system based on
a generalisation of resolution.
In particular, in section 4.4.2 we showed that not only the validity problem is
NP -Complete, but also that there is an algorithm that, given a finite Kripke
structure M with at most |φ| states, determines if a formula φ is satisfied by the
model in time O(|φ|2).
In further work we plan to tackle the guessing strategy of such small models, and
we believe that there are efficient strategies to find good candidates. Moreover,
for this purpose we will consider the guessing strategy of models both for general
formulas φ ∈ LS0 and for formulas in the Cover logic Multi-modal Prenex Normal
Form (CMPNF) (see section 5.8). This should pave the way for the development
of an automated theorem prover, which we expect to implement in Prolog.
Complexity of standpoint formulas with more expressive underlying logics.
It is well known that expressivity and complexity tend to pair together. In this
thesis we have explored in depth the propositional standpoint logic, but we have
also defined syntax and semantics for building standpoint logics based on more
expressive underlying logics, in particular for a description standpoint logic and
a first-order standpoint logic. Moreover, we highlighted in chapters 5 and 6 that
many of the natural applications of a standpoint framework do in fact benefit from
more expressive capabilities than those offered by an underlying propositional lan-
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guage. In this regard, an important line of further research is to investigate the
decidability and complexity of more expressive forms of standpoint logic. In par-
ticular we want to explore the logic ALC as well as more expressive description
logics, notably SHOIN [HPS04] and SROIQ [HKS06]. In addition, we want to
establish the complexity of known decidable fragments of modal first order logic
(see [WZ01]) for the standpoint framework.
Exploiting the notion of penumbral independence.
In supervaluationistic frameworks, accounting for penumbral connections is re-
garded as a core feature. Building on that, we intend to put forward the addi-
tional notion of penumbral independence. This notion attempts to capture the
intuition that certain concepts are semantically independent within a standpoint
(or globally). This would allow for the modularisation of a vocabulary into sets
of terms that do not impinge on each other (e.g. concepts relating to forests can
be modelled without worrying about books or buildings), which is expected to
both facilitate the design and integration of systems and to improve their com-
putational properties.
We say that two vague propositions φ and ψ are penumbrally independent when
every sense in which φ can be interpreted is compatible with every sense which ψ
can be interpreted. Building on the notion of logical separability, as investigated
by [Lev98], we intend to provide a formal treatment of the notion that effectively
contributes to the automated modularisation of vague vocabularies. Moreover, we
plan to develop an adaptation of the normal form Cover logic Multi-modal Prenex
Normal Form (CMPNF) to integrate such notion, along the lines of [FWWW19],
so that terms in the disjunctive form are penumbrally independent.
Computation of standpoint combinations.
In this thesis we have confined ourselves to the establishment of a definition
of the combination. In further work, we aim to establish effective methods for
computing relationships and combinations of standpoints (for example different
classifications of the same domain objects proposed by different organisations).
This idea is related to the work in [LD12], which introduces a framework for
combining agents’ beliefs and establishes four operators for combining different
179
7.2 Further work
viewpoints, which are represented by means of bipolar valuation pairs. Using sub-
sequent work comparing different representation formats for vague propositions
[CDL14], which highlights the connections of this formalism with our modal lo-
gic, we intend to explore the parallels between standpoint logic and the operators
suggested in [LD12].
Identity and the domain of individuals
One can argue that, when reasoning with logics with a domain of individuals,
if we change the precisification according to which the world is classified, the
set of entities is likely to change. For example, a particular set of tree-covered
pixels might be considered to form a single forest under one precisification pi,
whereas under another, pi′, it might consist of two forests separated by a band
of heathland. However, one could take the view that the set of entities can be
regarded as the same, even though their classification changes. This is consistent
with a de dicto view of vagueness, in which it is only linguistic descriptions that
are vague, not the objects that they describe, and it is the view taken (implicitly)
in this thesis. According to this view, the set of tree-covered pixels classed as a
forest in pi also ‘exists’‘It is an element on he domain of individuals, yet it may
not belong to any particular class.’ in pi′, but it is not a forest (it may be an
unclassified section of land).
While we have investigated individuation, classification and demarcation issues in
chapter 6, our logic framework is agnostic to these issues. Consequently, we rely
on the assumption that a reasonable criteria for identity, establishing the corres-
pondence between entities in different precisifications, can be explicitly provided
by the standpoints and be encoded in the underlying language.
In further work we intend to investigate these issues in more detail, and consider
the incorporation of mechanisms that can explicitly account for the individuation
of objects across precisifications and worlds. In the philosophical literature on
vagueness, this issue is known as ‘the problem of the many’ [Ung80] and some
frameworks such as [Aki00] have considered the representation of vague objects
and trans-world identity. Moreover, work in the domain of applied ontology has
considered representational issues of indentity and individuality in less expressive




We shall conclude this thesis with some general considerations regarding the distinctive
features and potential advantages of Standpoint Logic as a vehicle for representing and
reasoning in scenarios that involve vague terminology.
7.3.1 Our subject of inquiry
In this thesis we have used the phrase Semantic Variability of Natural Language Terms
(SVoNLT) to describe our subject. This may seem to be unnecessarily unconventional
jargon, especially since most of the philosophical and logical literature, upon which we
draw, describes its topic simply as vagueness; and we are studying much the same class
of phenomena, including sorites susceptible graded predicates (as exemplified by tall)
as well as multi-dimensional and non-numerical forms of vagueness.
We made this move to highlight the shift from the philosophical study of the sorites
paradox towards a more practical aim of modelling scenarios involving semantically
heterogeneous languages. This phrasing is, in our view, more aligned with contem-
porary research in applied domains, and avoids extended discussion of the nuances of
the philosophical notion of vagueness itself, which we understand is contested. For
instance, whereas philosophical analysis typically seeks to distinguish vagueness from
polysemy, we consider both polysemy and vagueness to fall under the umbrella of the
Semantic Variability of Natural Language Terms (SVoNLT).
While the listing of senses is a common strategy to informally convey the semantics
of a natural language term, drawing the attention of the reader to its interpretation in
different contexts and hopefully capturing its most relevant features, research in lex-
icography [RL00] tends to take the view that there is rarely such a set of well defined
senses; instead, the phenomenon is better explained through theories such as open-
texture [Wai45] or family resemblance concepts [Wit09], which can then be formally
represented, to a certain extent, through the notions of multidimensional and non-
numerical vagueness. We consequently hope, in that respect, that we have been suc-




7.3.2 Relation to other approaches
In the development of standpoint logic we have adopted an underlying supervaluation-
istic framework and we have focused on a particular problem: representation and reas-
oning in relation to contexts in which the semantic variability of terms is restricted.
Such restricted contexts, or sharpenings, are a result of semantic commitments either
explicitly expressed with the language or of principles that are implicit in a particular
viewpoint. We have called these contexts of restricted variability standpoints. We con-
sider that standpoints offer an interesting and useful tool for the modelling of vagueness,
and are particularly useful for modelling non-numerical vagueness.
Although problematic for classical logics based on truth conditions, sorites vague-
ness is a relatively uniform phenomenon for which a variety of styles of representation
have been proposed and explored in detail. However, the symbolic characterisation of
conceptual or non-numerical vagueness seems to be less well developed.
Most frameworks dealing with the latter type of vagueness follow one of two ap-
proaches. One approach is to extend mechanisms that have been useful in representing
homogeneous sorites vagueness to cover conceptual vagueness. In this direction, terms
might be represented using graded membership functions which rely on similarity meas-
ures over a fixed set of parameters. Approaches based on prototype theory, where the
distance from an instance to a prototype is computed within a space of parameters, are
of this kind.
The other common approach does not involve modelling the semantic variability of
the term itself, but instead focuses on providing a framework for handling it, by specify-
ing mechanisms for merging and negotiating diverging meanings. These mechanisms
may then be used to facilitate a multi-agent transaction of information or knowledge,
yet they can not be considered a knowledge representation strategy as such.
The first approach faces different representational limitations from a symbolic point
of view, as it cannot easily represent logical features of the semantics and the relation-
ships between interpretations, except in terms of compound measures of similarity.
These may be difficult to interpret unless based in a small number of dimensions, in
which case the framework only supports the modelling of multi-dimensional vague-
ness but not of non-numerical or conceptual vagueness, that involves complex semantic




The standpoint framework can be seen as unifying some key aspects these two
approaches. The supervaluationistic interpretation of vagueness provides a framework
in which vagueness, whether it be sorites or conceptual, is modelled in terms of a set of
fully precise interpretations, in what was described by Fine as ‘ambiguity on a grand
and systematic scale’. The flexibility of the approach relies on providing such a space
of interpretations ranging over possible meanings but without specifying any particular
organisation of this space. Yet, from the point of view of modelling the semantics of
vague terms symbolically, this lack of organisation makes it difficult to form a strategy
of how to use it for actual representation and reasoning involving vague terms.
By means of standpoints, we can impose order on the space of possible interpreta-
tions. Specifically, we can delimit and segregate the variability in meaning in the form
of alternative sets of semantic commitments and constraints, which may be adapted to
particular communities and contexts. In this way, the more (and more diverse) stand-
points we establish, the better we will characterise the semantics of the term, which
will be given by the whole set and the relations between them. And, from a practical
point of view, we provide a framework in which a variable set of standpoints can be
represented, which are relevant for the intended applications of the different users of
the system and facilitate their interoperation. Moreover, small subsets of standpoints
can be selected for reasoning in different scenarios, and operations between them can
be easily established. Hence, we see that the standpoint approach is, in some respects,
closely aligned to the transactional approaches to handling vague terminology.
In this way, by putting the focus on the representational issues we take a somewhat
different and complementary approach to the main strands of work on supervaluation-
ism, such as the seminal work of Fine [Fin75] or more recent frameworks like [LT12].
These lines of research focus more on the characterisation of the truth of a proposition
and on the notion of validity in terms different logical principles, as well as on the ex-
ploration of the interactions between the variability of language and other phenomena
such as uncertainty and beliefs.
7.3.3 Relation to other logics
In this project we have used a multi-modal normal logic as the tool to model the
SVoNLT under a supervaluationistic interpretation of vagueness. This is not an uncon-
ventional move, and indeed there is a substantial amount of work examining mostly
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philosophical considerations on this, as discussed in section 2.5.2. It is, however, not
the only approach. For instance, Lawry and Tang [LT12] argue that the simplest
formulation of supervaluationism in a propositional logic framework is in terms of su-
pervaluation pairs, which are sets of admissible classical valuations akin to epistemic
states.
As discussed in section 2.5.3, several pieces of research explore the connections
between the major representational frameworks that have been proposed to account
for vagueness. With regards to the position of standpoint logic within that landscape,
it is easy to see that one could express the models of individual standpoints via sets of
supervaluation pairs. However, Lawry and Tang’s logic develops the supervaluationistic
semantics for a propositional language, therefore it is, alone, not sufficient for the
representation of different standpoints. In that direction, one option would be to follow
the approach of Multi-modal Epistemic Logic (MEL), which despite being a modal
logic uses a semantics akin to Lawry’s supervaluation pairs. In fact, it is easy to see
the similarities between our semantics (if we consider the case of a single modality)
and MEL’s, which rests on the results that K45 modal logics can be represented in
terms of simplified Kripke frames, in which the relations are sets [Pie09]. We can then
envisage the extension for multiple modalities and the partial order of relations so that
an alternative semantics is provided in the form of sets of epistemic sets. This can then
be related to the rest of formalisms as shown in [CDL14].
On the other hand, the simplified Kripke semantics for multiple modalities that
we have provided in this dissertation has distinct advantages. In the first place, we
have shown that, by maintaining the “de facto” standard of modal logic we provide a
framework that would seem natural to the community working on multiagent systems,
where the use of multi-modal epistemic logics is pervasive and hence well understood.
Moreover, we are particularly interested in exploring the computational properties of
standpoint logic with more expressive underlying logics that preserve good computa-
tional properties. A particularly interesting case is that of description logics, which
has interesting applications in the area of applied ontology. Given that normal modal
logics have been extensively studied, there is existing work in both modal description
logics and modal horn clauses that can support these further developments, where ex-
isting automated reasoning systens generally use Kripke semantics. In addition, Kripke
semantics for multi-dimensional modal logics are also well understood, paving the road
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for the formulation of different extensions of the system.
From a formal point of view, our logic is not ground-breaking. It has strong similar-
ities to other modal logics, such as multimodal episemic logic [FHMV95] and MEL logic
[BD14]. Partial orders are formalised as in [AH10] and we have provided the proofs
of completeness, decidability and complexity following the lines of [HM92], adapting
them to the particularities of our modelsMS0 . Further work of ours includes the study
of the complexity of standpoint logic with different underlying description logics and
fragments of FOL, which are in our opinion very interesting for this project because,
for a logic that is committed with the representation of vagueness, the expressivity of
the underlying language plays a major role, as has been highlighted in chapter 5.
7.3.4 Simplicity and expressivity
Our framework also contrasts with an important part of the existing literature in the
simplicity of the model presented. Across this thesis, with the exception of the brief in-
troduction of a two-dimensional standpoint logic in 4.5, we only consider an elementary
scenario: a single state of the world that can be interpreted via multiple precisifica-
tions of the language. Moreover, we have not considered the representation of higher
order vagueness, we have not accounted for cognitive aspects of concept acquisition and
evolution, and we presume absolute lack of uncertainty both about the state of affairs
and the language (we do not model the agent’s mental state. In fact, standpoints can
belong to communities rather than individual agents).
Instead, we have focused on the development of the most simple framework that can
support the representational expressivity of standpoints within a supervaluationistic
framework. We have attempted to provide a well developed characterisation which also
shows good computational properties and has applications in a variety of domains.
7.3.5 Possible extensions
Our framework provides a basis for further work in a variety of directions, and that
can be easily extended to incorporate expressivity in other aspects that we consider
different from (but that may interact with) the semantic variability of the language.
For instance, if we wanted to support higher-order vagueness we could consider
providing an alternative set of axioms and/or modalities to model this phenomena. The
relevance of the problem of higher-order vagueness is itself contested (see, for instance,
185
7.3 Conclusions
[Sor01] for Sorensen’s defence of its importance and [Wri10] for Wright’s argument
that it is an illusion). Beyond the philosophical considerations, we take the view that,
in most applications, higher-order vagueness is not a relevant (not even desirable)
feature, and adds complexity to the formalisation. Yet, one could investigate standpoint
extensions that supported the phenomenon, which has been generally considered for
modal interpretations of supervaluationsim in [Var07].
Another possible extension would be to model epistemic lack of knowledge and
its interaction with vagueness. One could establish a framework along the lines of
the two-dimensional extension in 4.5, where instead of (or in addition to) the aletic
modalities, we use epistemic operators. With this in mind, the most interesting part is
the establishment of interaction axioms across dimensions. For instance, if we consider
exclusively uncertainty regarding the state of the world (e.g. we model an agent’s beliefs
as a set of possible worlds compatible with her belief state), then epistemic operators
would commute with standpoint operators. However if we allow the agents to have
beliefs about language not only about the worlds, then there would be more complex
interactions between the two kinds of modality. In such setting, we would accept that
an agent α can believe that according to a standpoint s something is the case, in which
the uncertainty may be both epistemic and linguistic, in a similar way to the framework
presented in [LT12].
7.3.6 Applications to supporting reasoning about the
forestry domain
In chapter 6 we used the forestry domain to illustrate applications of standpoint logic.
It should be noted that, rather than choosing a contrived or well circumscribed example,
we have chosen a very complex domain for representation and reasoning. There are
different reasons for this. On the one hand, we already gave examples of a more tailored
nature in chapter 5, that were intended to illustrate the expressive capabilities of the
framework and exemplify how to model different phenomena.
In contrast, in chapter 6 we aim to explore the usefulness of the framework in a real-
world scenario, where there are large open problems for representation and reasoning.
Vagueness is indeed known to be pervasive in the spatial domain in general and the
geographical domain in particular. On top of that, the domain of forestry widely reports
the challenges of the SVoNLT even outside of the computational domain. Thus, it is
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clear that analysis of information relating to forestry could benefit from a framework
that enables representation and reasoning in detail about the variable semantics of the
vague terms. This gives us breath to explore the challenges and opportunities that
such a framework would face. Hence, the domain of forestry has many attractions as
an application scenario.
This part of our research has driven us to the exploration of additional problems
of representation, which result in the distinction of three fundamental aspects in which
the semantics of terms referring to geographic objects tend to be vague. These are
the classification, identity and demarcation criteria, all of which seem to be essential to
resolving issues that arise in the interpretation and computational manipulation of geo-
graphic data. Concerns relating to of variability in these criteria can be found scattered
throughout the ontology literature, and in particular in the ontology of geography, and
of course, more specifically still, in the analysis of specifications or definitions of forest
(a wide collection is reported in [Lun02]). Nevertheless, prior research has not system-
atically considered the semantic variability of ‘forest’ in terms of these aspects. Rather,
it has been mainly concerned with difficulties arising at the level of human communic-
ation (i.e. mostly between research teams, administrations and stakeholders): they
discuss terminologies and definitions that are expressed in natural language and used
by humans.
Through the development of the use cases, we have illustrated how issues of vague-
ness in individuation, classification and demarcation arise in the representation of stand-
points associated with different datasets, research communities or organisational stand-
ards, and how we can deal with them using standpoint logic. Although many issues
relating to terminology and definitions can be handled by our framework, others are
difficult to capture. Indeed, the issues of individuation, classification and demarca-
tion are particularly tricky and have been introduced but not explored in great detail
in this thesis. Development in this direction would involve further explication of the
nature of vaguely defined objects (e.g. is there de re vagueness of objects as well as de
dicto vagueness in the descriptions?), and is likely to require certain enrichment of the
semantics that we have given.
Beyond these philosophical considerations, in the use cases of the chapter 6 we
have examined a scenario in which we have an integrated system that allows us to
acquire information from a well established ontology, EnvO, and from a well established
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forest data repository, GFW, and we have taken account of existing pieces of research
reporting the use of such data. Thus, the chapter has illustrated some possibilities
for using the framework in a realistic and complex setting. We acknowledge, however,
that further work with experts in the domain could help us greatly in directing the
capabilities of standpoint logic to better support practical application scenarios.
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